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The HIV/AIDS crisis of the late nineties, and the lack of affordable 
antiretroviral medicines (ARVs) in low and middle-income countries, 
showed that the pharmaceutical patent system was out of balance. The 
public health impact was staggering: 40 million people were infected with 
HIV in the developing world; 24.5 million of them lived in sub-Saharan 
Africa1—and only one in a thousand had access to antiretroviral medicines 
(ARVs). In the developing world, every day over 8,000 people died of 
HIV/AIDS. 
In 1996, effective ARVs had become available in high-income countries. 
However, these ARVs were not, or very sparsely, available in developing 
countries, and then only at very high prices from patent holding 
companies.2 Even when-low priced ARVs became available from Indian 
generic companies in the late nineties, many people living with HIV could 
not access them. In many countries, medicines patents restricted 
procurement agencies such as UNICEF, the International Dispensary 
Association (IDA), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) from distributing generic ARVs. 
Developing countries that tried to improve access to lower priced ARVs 
and or generic ARVs were confronted with trade retaliation by high-
income nations, or legal actions by patent holding companies.3 4 
The HIV/AIDS crisis brought the international community together in 
formulating a response to facilitate access to diagnostics, medicines and 
other tools needed for prevention, treatment, and care for people living 
with HIV. The clear need to make treatments available on a large scale 
drove important policy processes at the international level, leading to 
greater flexibility in the implementation of intellectual property law related 
to medicines, changes to the World Health Organization (WHO) Model List 
of Essential Medicines, and new global approaches to assuring the quality 
of medicines that were needed to treat HIV/AIDS. Countries, together with 
international organisations, also established new international health 
funding mechanisms, such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
(TB) and Malaria, the United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR), and UNITAID.5 As a result, by 2016 19.5 million of the 
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36.7 million people living with HIV had access to ARVs.6 The scale up of 
ARV treatment between 2005-2016 has led to a 48% decline in AIDS-related 
deaths.7 This progress in access to HIV treatment would not have been 
possible without the availability of low-priced generic medicines. 
This thesis describes the solutions that the international community has 
developed to overcome intellectual property barriers to produce and 
disseminate generic medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS; and aims to 
respond to the question whether the solutions developed to address the 
HIV/AIDS crisis can also be deployed to improve access to other, new and 
expensive essential medicines, for example, those needed to provide 
treatment for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, diabetes 
and cardiovascular disease. 
The research question of this thesis is: 
Can intellectual property solutions developed to address the 
HIV/AIDS crisis also be deployed to increase access to other, new 
and expensive essential medicines? 
I. Data sources and methods
This thesis presents the results of an interdisciplinary research project 
combining law and health science. Much of the data presented in this 
thesis, including historical data and political analyses, were collected over a 
period of seventeen years while working on advancing access to essential 
medicines for non-governmental organisations, governments, and the 
United Nations, often in settings that allowed for direct observation of and 
participation in international policy and legal processes.8 The selection of 
the research subjects was largely driven by the need to understand 
problems related to IP and access to medicines, and formulate practical 
legal and policy solutions. This thesis uses the so-called 'AAAQ' human 
rights framework, which identifies availability, accessibility, acceptability 
and quality as essential elements of the right to health, of which access to 
essential medicines is an integral part.9 While legal research is at the heart 
of the research project, the investigations from the health science 
perspective significantly contributed to the overall research, and thus were 
instrumental in identifying legal and policy insights for effective access to 
medicines. 
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II. Research questions 
 
The thesis particularly aims to answer the overarching question: 
 
Can intellectual property solutions developed to address the 
HIV/AIDS crisis also be deployed to increase access to other, new 
and expensive essential medicines? 
 
This question is particularly pertinent in the context of expanding 
treatment to non-communicable diseases,10 and infectious diseases beyond 
HIV, TB and malaria, which require access to expensive and patented new 
essential medicines, such as hepatitis C.11 12 
 
The overall research question can be studied through five more specific 
research questions. These are systematically addressed in chapters 2-7, 
using the human rights framework for essential medicines that describes 
States as primary duty holders to ensure that essential medicines are 
available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality (‘AAAQ’ framework).13 
Each chapter examines a different piece of the international response to the 
HIV crises: legal and policy developments at the international level, the use 
of those legal and policy changes at the national level, developments to 
ensure medicine quality, and access to data on medicines. Finally, this 
thesis ties all these pieces together and analyses possible public health 
approaches to pharmaceutical innovation with the aim of proposing 
approaches to innovation that avoid the development of unaffordable 
essential medicines in the future. 
 
Those five research questions are: 
II. a. How did HIV/AIDS lead to changes in intellectual property law and 
policy? 
 
The availability of low-priced generic medicines is a cornerstone of policies 
designed to secure access to essential medicines. Intellectual property 
protection of medicines can impede access to lower priced generic 
medicines. The World Trade Organization Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health (Doha Declaration) was adopted in 2001 to rebalance the 
rights of patent holders with the rights and duties of countries to protect 
public health and in particular to promote access to medicines for all.14 The 
Doha Declaration describes practical legal tools countries can use, known 
as TRIPS Flexibilities, and signalled international political support to take 
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measures to overcome patent barriers that impeded access to medicines. 
Chapter 2 describes the legal and policy developments that drove the 
changes in the approach to IP and public health. 
II. b. How did the UN guarantee the quality of generic medicines for
HIV?
Quality assurance of medicines is an inherent part of availability and 
accessibility of medicines. ARVs that were produced and that countries 
were willing to purchase could not be made available by the UN and other 
organisations when the quality of the medicines was unknown. The use of 
ARVs of unknown quality can also increase the risk of accelerating the 
development of resistance to HIV treatments, ultimately leading to a 
situation where the medical profession runs out of treatment options. 
Quality assurance of medicines, in accordance with international standards, 
therefore became a requirement of large donors of treatment programs 
such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria.15 For this reason lifting 
intellectual property barriers to accessing medicines alone was not 
sufficient to ensure availability of generic antiretroviral medicines. Quality 
assurance of the products was a second and crucial condition for the large-
scale supply and procurement of generic ARVs. 
Chapter 3 addresses the question: How did the United Nations (UN) 
guarantee the quality of generic medicines for HIV? It examines the 
developments that led to the establishment of the WHO Prequalification of 
Medicines Program (PQP) as well as the achievements of the programme. 
II.c. To what extent have governments used the TRIPS flexibilities in
practice to access lower priced medicines?
When patents form a barrier to the procurement and use of lower priced 
generic medicines, the implementation and use of TRIPS flexibilities may 
be required to produce and access these medicines. Chapter 4 studies the 
question to what extent governments have used the TRIPS flexibilities in 
practice to access lower priced medicines. The purpose of this chapter is to 
document the actual use of TRIPS flexibilities by countries in promoting 
access to medicines during 2001 – 2016 specifically in the procurement of 
medicinces. The chapter offers a more comprehensive overview of the use 
of TRIPS flexibilities than has previously been reported in the literature.16 
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II. d. How does data exclusivity form a barrier to the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities? 
 
Data exclusivity can create additional hurdles, beyond patents, to access to 
medicines. In particular, it may hamper the effective use of TRIPS 
flexibilities which, as is shown in chapter 4, have been important in 
increasing access to HIV medicines. Data exclusivity prohibits a medicines 
regulatory agency from registering a generic equivalent product (to an 
originator product) using the clinical studies submitted by the originator, 
for a certain period of time. This implies that during this period generic 
applicants have to provide their own clinical efficacy and safety data. 
Doing so creates a serious ethical issue because it would require a placebo-
controlled drug trial and thus withholding the proven effective treatment 
from certain patients; in reality such “repeat” studies are never approved. 
As a result, data exclusivity can be a strong barrier to the effective use of 
TRIPS flexibilities. Chapter 5 examines how data exclusivity is regulated in 
the European Union (EU), how it restricts the effective use of TRIPS 
flexibilities, specifically compulsory licensing, and what can be done about 
it. 
 
II. e. How to achieve a public health approach to innovation and access? 
 
A public health approach to innovation of and access to new medicines 
assures that pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) priorities 
match health needs, that new medicines are adapted and available to the 
populations who need them, and that the new products are priced at a level 
the population can afford. A public health approach to R&D is different 
from a commercial approach to R&D, which focuses on developing 
products with the greatest return on investment. Chapter 6 addresses the 
question how to achieve a public health approach to pharmaceutical 
innovation. It describes the shortcomings of innovation incentive 
mechanisms based on market exclusivity (high prices), and concludes with 
recommendations for alternative priority setting and financing models for 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
II. f. Summary Conclusion and Reflection on the Future 
 
The final chapter (Chapter 7) presents a general discussion of the findings 
and recommendations, and elaborates on the overarching question: will the 
practical application of TRIPS flexibilities remain confined to HIV or can 
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the TRIPS flexibilities serve to increase access to pharmaceutical treatment 
for a wider range of diseases, as part of the progressive realisation of the 
human right to health? It also offers further reflections on the future of 
pharmaceutical innovation and access, and the need for further research. 
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Infectious diseases kill over 10 million people each year, more than 90 
percent of whom are in the developing world.1 The leading causes of illness 
and death in Africa, Asia, and South America—regions that account for 
four-fifths of the world’s population—are HIV/AIDS, respiratory infections, 
malaria, and tuberculosis. 
In particular, the magnitude of the AIDS crisis has drawn attention to 
the fact that millions of people in the developing world do not have access 
to the medicines that are needed to treat disease or alleviate suffering. Each 
day, close to eight thousand people die of AIDS in the developing world.2 
The reasons for the lack of access to essential medicines are manifold, but in 
many cases the high prices of drugs are a barrier to needed treatments. 
Prohibitive drug prices are often the result of strong intellectual property 
protection. Governments in developing countries that attempt to bring the 
price of medicines down have come under pressure from industrialized 
countries and the multinational pharmaceutical industry. 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS” or “Agreement”), which 
sets out the minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property, 
including patents for pharmaceuticals, has come under fierce criticism 
because of the effects that increased levels of patent protection will have on 
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drug prices. While TRIPS does offer safeguards to remedy negative effects 
of patent protection or patent abuse, in practice it is unclear whether and 
how countries can make use of these safeguards when patents increasingly 
present barriers to medicine access. 
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 2001 in Doha, Qatar, 
adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (“Doha Declaration” or 
“Declaration”) which affirmed the sovereign right of governments to take 
measures to protect public health. Public health advocates welcomed the 
Doha Declaration as an important achievement because it gave primacy to 
public health over private intellectual property, and clarified WTO 
Members’ rights to use TRIPS safeguards. Although the Doha Declaration 
broke new ground in guaranteeing Members’ access to medical products, it 
did not solve all of the problems associated with intellectual property 
protection and public health.  
 
1 The access problem and intellectual property  
 
A number of new medicines that are vital for the survival of millions are 
already too costly for the vast majority of people in poor countries. In 
addition, investment in research and development (“R&D”) towards the 
health needs of people in developing countries has almost come to a 
standstill. Developing countries, where three-quarters of the world 
population lives, account for less than 10 percent of the global 
pharmaceutical market. The implementation of TRIPS is expected to have a 
further upward effect on drug prices, while increased R&D investment, 
despite higher levels of intellectual property protection, is not expected.3 
One-third of the world population lacks access to the most basic 
essential drugs and, in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia, this figure 
climbs to one-half. Access to treatment for diseases in developing countries 
is problematic either because the medicines are unaffordable, have become 
ineffective due to resistance, or are not sufficiently adapted to specific local 
conditions and constraints. 
Many factors contribute to the problem of limited access to essential 
medicines. Unavailability can be caused by logistical supply and storage 
problems, substandard drug quality, inappropriate selection of drugs, 
wasteful prescription and inappropriate use, inadequate production, and 
prohibitive prices. Despite the enormous burden of disease, drug discovery 
and development targeted at infectious and parasitic diseases in poor 
countries has virtually ground to a standstill because drug companies in 
developed and developing nations simply cannot recoup the cost of R&D 
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for products to treat diseases that abound in developing countries.4 Of the 
1,223 new drugs approved between 1975 and 1997, approximately 1 percent 
(13 drugs) specifically treat tropical diseases.5 
TRIPS sets out minimum standards and requirements for the protection 
of intellectual property rights, including trademarks, copyrights, and 
patents. The implementation of TRIPS, initially scheduled for 2006 by all 
WTO Members, is expected to impact the possibility of obtaining new 
essential medicines at affordable prices. 
Médecins sans Frontières (“MSF”), together with other non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”), formulated the following concerns 
related to TRIPS: 
Increased patent protection leads to higher drug prices.6 The number of 
new essential drugs under patent protection will increase, but the drugs 
will remain out of reach to people in developing countries because of high 
prices. As a result, the access gap between developed and developing 
countries will widen. 
Enforcement of WTO rules will have a negative effect on local 
manufacturing capacity and will remove a source of generic, innovative, 
quality drugs on which developing countries depend. 
It is unlikely that TRIPS will encourage adequate R&D in developing 
countries for diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, because poor 
countries often do not provide sufficient profit potential to motivate R&D 
investment by the pharmaceutical industry. 
Developing countries are under pressure from industrialized countries 
and the pharmaceutical industry to implement patent legislation that goes 
beyond the obligations of TRIPS. This is often referred to as “TRIPS plus.” 
TRIPS plus is a non-technical term which refers to efforts to extend patent 
life beyond the twenty-year TRIPS minimum, to tighten patent protection, 
to limit compulsory licensing in ways not required by TRIPS, or to limit 
exceptions which facilitate prompt introduction of generics.7 
Industrialized countries and World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) offer expert assistance to help countries become TRIPS-
compliant. This technical assistance, however, does not take into account 
the health needs of the populations of developing countries. Both of these 
institutions are under strong pressure to advance the interests of large 






2. Important developments in the debate on access to drugs and 
intellectual property 
 
A number of factors have shaped the debate on TRIPS and access to 
medicines, directly or indirectly impacting the content of the Doha 
Declaration. 
 
A. Big Pharma vs. Nelson Mandela: Trade dispute in South Africa 
 
In February 1998, the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association and forty (later thirty-nine, as a result of a merger) mostly 
multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers brought suit against the 
government of South Africa, alleging that the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90 of 1997 (“Amendment Act”) 
violated TRIPS and the South African constitution.8 
The Amendment Act introduces a legal framework to increase the 
availability of affordable medicines in South Africa. Provisions included in 
the Amendment Act are generic substitution of off-patent medicines, 
transparent pricing for all medicines, and the parallel importation of 
patented medicines.9 
At the start of the litigation, the drug companies could rely on the 
support of their home governments. For its part, the US had put pressure 
on South Africa by withholding trade benefits and threatening further 
trade sanctions, aiming to force the South African government to repeal the 
Amendment Act.10 In 1998, the European Commission joined the US in 
pressuring South Africa to repeal the legislation.11 AIDS activists effectively 
highlighted these policies, profoundly embarrassing then-presidential 
candidate Al Gore. Confronted at election campaign rallies about his 
personal involvement in the dispute, demonstrators accused him of killing 
babies in Africa.12 As a result of increasing public pressure, the US changed 
its policies at the end of 1999. By the time the case finally reached the 
courtroom in May 2000, the drug companies could no longer count on the 
support of their home governments. 
Demonstrators in major cities asked the companies to drop the case; 
several governments and parliaments around the world, including the 
European Parliament, demanded that the companies withdraw from the 
case. The legal action turned into a public relations disaster for the drug 
companies.13 
During the course of the trial it became clear that the most contentious 
section of the Amendment Act was based on a draft legal text produced by 
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the WIPO Committee of Experts,14 a fact that made it difficult for the drug 
companies to maintain the position that the Amendment Act violated 
South Africa’s obligations under international law. Eventually, the strong 
international public outrage over the companies’ legal challenge of a 
developing country’s medicines law and the companies’ weak legal 
position caused the companies to unconditionally drop the case in April 
2001. 
The widely publicized South African court case brought two key issues 
out into the international arena. First, the interpretation of the flexibilities 
of TRIPS and their use for public health purposes needed clarification to 
ensure that developing countries could use its provisions without the threat 
of legal or political challenge. Second, it became clear that industrialized 
countries that exercised trade pressures to defend the interest of their 
multinational industries could no longer exert pressure without 
repercussions at home. 
 
B. US vs. Brazil: The Brazilian AIDS program 
 
Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has offered comprehensive AIDS care, including 
universal access to antiretroviral (“ARV”) treatment. An estimated 536,000 
people are infected with HIV in Brazil, with 203,353 cases of AIDS reported 
to the Ministry of Health from 1980 through December 2000. In 2001, 
105,000 people with HIV/AIDS received ARV treatment. The Brazilian 
AIDS program has reduced AIDS-related mortality by more than 50 
percent between 1996 and 1999.15  In two years, Brazil saved $472 million in 
hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDS-related infections. 
At the core of the success of Brazil’s AIDS program is the ability to 
produce medicines locally. In Brazil, the price of AIDS drugs fell by 82 
percent over five years as a result of generic competition.16 The price of 
drugs that had no generic competitor remained relatively stable, falling 
only 9 percent over the same period. Brazil has also been able to negotiate 
lower prices for patented drugs by using the threat of production under a 
compulsory license.17 Article 68 of the Brazilian patent law allows for 
compulsory licensing, which allows a patent to be used without the consent 
of the patent holder.18 The Brazil AIDS program serves as a model for some 
developing countries that are able to produce medicines locally, and Brazil 
has offered a cooperation agreement, including technology transfer, to 
developing countries for the production of generic ARV drugs.19 
In February 2001, the US took action against Brazil at the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (“DSB”) over Article 68 of the Brazilian intellectual 
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property law. Under that provision, Brazil requires holders of Brazilian 
patents to manufacture the product in question within Brazil—a so-called 
“local working” requirement. If the company does not fulfill this 
requirement, the patent shall be subject to compulsory licensing after three 
years, unless the patent holder can show that it is not economically feasible 
to produce in Brazil or can otherwise show that the requirement to produce 
locally is not reasonable. If the company is allowed to work its patent by 
importation instead of manufacturing in Brazil, parallel import by others 
will be permitted. 
The US argued that the Brazilian law discriminated against US owners 
of Brazilian patents and that it curtailed patent holders’ rights. The US 
claimed that the Brazilian law violated Article 27.1 and Article 28.1 of 
TRIPS.20 Brazil argued that Article 68 was in line with the text and the 
spirit of TRIPS, including Article 5.4 of the Paris Convention, which 
allows for compulsory licensing if there is a failure to work a patent. Article 
2.1 of TRIPS incorporates relevant articles of the Paris Convention. 
The US action came under fierce pressure from the international NGO 
community, which feared it would have a detrimental effect on Brazil’s 
successful AIDS program.21 Brazil has been vocal internationally in the 
debates on access to medicines, and on several occasions, including the G-8, 
the Roundtable of the European Commission, and WHO meetings, Brazil 
has offered support to developing countries to help them increase 
manufacturing capacity by transferring technology and know-how. NGOs 
feared that the US action could have a negative effect on other countries’ 
ability to accept Brazil’s offer of assistance. On June 25, 2001, in a joint 
statement with Brazil, the US announced that it would withdraw the WTO 
panel against Brazil.22 
 
C. The role of NGOs 
 
NGOs have played a key role in drawing attention to provisions of TRIPS 
that can be used to increase access to medicines. One such provision 
pertains to compulsory licensing, which enables a competent government 
authority to license the use of an invention to a third-party or government 
agency without the consent of the patent-holder. The patent holder, 
however, according to Article 31 of TRIPS, retains intellectual property 
rights and “shall be paid adequate remuneration” according to the 
circumstances of the case. The first international meeting specifically on the 
use of compulsory licensing to increase access to AIDS medicines took 
place in March 1999 at the Palais de Nations in Geneva and was organized 
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by Consumer Project on Technology, Health Action International, and 
MSF. Later that year, the same group of NGOs organized the Amsterdam 
Conference on Increasing Access to Essential Drugs in a Globalized 
Economy, which brought together 350 participants from 50 countries on the 
eve of the Seattle WTO ministerial conference. The statement drawn up at 
this conference (“Amsterdam Statement”) focused on establishing a 
working group in the WTO on TRIPS and access to medicines, considering 
the impact of trade policies on people in developing and least-developed 
countries, and providing a public health framework for the interpretation 
of key features of WTO agreements. The working group was to address 
questions related to the use of compulsory licensing to increase access to 
medicines, mechanisms to allow production of medicines for export 
markets to a country with no or insufficient production capacity, patent 
barriers to research, and overly restrictive and anti-competitive 
interpretations of TRIPS rules regarding protections of health registration 
data. In addition, the working group was to examine “burden sharing” 
approaches for R&D that permit countries to consider a wider range of 
policy instruments to promote R&D and to consider the practical burdens 
on poor countries of administrating patent systems. The Amsterdam 
Statement also urged national governments to develop new and innovative 
mechanisms to ensure funding for R&D for neglected diseases. 
The Amsterdam Statement has served as a guide for the work of NGOs 
and other advocates on TRIPS and public health. Many international and 
national NGOs, such as the OXFAM campaign, “Cut the Cost,” the South 
African Treatment Action Campaign, and Act Up, are now involved in 
campaigning for access to medicines. 
 
D. The WTO Ministerial 1999 in Seattle 
 
Though public health and access to medicines did not form part of the 
official agenda in Seattle in the way it would two years later in Doha, the 
issue did receive attention for a number of reasons. First, in Seattle a 
Common Working Paper section on TRIPS contained the following 
proposal: “to issue . . . compulsory licenses for drugs appearing on the list 
of essential drugs of the World Health Organization.”23 Since only about 11 
of the 306 products on the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs are patented 
drugs in certain countries,24 this proposal could have limited the use of 
compulsory licensing, rather than making sure it became a useful tool to 
overcome access barriers, such as prohibitive pricing, caused by patent 
abuse. 
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Then-US President Clinton chose Seattle as the venue to declare a 
change in US policy with regard to intellectual property rights and access 
to medicines. The US government had come under fierce attack from AIDS 
activists because of its policies in South Africa. Under the new policy, the 
US Trade Representative and the Department of Health and Human 
Services would together establish a process to analyze health issues that 
arise in the application of US trade-related intellectual property law and 
policy. In his speech, President Clinton referred specifically to the situation 
in South Africa and the HIV/AIDS crisis, saying that “the United States will 
henceforward implement its health care and trade policies in a manner that 
ensures that people in the poorest countries won't have to go without 
medicine they so desperately need.”25 
In May 2000, President Clinton confirmed the change in US policy by 
issuing an Executive Order on Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and 
Medical Technologies, supporting the use of compulsory licenses to 
increase access to HIV/AIDS medication in sub-Saharan Africa.26 Although 
this policy change contributed to breaking the taboo on the use of 
compulsory licensing in the health field, attention to TRIPS and medicines 
at the WTO was diverted by the collapse of the WTO conference in 
Seattle.27 However, outside the WTO, the debate on access to medicines, 
TRIPS, and compulsory licensing became more intense. 
 
E. Changing attitudes among global players 
 
A number of international institutions and UN agencies contributed to the 
debate on access to medicines and looked into the consequences of stronger 
intellectual property protection as a result of TRIPS for developing 
countries. 
 
I. The World Health Organization 
 
The public health community first raised concerns about the consequences 
of globalization and international trade agreements with respect to drug 
access during the 1996 World Health Assembly. A resolution on the 
Revised Drug Strategy (“RDS”) set out the WHO’s medicines policy.28 The 
WHO resolution on the RDS requested the WHO in paragraph 2(10) “to 
report on the impact of the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
with respect to national drug policies and essential drugs and make 
recommendations for collaboration between WTO and WHO, as 
appropriate.” This resolution gave the WHO the mandate to publish, in 
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1998, the first guide with recommendations to Member States for 
implementing TRIPS while limiting the negative effects of higher levels of 
patent protection on drug availability.29 The US and a number of European 
countries unsuccessfully pressured the WHO in an attempt to prevent 
publication of the guide.30 
At that time, the WHO’s involvement in trade issues was highly 
controversial. The emphasis on public health needs versus trade interest 
was seen as a threat to the commercial sector of the industrialized world. 
For example, in 1998, in response to the draft World Health Assembly’s 
resolution on the RDS and in reference to “considerable concern among the 
pharmaceutical industry,” the European Directorate General for Trade 
(“DG Trade”) of the European Commission concluded: “No priority should 
be given to health over intellectual property considerations.”31 
However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have 
strengthened the WHO’s mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World 
Health Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing 
on the debate over TRIPS.32 The resolutions addressed 1) the need to 
strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs, and 2) the 
need to evaluate the impact of TRIPS on access to drugs, local 
manufacturing capacity, and the development of new drugs. As a result, 
the WHO’s work program on pharmaceuticals and trade now includes the 
provision of policy guidance and information on intellectual property and 
health to countries for monitoring and analyzing the effects of TRIPS on 
access to medicines.33 
 
II. The UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights 
 
The UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights passed a resolution, pointing out the negative consequences for 
human rights to food, health, and self-determination if TRIPS is 
implemented in its current form. The resolution was an initial effort to 
monitor the implications of TRIPS on human rights concerns. Reminding 
governments of the primacy of human rights obligations over economic 
policies and programs, the resolution states that there are “apparent 
conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime embodied in 
TRIPS, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the 
other.”34 Referring specifically to pharmaceutical patents, the resolution 
stresses the need for intellectual property rights to serve social welfare 
needs. 
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III. The United Nations Development Program 
 
In 1999, the United Nations Development Program’s (“UNDP’s”) Human 
Development Report made a plea for re-writing the rules of globalization to 
make them work “for people—not just profits.”35 The report, in particular, 
draws attention to the high cost of the patent system for developing 
countries compared to the unequal distribution of the system’s benefits. 97 
percent of the patents held worldwide are held by individuals and 
companies of industrialized countries, and 80 percent of the patents 
granted in developing countries belong to residents of industrial countries. 
UNDP called for a full and broad review of TRIPS and called upon 
countries not to create an unsustainable burden by adding new conditions 
to the intellectual property system. The report suggested that countries 
present frameworks for alternatives to the provisions of TRIPS and that the 
room for manoeuvring granted in TRIPS be respected in practice. 
 
IV. The European Union 
 
In February 2001, the EU adopted the Program for Action, a program 
which accelerates action on HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in the 
context of poverty reduction. The EU program recognized the potential 
problems of TRIPS and the need to rebalance its priorities. In addition, 
several European Parliament resolutions reflected a shift in support of a 
pro-public health approach to TRIPS.36 As part of this approach, DG Trade 
changed its policy to acknowledge the concerns of developing countries. 
Reflecting this change, DG Trade dropped its objections to the use of 
compulsory licensing to overcome patent barriers to medicine access and 
became an advocate for a global tiered pricing system for 
pharmaceuticals.37 These policy changes are in stark contrast to previous 
European Commission policies, which closely track the pharmaceutical 
industry’s agenda. 
 
V. Other Organizations 
 
Other organizations, such as UNAIDS, the World Bank, the Group of 77, 
and regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, 
added their voice to the debate on TRIPS and access to medicines. 
Unable to turn a deaf ear to the growing chorus of critics of TRIPS and 
its effects on access to medicines, the WTO changed course. In April 2001, 
when proposing a special TRIPS Council session on access to medicines, 
 17 
Zimbabwe—chair of TRIPS Council—said that the WTO could no longer 
ignore the access to medicines issue, an issue that was being actively 
debated outside the WTO but not within it.38 The voices had been heard; 
public health would be featured as a key subject at the Doha Conference. 
 
3. A brief history of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
 
The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO took place in Doha in 2001 
and was a breakthrough in international discussions on TRIPS and access 
to medicines. The WTO Ministerial adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health, which put public health before commercial interests and 
offered much needed clarification in the field of TRIPS and public health. 
 
A. The African proposal for a special TRIPS Council meeting in June 
 
Zimbabwe’s statement on behalf of the “African Group” about the need to 
confront the access to medicines issue initiated preparations for the 
Declaration. Just two months later, in June 2001, the TRIPS Council held its 
first session devoted to TRIPS and access to medicines. It was the first time 
that the TRIPS Council discussed intellectual property issues in the context 
of public health. At that meeting, the African Group proposed issuing 
separate declarations on access to medicines.39 Referring to the devastating 
AIDS crisis in Africa and mounting public concern, Zimbabwe stated: “We 
propose that Members issue a special declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and access to medicines at the Ministerial Conference in Qatar, affirming 
that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement should prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health.”40 
In September 2001, the TRIPS Council devoted another full day of 
discussion to the topic of access to medicines. At this meeting, the African 
Group, joined by nineteen other countries, presented a draft text for a 
ministerial declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. A comprehensive text, 
this proposal addressed political principles to ensure that TRIPS did not 
undermine the legitimate right of WTO Members to formulate their own 
public health policies. The text also provided practical clarifications for 
provisions related to compulsory licensing, parallel import, data protection, 
and production for export to a country with insufficient production capacity. 
In addition, the draft included a proposal for evaluating the effects of TRIPS 
on public health, with particular emphasis on access to medicines and R&D 
for the prevention and treatment of diseases predominantly affecting people 
in developing and least-developed countries. 
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At the meeting, the US, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada 
circulated an alternate draft, stressing the importance of intellectual 
property protection for R&D, arguing that intellectual property contributes 
to public health objectives globally. The text was aimed at limiting the 
flexibilities of TRIPS during crisis and emergency situations. The EU 
circulated its own draft, which proposed a solution to the problem of 
production for exports to fulfil a compulsory license in a country with 
insufficient or no production capacity by allowing production under the 
TRIPS Article 30 exception. 
From the onset of the pre-Doha negotiations, the main point of 
contention was the text proposed by the developing countries: “Nothing in 
the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health.”41 Some developed countries saw this wording as a 
new rule that would override the present rules of TRIPS, which do not 
allow for health exceptions that are inconsistent with TRIPS.42 
The text drafted by the chair of the WTO General Council, Mr. Stuart 
Harbinson, that was the basis for the negotiations in Doha left the issue 
unresolved and instead offered two options for Paragraph 4. The first 
option read: 
Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement 
shall be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
ensure access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the 
right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement which provide flexibility for this purpose. 
 
Whereas the second option offered was: 
We affirm a Member's ability to use, to the full, the provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement which provide flexibility to address public health 
crises such as HIV/AIDS and other pandemics, and to that end, that a 
Member is able to take measures necessary to address these public 
health crises, in particular to secure affordable access to medicines. 
Further, we agree that this Declaration does not add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations of Members provided in the TRIPS 
Agreement. With a view to facilitating the use of this flexibility by 
providing greater certainty, we agree on the following clarifications. 
 
In Doha, for three days the discussions on TRIPS and public health 
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dominated the trade talks. Early on in the meeting it became clear that a 
majority of Members preferred the first option of the Harbinson draft, 
making it the basis for further negotiation. The core supporters of the 
second option included the US, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Canada, and 
Korea. The EU, at this stage, did not take a clear position and claimed it 
was playing the role of “honest broker.” After three days of negotiation 
among the participating Members, a compromise was reached. The 
compromise text, which resulted from negotiations primarily between 
Brazil and the US, read: 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, 
while reiterating our commitments to the TRIPS Agreement, we 
affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.43 
 
This text acknowledges the unmitigated right of countries to take measures 
to protect public health. Thus, if intellectual property rules should stand in 
the way of doing so (for example, in the case of high prices associated with 
patented medicines), countries are allowed to override the patent. 
In Paragraph 5, the Declaration lays out the key measures and 
flexibilities within TRIPS that can be used to overcome intellectual property 
barriers to access to medicines. The discussions at Doha and the Doha 
Declaration itself make it unambiguously clear that the use of compulsory 
licenses is in no way confined to cases of emergency or urgency; in fact, the 
grounds for issuing a compulsory license are unlimited. Members who 
proposed language that would have limited measures like compulsory 
licensing to emergency situations, pandemics, or specified diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS were unsuccessful. In addition, the Declaration leaves Members 
free to determine for themselves what constitutes a national emergency or 
urgency, in which cases the procedure for issuing a compulsory license 
becomes easier and faster. The Declaration also resolves the question of 
whether TRIPS authorizes parallel trade once and for all by noting: “The 
effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to 
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge.”44 
In addition, the Declaration grants least-developed country (“LDCs”) 
Members an extra ten-year extension—until 2016, instead of 2006—to the 
implementation deadline for pharmaceutical product patent protection. 
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The negotiating history illustrates that this outcome was not 
predetermined. Pre-Doha, the US proposed two operative paragraphs, 
which included this extension of transition periods until 2016 for patents on 
pharmaceutical products, as well as offering a moratorium on dispute 
settlement action to sub-Saharan African countries, which do not fall within 
the LDC grouping. The moratorium covered laws, regulations and other 
measures that improve access to patented medicines for HIV/AIDS and 
other pandemics. These proposals were viewed as a “divide and conquer” 
strategy employed by the US to break the cohesion of the developing 
countries45 and the proposal for a moratorium on dispute settlement 
actions was rejected at Doha. The proposal to extend the deadlines for 
LDCs were accepted. The extended deadlines are important because they 
extend the timeframe (until 2016) in which countries may rethink the kind 
of pharmaceutical intellectual property law they want while still being able 
to import and produce generic medicines. 
The Declaration also refers to the as-yet unfulfilled commitment of 
developed-country Members to provide incentives to their enterprises and 
institutions to promote technology transfer to LDCs pursuant to Article 
66.2. The ten-year extension might be of limited value because only LDCs 
will be able to benefit from this provision. Of the 143 WTO members, only 
30 are LDCs, representing 10 percent of the world’s population. The ten-
year extension is also limited to Sections 5 (patents) and 7 (undisclosed 
information) of TRIPS; the extension does not apply to other provisions of 
the Agreement relevant to pharmaceuticals, notably Article 70 (“exclusive 
marketing rights”). Though there seemed to be an understanding among 
the negotiators in Doha that Paragraph 7 implied that LDCs are not 
required to provide “mail box” protection or “exclusive marketing rights,” 
this is not clear from the text of the declaration. Paragraph 7 of the 
declaration refers to pharmaceutical products, which means that LDCs still 
are under the obligation to provide process patents. 
 
B. Other areas of debate 
 
1. Public Health: Most of the language aimed at narrowing the scope of the 
Declaration to health crisis and pandemics46 was replaced with language 
that referred generally to public health. Indeed, the title itself—Doha 
Declaration on Public Health— reflects this shift. 
 
2. Access for All: Some countries objected to the text that countries have the 
right “to ensure access to medicines for all.”47 In particular, Switzerland 
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objected to the wording, but had difficulty defending a position that 
advocated access to medicines for some but not for others. 
 
3. Scope: A point of strong contention was how far-reaching the 
Declaration would be. Some WTO Members feared that the negotiations 
could lead to changes in TRIPS and wanted to include a confirmation that 
the Declaration was purely a clarifying exercise. They borrowed language 
from the WTO Dispute Settlement Process Rules to indicate that the 
Ministerial Declaration would have no formal legal effect to change the 
rights and obligations TRIPS established. 
 
The text did not, however, make it into the final version of the Declaration. 
As a result, one could argue that the Declaration actually does go beyond 
clarifying the already existing rules. A Member can appeal to the 
Declaration and its negotiating history in the event that a Member’s 
legislation, particularly relating to patents in the health field, is challenged 
on the grounds that it is incompatible with TRIPS. 
 
C. Why Doha came to pass 
 
Why was it possible to achieve a declaration on such a contentious issue 
considering that public health hardly played a part in the trade talks two 
years ago? Mike Moore, WTO Director-General, made it clear on the 
opening day of the conference that the TRIPS and health issue could be the 
deal-breaker for a new trade round. Observers point to a number of factors 
that contributed to the success of the negotiations.48 First, the developing 
country Members were extremely well prepared and operated as one bloc. 
Second, the uncompromising positions of western countries such as the US 
and Canada were hard to maintain in light of the anthrax crisis and the 
threat that a shortage of Ciprofloxacine (“Cipro”) might occur. Both the US 
and Canada rapidly expressed their willingness to set aside the patent held 
by the German company Bayer if other solutions could not be found.49 The 
anthrax scare and the threatened shortage of Cipro forced all WTO 
Members to ask how much of a prisoner they want to be of their own 
patent systems. Third, a growing and active international NGO movement 
ensured the issue would be high profile, and that NGOs would monitor 





4. Drug industry response to the WTO Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health 
 
The multinational pharmaceutical industry argued from the beginning that 
a declaration was not necessary because: a) patents are not a problem,50 and 
b) weakening patent protection would have devastating effects on the R&D 
capabilities of the research-based industry. Although the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (“IFPMA”) officially 
welcomed the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, individuals in the 
industry expressed their concerns. Indeed, the US pharmaceutical 
companies asked the USTR to re-open the negotiations even after an 
agreement on the text of the Declaration was reached. 
For more than two years, IFPMA has warned against the dangers of 
compulsory licensing—ever since NGOs started to propose compulsory 
licensing systems to overcome patent barriers. IFPMA’s position has not 
changed. “[C]ompulsory licensing is a threat to good public health by 
denying patients around the world the future benefits of R&D capabilities 
of the research-based industry from which new therapies come.”51 
The generic drug industry welcomed the Declaration, in particular the 
freedom of countries to decide the grounds for compulsory licensing. The 
generic drug industry did express concern about possible unilateral 
pressure to influence countries not to make full use of the Declaration. The 
industry suggested that the advanced WTO Members should commit to the 
Declaration in practice by refraining from exerting unilateral pressure. The 
generic drug contingent expressed disappointment that there was no 
resolution of the issue that arises when a country with limited production 
capacity that issues a compulsory license for a medicine cannot find an 
efficient, affordable, and reliable source of medicines, due to TRIPS 
restrictions on production and export of medicines. After 2005, production 
of affordable medicine will increasingly become dependent on compulsory 
licensing. However production under a compulsory license is restricted to 
production “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.”52 The 
problem is not the compulsory license itself, but the need to allow exports 
from a country where the drug is under patent to a country that has issued 
the compulsory license. 
The generic drug industry expressed further disappointment that the 
Declaration did not offer an interpretation of the data protection issue 
addressed in Article 39.3 of TRIPS.53 The concern here is that an overly 
restrictive interpretation of Article 39.3 will lead to delays in introduction 
of generic medicines, may provide exclusive marketing rights beyond the 
 23 
patent protection term and increase barriers to the registration of generic 
medicines including those produced under a compulsory license. 
 
5. The post-Doha agenda 
 
A key issue that remained unresolved in Doha is how to ensure that 
production for export to a country that has issued a compulsory license, but 
does not have manufacturing capacity, can take place within a country that 
provides pharmaceutical patents. Since Article 31(f) of TRIPS limits 
compulsory licensing to uses which are predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market, further clarification is necessary to ensure that 
countries without production capacity can make use of compulsory 
licensing provisions to the same extent that countries with manufacturing 
capacity can use these provisions. The Doha Declaration acknowledges the 
problem in Paragraph 6: 
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002. 
 
It is increasingly urgent that the production for export issue be resolved. 
Implementation deadlines for some important producing countries are 
quickly approaching, thus further limiting the possibilities of producing 
generic versions of medicines that are protected by patent elsewhere. 
Another flaw of the Doha Declaration is that it does not resolve the 
problem of production for export from markets that provide patents to 
countries that do not grant pharmaceutical patents (and subsequently do 
not grant compulsory licenses). This is of particular importance now that 
the least-developed WTO Members can delay the granting of 
pharmaceutical product patents until 2016. These countries need to have 
access to sources of affordable medicines, which threaten to dry up as the 
2005 deadline for TRIPS implementation is nearing for producing 
countries. 
Another challenge will be to find ways to make the Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public Health operational at the regional and national levels. 
A classic example is the Bangui Agreement, the regional intellectual 
property agreement for francophone Africa, which was adopted in 1977 
and revised in 1999 to ensure TRIPS compatibility, but includes typical 
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TRIPS plus provisions that are not in line with the Doha Declaration. 
At the national level, countries should be encouraged to make full use 
of the Doha Declaration in the process of adjusting national intellectual 
property laws to become compliant with TRIPS. This will require 
substantial advice and technical assistance from institutions like WIPO and 
WTO. While the spirit of the Doha Declaration is to go slowly and to tailor 
intellectual property laws to national needs, the practice has been to 
encourage developing countries to go beyond the minimum requirements 
and speed up the process to become TRIPS-compliant. It will require a 
“culture change” at WIPO and WTO to adjust the type of technical 
assistance to developing countries’ needs. In addition to increasing their 
interaction with countries, WIPO and WTO will have to increase their level 
of collaboration with the public health community, including the WHO, 
which has become heavily involved in trade discussions as a result of the 




The very fact that public health and access to medicines have been singled 
out as major issues needing special attention in TRIPS implementation 
indicates that health care and health care products need to be treated 
differently from other products. By giving countries broad discretion in 
deciding how to counter the negative effects of TRIPS, the Doha 
Declaration may stand for the proposition that public health concerns 
outweigh full protection of intellectual property. 
In fact, the Doha Declaration takes a large step toward ensuring that 
intellectual property protection actually serves the public interest, an 
interest broader than that of the commercial sector. In the years to come, it 
will be important to scrutinize closely whether the results of intellectual 
property protection serve the poor as well as the rich. The Doha 
Declaration lays out the options countries have available when prices of 
existing patented drugs are too high for their populations. But Doha did 
not solve every problem: the lack of R&D investment in new drugs for the 
particular health needs of the poor remains to be addressed.54 
In the Doha process, developing countries and NGOs pointed to 
commercial and public sector neglect of the R&D needs of developing 
countries. Recent studies claim that the R&D cost of a commercial drug 
company per new pharmaceutical product is $802 million.55 The Global 
Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug Development, a non-profit entity for R&D 
of tuberculosis drugs, estimated that the total R&D cost for a new 
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tuberculosis drug, including the cost of failure, is between $115 million and 
$240 million.56 These high R&D costs claimed by the commercial 
pharmaceutical sector pose some key questions that need to be resolved. Is 
the present system for funding R&D the most efficient, and is it sufficient to 
rely on the present intellectual property systems to fuel innovation? 
Clearly, in the area of neglected diseases, the answer is no. 
In an increasingly globalized economy, additional international 
mechanisms need to be developed to address health needs in developing 
countries. MSF and others have proposed a radical shift in the way health 
R&D is financed in particular for drugs for neglected diseases. For example, 
health R&D could be financed based on burden sharing between countries, 
or obligating companies to complete essential medical research. Such a 
proposal might be incorporated into an international treaty on essential 
health R&D. In the end, the challenge for the coming years will be to 
encourage essential health R&D not only for the benefit of some, but for the 
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Since 2000, access to antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV infection has 
dramatically increased to reach more than five million people in 
developing countries. Essential to this achievement was the dramatic 
reduction in antiretroviral prices, a result of global political 
mobilization that cleared the way for competitive production of 
generic versions of widely patented medicines. 
Global trade rules agreed upon in 1994 required many developing 
countries to begin offering patents on medicines for the first time. 
Government and civil society reaction to expected increases in drug 
prices precipitated a series of events challenging these rules, 
culminating in the 2001 World Trade Organization’s Doha Declaration 
on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights and Public Health. The Declaration affirmed that patent rules 
should be interpreted and implemented to protect public health and 
to promote access to medicines for all. Since Doha, more than 60 low- 
and middle-income countries have procured generic versions of 
patented medicines on a large scale. 
Despite these changes, however, a “treatment timebomb” awaits. 
First, increasing numbers of people need access to newer 
antiretrovirals, but treatment costs are rising since new ARVs are 
likely to be more widely patented in developing countries. Second, 
policy space to produce or import generic versions of patented 
medicines is shrinking in some developing countries. Third, funding 
for medicines is falling far short of needs. Expanded use of the 
existing flexibilities in patent law and new models to address the 
second wave of the access to medicines crisis are required. 
One promising new mechanism is the UNITAID-supported Medicines 
Patent Pool, which seeks to facilitate access to patents to enable 
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competitive generic medicines production and the development of 
improved products. Such innovative approaches are possible today 
due to the previous decade of AIDS activism. However, the Pool is 
just one of a broad set of policies needed to ensure access to medicines 
for all; other key measures include sufficient and reliable financing, 
research and development of new products targeted for use in 
resource-poor settings, and use of patent law flexibilities. 
Governments must live up to their obligations to protect access to 





A decade ago, the world prepared to gather in Durban, South Africa, for 
the first International AIDS Conference to be held on the continent most 
devastated by HIV. At the time, the statistics were grim: only one in a 
thousand people living with HIV in Africa had access to AIDS treatment. 1 
Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs were largely available only from the originator 
companies that controlled the patents on these medicines, and came with a 
paralysing price tag of US$10,000 to $15,000 per patient per year.2 
With civil society at the forefront,3 4 5 6 7 8 a joint mobilization of people 
living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV), doctors and nurses, ministries of health, 
developing country and donor governments,9 10 11 12 intergovernmental 
organizations, and pharmaceutical companies13 14 achieved today what most 
delegates at Durban thought impossible: access to ARVs for more than five 
million people in the developing world.15 
This achievement required some essential ingredients: first, civil society 
had to put access to treatment for HIV/AIDS on the global political agenda; 
second, innovative healthcare providers had to demonstrate that delivering 
treatment was safe and effective and thus feasible in resource-poor settings; 
and third, the price of medicines had to come down. Once these ingredients 
were in place, increased funding for ARVs followed, and investment in 
strengthening health systems to deliver treatment and care for all - both 
HIV positive and HIV negative - was made possible. Civil society, 
alongside courageous leaders willing to take risks, made it happen. 
While the achievements have been enormous, huge challenges remain 
to sustain the progress made to date and to meet future needs. 
The past 10 years have shown how ARV treatment can reduce 
HIV/AIDS-related illness and death in developing countries. But in the 
current climate of wavering support for achieving universal access to 
treatment, prevention, care and support - a commitment that Member 
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States made at the UN General Assembly just five years ago,16 17 - it is 
necessary to look ahead to consider how to make an even greater impact. 
Overall, ARVs are still underused relative to need, and they still reach 
people with too much delay. The latest World Health Organization (WHO) 
guidelines for HIV treatment in resource-poor settings recommend that 
people should start treatment when their CD4 cell counts are above 350 
cells/mm3 rather than 200.18 19 Recent guidelines from wealthy countries 
recommend even earlier initiation of ARVs, at a CD4 cell count of 500 
cells/mm3 or above.20 The WHO recommendation is a critical step toward 
improving the efficacy of treatment in developing countries, and is also 
expected to help prevent transmission of the virus.21 However, it also 
means that over 14 million people are now in urgent need of treatment, 
with more than nine million still left empty handed in the waiting room. 
In order to address this challenge, ARVs should be more affordable, 
meet current medical standards, and be developed or adapted for use in 
the contexts where they are needed: that is, in settings with minimal or no 
monitoring available (e.g., for toxicity, viral load, or resistance), where 
refrigeration may be scarce, and where health workers are in short supply. 
 
Patents and access to medicines 
 
What role do intellectual property rules and practices play in this equation? 
The AIDS crisis has radically changed conceptions of and policy 
approaches to patents on medicines. This shift is reflected in changes in 
international treaties, national law, public policies, and the business 
practices of pharmaceutical companies. In order to understand current 
thinking on HIV medicines patents, we need to look back at least to the 
1990s. 
In 1996, a group of health non-governmental organizations (NGOs) met 
in Bielefeld, Germany, to discuss the public health implications of new 
intellectual property rules created by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) was part of the set of treaties that established the WTO in 
1994, and had just come into force in 1995. The negotiations leading to 
TRIPS had been primarily driven by the trade and commercial interests of 
the industrialized nations.22 23 While developing country negotiators were 
able to preserve certain flexibilities in the agreement, such as transition 
periods for implementation in developing countries, overall, TRIPS was not 
focused on public health, and civil society organizations were not part of 
the negotiation process. 
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TRIPS required that all WTO Members, which today number 153, 
provide a minimum standard of intellectual property protection, and was 
enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement procedures. The 
standards for intellectual property protection that were globally 
harmonized through the TRIPS Agreement derived primarily from 
practices in the industrialized countries, where national patent systems had 
evolved over many years. While proponents argued that TRIPS would 
increase foreign direct investment, technology transfer and research in the 
developing countries, critics argued that it would retard industrialization, 
hamper technology transfer and increase the prices of essential goods, such 
as medicines and agricultural inputs.24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
Before TRIPS, pharmaceutical patent policies and practices were 
diverse. For example, many countries did not consider patents on such 
products as medicines and food to be in the public interest. Half of the 98 
countries that were members of the 1883 Paris Convention on the 
Protection of Industrial Property (a major international patent treaty prior 
to TRIPS, now administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization) actively excluded pharmaceutical (product) patenting 
altogether.40 Some countries reduced patent terms on medicines, or only 
made them available for manufacturing processes but not for the end 
product. Even among the wealthy countries, some did not grant product 
patents on medicines until relatively recently: for example, Italy and 
Sweden began granting pharmaceutical patents only in 1978 and Spain in 
1992.41 
TRIPS put an end to this diversity when it required all Members to 
introduce 20-year patents in all fields of technology; in practice, this 
requirement meant that many developing countries had to begin offering 
patents on pharmaceutical products for the first time. Because TRIPS was 
part of the WTO package, countries that wished to remain Members of the 
WTO could not opt out of TRIPS or make reservations to the treaty (unlike 
many other international agreements). The ensuing years saw a wave of 
intellectual property reforms in most developing countries in response to 
TRIPS obligations.42 The policy space that countries once enjoyed to design 
intellectual property systems in line with their development needs had 
been dramatically constrained. 
In the late 1990s, the potential effect of these new intellectual property 
rules on access to medicines was little understood, and interest in 
intellectual property issues among the public health community was still 
rare. The tide begins to turn. 
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In early 1998, 41 drug companies and their representative body sued the 
new democratic post-apartheid government of South Africa over 
amendments made in 1997 to its Medicines Act, which aimed to make low-
cost medicines more readily available. The companies asserted that it was 
neither constitutional nor in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.43 
This lawsuit was brought against the backdrop of the growing AIDS 
crisis. It came two years after the 1996 International AIDS Conference in 
Vancouver, Canada, where the world had learned that highly active 
antiretroviral therapy could transform HIV infection from a disease with a 
certain death sentence into a chronic, manageable condition. However, 
while ARVs were becoming available in the industrialized countries, they 
remained far out of reach of most South Africans and others living in 
developing countries. At the time, South Africa was (and remains today) 
home to the largest estimated number of PLHIV in the world. 
Big Pharma vs. Nelson Mandela shocked the world’s conscience. It was 
a call to action that pulled many different actors onto the stage. 
In 1999, at the United Nations in Geneva, a group of NGOs and AIDS 
activists held a conference on compulsory licensing for HIV medicines. A 
compulsory licence is a way to remedy problems caused by a patent, 
whereby a government body (such as a ministry, court or a statutory 
tribunal) grants a licence to an entity other than the patent holder, allowing 
them to produce the patented product in exchange for “adequate 
remuneration”. It is allowed under the TRIPS Agreement, which sets out 
some procedural requirements but leaves countries free to determine the 
grounds for issuing a compulsory licence. Industrialized countries have 
repeatedly used compulsory licensing, including to purchase low-cost 
medicines. For example, from 1969 until 1992, when Canada changed its 
system as a requirement of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
Canada granted 613 compulsory licences for the production or import of 
generic medicines, leading to some of the lowest medicines prices in the 
industrialized world.44 
(A generic drug is a pharmaceutical product, usually intended to be 
interchangeable with an innovator product.) 
Today there is nothing revolutionary or newsworthy about holding a 
meeting about compulsory licensing and access to medicines, but in 1999, 
the situation was quite different. Discussing compulsory licensing was the 
exclusive domain of specialized intellectual property lawyers. The Geneva 
meeting gathered NGOs and health officials to discuss how flexibilities in 
intellectual property law, such as compulsory licences, could be used to 
increase the availability of low-cost HIV medicines in the developing 
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world. This caused a great deal of concern among patent holders. 
The growing discontent with the public health implications of TRIPS 
culminated at the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle in 1999 with a call 
to “humanize the trade agreements”. Advocates from civil society and 
developing country governments began forming a strong coalition and 
pushed for the use of measures, such as compulsory licensing, to accelerate 
the production and availability of low-cost generic medicines for 
HIV/AIDS, without risk of trade retaliation. At the time, an editorial in the 
Pharmaceutical Executive commented: “Unlikely as it seems, the 
pharmaceutical industry may have reason to thank the demonstrators who 
brought Seattle and the ministerial meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to a standstill. Had the demonstrators not disrupted 
the gathering, the forecast for global pharma might be much cloudier 
(Gopal 2000).” 
The period between the failed Seattle WTO Ministerial conference in 
1999 and the 2001 WTO meeting in Doha saw a number of developments 
that had a profound effect on intellectual property rules and access to 
medicines. 
Developing countries that were at the forefront of providing ARV 
therapy began to experience the consequences of pharmaceutical patents on 
HIV/AIDS drugs. For example, in Thailand and Brazil, patents significantly 
limited the legal space to produce lower-cost generics, resulting in a heavy 
burden on public health budgets. 
Brazil was the first developing country to provide widespread access to 
HIV/AIDS treatment through its national programme; the Brazilian 
programme demonstrated to the world that ARVs could be provided safely 
even with limited toxicity and efficacy monitoring.45 Initially, Brazil’s 
programme heavily relied on the ability to produce lower-cost generic 
versions of ARVs that were not patented in the country. However, like 
many developing countries, in the 1990s, Brazil had come under strong 
pressure from wealthy nations to tighten patent protection, and had 
amended its national laws to begin granting pharmaceutical patents in 1996 
(nine years before it was obligated to do so by TRIPS). The high price of 
patented drugs soon began to consume more and more of the ARV budget. 
At one point in Brazil, three patented medicines (out of a total of 17) took 
up 75% of the AIDS programme’s drug budget.46 47 48 
At the same time that awareness of the public health implications of 
TRIPS was growing, the AIDS crisis also began to attract greater political 
attention at the global level. In 2000, the Group of 8 countries paid 
unprecedented attention to health and the need for action to increase access 
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to medicines. At the International AIDS Conference in Durban, the 
Treatment Action Campaign and its partners organized the Global March 
for Treatment, squarely placing access to ARVs on the political agenda. 
In December of that year, a three-day global summit in Okinawa, 
Japan, on infectious diseases outlined an agenda to prevent the spread of 
AIDS, provide treatment and care for those affected, and to enhance 
research and development (R&D) for international public goods, including 
new approaches to managing intellectual property. Most importantly, 
Okinawa witnessed the birth of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund), a result of extensive efforts by 
many advocates to create a new approach to financing the international 
response to HIV and other global health concerns. 
Under increasing public pressure to support rather than hinder efforts 
to combat the epidemic, the patent-holding pharmaceutical industry began 
to respond. In May 2000, five pharmaceutical companies announced the 
Accelerating Access Initiative, offering price discounts on HIV-related 
medicines and diagnostics in developing countries.49 However, even with 
the discounts, the prices offered through this initiative paled in comparison 
with the prices offered by generic producers.  
Generic production of ARVs in India was possible because the Indian 
Patents Act did not provide for patents on pharmaceutical products until 
required by TRIPS to do so in 2005. Generic producers competed with each 
other to make medicines at prices far lower than the originators. Indian 
firms also combined two or more medicines into one pill in “fixed-dose 
combinations” (FDCs), a type of innovation facilitated by the absence of 
medicines product patents. FDCs are thought to facilitate patient 
adherence, reduce the risk of resistance and simplify supply chain 
management.50 51 52 Although Indian firms were not the only ones that 
produced three-in-one FDCs, they were the first to produce the FDC of 
stavudine, lamivudine and nevirapine, a first-line regimen recommended 
by WHO at the time. 
The convenience for patients and relatively low price of this FDC has 
helped make it the mainstay of many treatment programmes in developing 
countries. 
In high-income countries, the patents on these three medicines were 
controlled by three different companies (Bristol Myers Squibb, 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim), which raised the transaction 
costs of developing this product. In high-income countries, the first three-
in-one FDC comprised of medicines on which patents were controlled by 
different companies was the combination of tenofovir, emtricitabine and 
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efavirenz (brand name Atripla). First approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration in 2006, this product has become the standard of care in 
recent recommendations in high-income countries. 
In early 2001, the Indian generic medicines producer, Cipla, offered a 
triple-combination of ARVs for US$350 per patient per year - or HIV/AIDS 
treatment for less than a dollar a day.53 At the time, originator prices 
through the Accelerating Access Initiative were generally not publicly 
announced, and eligibility was restricted to a limited list of developing 
countries.54 The lowest publicly announced originator price for the same 
combination of drugs offered by Cipla was about $1000 at the time, but 
countries negotiated case-by-case with originator companies for price 
discounts, with wide variation in prices by country.55 56 In contrast, Cipla 
publicly offered its price to all countries. Cipla’s dramatic price reduction, 
which received widespread media attention, hammered the message home 
that many of the multinational drug companies were abusing their market 
monopoly in the face of a catastrophic human disaster. It also drew 
attention to the effects of generic competition in bringing drug prices 
down. India quickly was becoming the “pharmacy of the developing 
world”. 
Also in 2001, controversy had broken out over the cost of the drug 
stavudine (also known as d4T), which came to a head on the Yale 
University campus in March. Stavudine was developed by researchers at 
Yale University, which held the patent on the drug. The price of the generic 
version of stavudine in South Africa was 34 times less than the price of the 
brand-name product from Bristol Myers Squibb, but the patent prevented 
its use in South Africa. Under pressure from researchers, students and 
access advocates, Yale renegotiated its licence with Bristol Myers Squibb to 
ensure the availability of generic stavudine in developing countries.57 58 
Meanwhile, the Medicines Act court case in South Africa was 
progressing. In early 2001, an amicus curiae brief filed by the AIDS Law 
Project on behalf of the Treatment Action Campaign put the spotlight on 
access to ARV treatment and brought the matter to the international stage. 
In April 2001, after a global public outcry that built on the Treatment 
Action Campaign’s legal intervention and domestic advocacy campaign, 
the drug companies dropped their case against the South African 
Government. The landscape had dramatically changed. 
Access to medicines and the need to revisit the patent rules that govern 
them had become part of a larger political agenda, and was no longer the 
exclusive domain of trade negotiators or intellectual property lawyers. 
In November 2001, governments at the WTO Ministerial Conference, in 
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an unprecedented move, adopted the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health. The Doha Declaration made clear that the TRIPS Agreement 
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive 
of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.”59 
This landmark event represented the first significant push back to the 
relentless march to strengthen private intellectual property rights without 
regard for societal consequences in poor countries. 
 
Implementing the Doha Declaration 
 
The 500-word Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health has been 
essential in making lower-cost generic versions of patented medicines 
available on a large scale. 
In 2003, the WTO adopted the “August 30th decision” in an attempt to 
find a remedy for legal barriers to exporting sufficient amounts of 
medicines produced under a compulsory licence, and to ensure that 
countries that rely on import for their medicines supply could benefit from 
compulsory licences. Most developing countries do not have domestic 
manufacturing capacity for ARVs. Although some argued that the absence 
of ARV patents in a number of African countries meant that intellectual 
property did not pose a barrier to HIV treatment, this perspective did not 
take into account the industrial reality that patents in a few producing 
countries (such as India) could hinder access to generic medicines in scores 
of importing countries.60 61 While the solution that was adopted is deeply 
flawed and should be revised, the proposed TRIPS 31bis amendment, 
which has yet to come into force, is the sole amendment agreed since 1994 
not only to TRIPS itself, but to the full set of WTO agreements. Public 
health concerns in general, and the AIDS crisis in particular, made this 
happen. 
On 1 December 2003, WHO and the Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS declared the lack of HIV/AIDS treatment to be a global public 
health emergency and announced the launch of a drive to get three million 
people on ART by 2005; this was the “3 by 5” campaign. The political 
momentum of the campaign, combined with newly available funding from 
governments, the Global Fund and the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), allowed countries to begin purchasing HIV/AIDS 
medicines in significant volumes. 
By 2010, such purchases were predominantly generic drugs.62 For 
example, by 2008, 95% (by volume) of the global donor-funded ARV 
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market was comprised of generics, primarily from India.63 The generic 
proportion of PEPFAR-purchased ARVs grew from 15% to 89% from 2005 
to 2008, with estimated savings to PEPFAR totalling $323 million over the 
four-year period.64 How did countries manage the potential barriers posed 
by patents? While Thailand and Brazil’s compulsory licences for ARVs in 
2006 and 2007 have been widely publicized, it is perhaps less widely 
known that over 60 developing countries have procured lower-cost 
medicines on a large scale using TRIPS flexibilities.65 66 67 Of these, 17 low- 
and middle-income countries have issued compulsory licences or 
government use licences to gain access to generic ARVs, including, most 
recently, Ecuador in 2010. Twenty-six out of 32 least developed country 
WTO members authorized importation of generic ARVs with reference to 
Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, which allowed them to delay 
granting or enforcing medicines patents until at least 2016.68 However, 
some countries, such as South Africa, have yet to make use of such 
flexibilities. 
In other cases, the policy space for countries to use such flexibilities is 
being constrained by stringent intellectual property requirements that 
exceed TRIPS and are contained in bilateral or regional free trade 
agreements, investment treaties and/or WTO accession agreements.69 
Middle-income developing countries that are seen as potentially lucrative 
emerging markets, in particular, have been subject to strong bilateral 
pressure from industrialized countries to refrain from using TRIPS 
flexibilities. Despite these persistent pressures, however, the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities to access generic medicines has been widespread and represents 
a major normative and policy shift from 2000. 
Many countries could import generic ARVs, largely because India 
could produce and export them.70 There was great concern in the public 
health community when India had to begin granting pharmaceutical 
patents in 2005 under its TRIPS obligations. However, the Indian 
Parliament incorporated public health safeguards in its Patents Act, 
including strict patentability criteria and the possibility for anyone to 
oppose the granting of patents. PLHIV supported by the Lawyers 
Collective used these safeguards successfully to oppose patents on 
HIV/AIDS medicines that did not fulfil the patentability criteria that India 
had adopted. A challenge to these provisions by one drug company 
(Novartis), which did not receive a patent for its cancer drug (Glivec), was 
rejected. 71 72 73 
Companies have also responded to patent challenges by agreeing to 
voluntary licences to their patents. For example, GlaxoSmithKline and 
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Boehringer-Ingelheim expanded their voluntary licences in South Africa as 
part of a settlement reached after the AIDS Law Project, acting on behalf of 
the Treatment Action Campaign and others, had filed a successful 
complaint with the South African Competition Commission.74 75 Companies 
have also made voluntary licences available in response to the threat of 
non-voluntary measures, such as compulsory licences and patent 
oppositions.76 Such licences are critical because they can encourage robust 
competition among drug manufacturers; competition drove down first-line 
regimen prices by 99% over the past decade, from $10,000 to as low as $67 
per patient per year.77 
In short, the AIDS crisis has been an engine for change. These changes 
extend beyond the field of intellectual property and access to medicines, 
and also include: 
• Increasing political attention for global health well beyond HIV 
and AIDS 
• Strengthening the role of civil society in decision making in health 
policy 
• Bringing about new financing mechanisms, such as the Global 
Fund, PEPFAR and UNITAID, whose beneficiaries go beyond HIV 
and AIDS Catalyzing other innovative approaches to financing 
development, such as the “Robin Hood tax”78 
• Expanding healthcare delivery through task shifting from doctors 
to nurses and/or community health workers79 80 
• Empowering patients through treatment literacy, and putting 
PLHIV at the centre of their own treatment 
• Catalyzing the establishment of access strategies by the 
pharmaceutical industry 
• Establishing the WHO Prequalification Programme, which helped 
create the market for low-cost generics by providing quality-
assurance and a level playing field for competitors81 
• Improving the standard of care for chronic conditions in resource-
limited settings. 
 
Changing approaches to R&D 
 
The HIV/AIDS crisis and AIDS activists also impacted the way R&D for 
new medicines is carried out. Since the 1980s, when the US National 
Institutes of Health was investing in the development of the first AIDS 
drugs, PLHIV developed scientific expertise on the virus, clinical trials, 
research methods and promising candidates for drug development. For 
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example, activists demanded greater freedom to decide which risks they 
were willing or unwilling to take with experimental therapies, and 
challenged what they saw as the slow pace of regulatory decisions at the 
US Food and Drug Administration.82 In addition, by calling into question 
the legitimacy of global intellectual property rules and their impact on 
access to medicines in developing countries, the AIDS crisis also helped to 
spur new thinking on how to generate R&D that would meet the needs of 
the world’s poor. 
A patent can be understood as a type of social contract: in exchange for 
exclusive rights, patent holders are expected to provide benefits, such as 
innovation, to society. If, however, these benefits are not forthcoming or 
not widely available, the contract is not being fulfilled.83 In the conventional 
model, R&D priorities are driven primarily by the potential profitability of 
the market for a medicine. This means that the health needs of those who 
do not comprise a sufficiently attractive market - because they are too poor 
or too few - will be neglected. 
Between 1975 and 2004, of the 1556 new chemical entities marketed 
globally, only 20 (1.3%) new drugs were for tropical diseases and 
tuberculosis, diseases that account for 12% of the total disease burden.84 In 
2006, the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and 
Public Health concluded that “there is no evidence that the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries will significantly boost 
R&D in pharmaceuticals on Type II and particularly Type III diseases. 
Insufficient market incentives are the decisive factor.”85 (Type II diseases 
are incident in both rich and poor countries, but with a substantial 
proportion of the cases in poor countries. Type III diseases are those that 
are overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing countries.) 
A number of new initiatives have been launched to address the 
problem of insufficient research into the neglected diseases. These include 
more than two dozen public-private product development partnerships, 
such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative86 and a “priority review 
voucher” from the US Food and Drug Administration, awarded for the 
development of a new pharmaceutical for a neglected tropical disease (the 
voucher can be applied to any new drug application to speed up regulatory 
review time).87 88 At the global level, two years of intergovernmental 
negotiations culminated in the 2008 Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, adopted at the 2008 
World Health Assembly.89 
The search is on for new ways to generate needs-driven medical 
innovation that will meet the needs of both the world’s rich and poor. 
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Indeed, the crisis in innovation is not limited to developing countries or 
neglected diseases alone. While globally, the level of patent protection has 
increased over the past 20 years, the rate of pharmaceutical innovation has 
fallen, with an increasing number of “me-too drugs” of little or no 
therapeutic gain. Prescrire International found that 68% of the 3096 new 
products approved in France between 1981 and 2004 offered “nothing 
new” over previously available medicines. Furthermore, an analysis of 
more than 1000 new drugs approved by the US FDA between 1989 and 
2000 found that more than three-fourths have no therapeutic benefit over 
existing products.90 
While patents can provide incentives for innovation if sufficient market 
prospects exist, granting too many intellectual property rights may also 
impede rather than accelerate innovation by creating a “tragedy of the anti-
commons.”91 92 At the same time, the high prices of medicines that result 
from the current innovation system raise ongoing access barriers and 
serious ethical concerns. 
Furthermore, recent improvements in access to first-line ARVs should 
not mask the need for additional research in this field. The gold standard 
three-in-one FDC (of tenofovir, emtricitabine and efavirenz) still cannot be 
used during early pregnancy because of the potential first trimester 
teratogenicity of efavirenz. In addition, the current widely used regimen 
(which is nevirapine-based) is not suitable for treatment in the early stages 
of HIV infection due to increased toxicity. 
While tuberculosis (TB) remains the most frequent opportunistic 
infection of HIV/AIDS, using ARVs in combination with TB drugs is still a 
challenge. Regimens for patients for whom first-line therapy is failing are 
still expensive, inconvenient and carry side effects and potential 
interactions with multiple other drugs, making their use impractical. 
Economic incentives are insufficient for the industry to develop child-
friendly drug formulations. Finally, implementing WHO’s new 
recommendations for earlier initiation of ARV therapy in both children and 
adults will require an expanded drug formulary geared towards 
addressing a generalized epidemic. Products should ideally be heat stable, 
require minimal monitoring, and offer simplified dosing and other features 
that facilitate adherence. 
How can we address these interrelated problems of market-driven 
R&D priority setting, declining innovation and high medicines prices? A 
number of new proposals have been put on the table, and are being 
debated and/ or pilot tested, including: rewarding innovation based on 
therapeutic value; prize funds to attract new “solvers” to a problem; 
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guaranteeing markets for end products; open-source collaborative drug 
discovery; and an R&D treaty.93 94 95 96 97 98 99 While a full discussion of these 
proposals is beyond the scope of this article, and many cannot be fully 
evaluated for years to come, it is worth pointing out several lessons from 
the experience of HIV/AIDS. 
First, competitive production of medicines has consistently proven to 
be the most powerful and reliable way to reduce drug prices to their lowest 
sustainable levels.100 101 New innovation models that can “de-link” the 
market for medicines production from the market for R&D - such that R&D 
costs do not need to be recuperated through high prices but are rewarded 
through other mechanisms - hold the promise of helping to address 
affordability issues.102 
Second, public involvement in and funding for research plays a key 
role in accelerating scientific progress. Governments need to invest 
sufficiently in medical R&D. For example, additional funding is needed to 
conduct further research on promising tenofovir-containing vaginal 
microbicides to reduce the risk of HIV transmission - a product that offers 
the important benefit of being woman-initiated and controlled.103 
Third, PLHIV engagement played a central role in overcoming both 
innovation and access barriers with respect to treatment for HIV/AIDS. 
New approaches to generating innovation and ensuring widespread access 
to the fruits of scientific progress should prioritize the engagement of 
people directly affected by a disease. 
 
The “treatment timebomb” 
 
With all of the progress of the past decade in scaling up access to ARVs, 
what is the problem? Unfortunately, the challenges ahead are formidable 
and many. 
First, the cost of treatment is increasing again because new ARVs are 
likely to be more widely patented in developing countries and thus more 
expensive. Even with the high patentability standards implemented in 
India and other countries, some of the new ARVs are likely to be patented. 
Without production sources, the countries that rely on importation will 
find it hard to source low-cost medicines. In addition, patents on individual 
medicines can make it more difficult to develop new FDCs. 
Second, increasing numbers of people will need access to new-
generation ARVs: an expanded drug formulary is urgently needed. In 
addition, about two-thirds of people in need of treatment still do not 
receive first-line medicines today. ARV prices, particularly in some middle-
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income developing countries, can still put them out of reach of the people 
who need them. There is wide variation in the voluntary licensing practices 
of the patent-holding companies, and such licences too often come with 
limitations that hamper the full effect of generic competition and the ability 
to develop FDCs. 
Third, advances in research on newer drugs and combinations need to 
be available worldwide. For example, tenofovir is a promising newer drug 
that is finally becoming available in resource-limited settings, but 
experience on how to use it without monitoring or in specific populations 
(e.g., people with renal damage) is lacking. To avert such situations, 
research should be carried out in the specific contexts, and taking into 
account the specific co-morbidities of the target populations where 
medicines are needed. Some drugs, such as raltegravir, elvitegravir or 
rilpivirine, are promising, but long-term follow up regarding adverse 
events is lacking, and the feasibility of their use for treating TB co-infected 
patients is unclear at this stage. 
Fourth, the policy space to produce or import generic versions of 
patented medicines is shrinking in some developing countries. Stringent 
intellectual property provisions exceeding TRIPS requirements ("TRIPS-
plus”) have been negotiated into free trade agreements between 
industrialized and developing countries, and/or investment and WTO 
accession agreements. Measures, such as patent term extensions, data 
exclusivity, patent-registration linkage and border enforcement 
requirements, can all delay access to generics by lengthening, strengthening 
or broadening monopolies on medicines.104 105 106 107 In addition, some 
agreements contain measures that confuse legitimate generics with 
counterfeit medicines; such policies can undermine public health by 
restricting access to affordable, quality-assured generic medicines.108 109 110 111 
112 Countries that enter into agreements that undermine access to medicines 
are arguably violating their international human rights obligations.113 114 
Fifth, we are faced with a serious financial crisis that risks setting back 
the treatment achievements of the past 10 years. 
 
In July 2009, the United Kingdom All Party Parliamentary Group on AIDS 
called this situation a “treatment timebomb” and called for “political 
activism” to “ensure that the next generation of drugs is available to the 





New approaches to managing intellectual property: the Medicines Patent 
Pool 
 
We need to go further than where we are today. We need expanded use of 
the existing flexibilities in patent law and new models to address the 
second wave of the access crisis. Without generic competition, prices for 
newer drugs will not come down the same way that they did for the first 
generation of medicines. One promising new mechanism is the Medicines 
Patent Pool, established with the support of UNITAID. 
UNITAID is a new financing mechanism based on a small solidarity 
levy on airline tickets, and is supported by 29 countries, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, NGOs and communities. Its mission is to increase access 
to treatment for HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria by making markets work better 
for health. UNITAID has raised approximately US$1.5 billion, and seeks to 
be innovative in the way that it both raises and spends funds.116 117 
It is UNITAID’s overarching principle to make markets work better for 
health that made it a natural birth-place for the Medicines Patent Pool 
Initiative, which became operational in mid-2010. The idea for an HIV 
medicines patent pool was first launched at the 2002 International AIDS 
Conference in Barcelona, Spain, by James Love from Knowledge Ecology 
International. He had studied the US airplane patent pool that was 
established in 1917 by the US Government to overcome patent barriers to 
the mass production of airplanes needed for the military.118 He suggested 
doing the same for HIV medicines patents. 
The Medicines Patent Pool is a response to the changed global 
intellectual property environment in which medicines are being more 
widely patented in developing countries. It is built on the principle of 
relying on market competition to bring medicines prices down. However, 
robust competition is possible only if licences are available. The Pool is 
expected to work as follows: 
Patent holders will make licences available through the Pool that will 
allow others to produce low-cost generic versions of patented ARVs for use 
in developing countries. It will be important that the licences cover as many 
developing countries as possible, both to maximize public health benefit 
and to ensure economies of scale in generic drug production. The licences 
are also intended to facilitate the development of FDCs and other 
formulations adapted for use in resource-poor settings, such as special 
formulations for treating children, by ensuring that patents do not block 
generic companies or product development initiatives from carrying out 
follow-on R&D. 
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Companies that receive licences from the pool will pay royalties on 
their sales to the patent holders. The Pool will be a systematic and 
predictable way of making voluntary licences available, offering legal 
certainty to all parties involved. No change in international or national law 
is required for the Pool to work; what is required is a change in mindset 
from the patent holders, without whose collaboration this initiative cannot 
succeed. In other words, the Patent Pool will work only if patent holders 
are willing to collaborate to make their intellectual property available to the 
Pool. Several major leading patent holders have expressed an interest and 
willingness to engage with the Pool. 
In addition, companies have increasingly adopted voluntary licensing 
practices as part of their access policies; voluntary measures, such as the 
Pool, may provide an attractive alternative to non-voluntary measures for 
patent holders, and can be understood as one outcome of the decade-long 
evolution in approaches to managing intellectual property and access to 
medicines. In September 2010, the US National Institutes of Health became 
the first patent holder to licence its patents (related to a class of ARVs) to 
the newly established Medicines Patent Pool.119 
Despite these recent developments, the Pool faces many challenges and 
many key factors have yet to be determined.120 121 122 123 124 Nevertheless, it 
provides a clear illustration of the considerable normative shift that has 
taken place regarding how intellectual property should be handled relative 
to access to medicines and the central role played by the AIDS crisis in 




New approaches to achieving innovation and access to medicines are 
possible today because of the previous decade of activism that demanded a 
change in the way we approach intellectual property and public health. The 
political and civil society mobilization catalyzed by HIV/AIDS was at the 
forefront of these changes. But three warnings merit attention at this point. 
First, initiatives such as the Pool are only one approach to addressing 
access issues, and must be seen as complements to a broad set of other 
policies that are needed to ensure access to medicines for all. The Pool is 
not a panacea, and governments must live up to their responsibilities to 
protect the health of their populations. 
Second, overcoming intellectual property barriers to innovation and 
competitive production is critical, but is only one piece of the complex 
machinery required to ensure that we achieve our shared objective of 
46 
universal access to treatment, care and prevention services for HIV/AIDS. 
Improving access to medicines also requires addressing regulatory issues, 
strengthening procurement and supply chains, and establishing 
pharmacovigilance systems, among other measures. In particular, sufficient 
levels of funding are critical. Without a market for even the lowest-cost 
medicines, we cannot expect that anyone will be ready to develop and 
produce these products. 
Third, while there may be progress in key aspects of HIV treatment, 
needs for the development of new products (such as microbicides) and 
access to medicines for other diseases remain immense. For example, 
treatment is often unavailable in many developing countries for both acute 
infectious diseases and chronic diseases, such as diabetes and cancer.125 126 127 
Progress against one disease should not allow us to be complacent, nor 
should it overshadow the scale of ongoing unmet needs. 
The struggle for improved access to medicines has been and will be a 
continuous fight, sometimes an uphill battle, and not always easy to win. 
But the lessons of the past 10 years show what can be achieved if we 
mobilize. 
We are at a crucial point in time: not only do we need to protect what 
has been achieved, but we also need to be ambitious and go further. It is 
feasible that with better-adapted, more affordable ARVs, we can double or 
triple the number of people on treatment without doubling or tripling the 
cost. We can also ensure that people have access to better and better- 
tolerated medicines. 
High prices simply cannot be legitimate grounds for withholding 
lifesaving treatment from people. Access to medicines is a fundamental 
human right,128 129 which puts the obligation on all of us to do all we can to 
ensure that it is fully realized. 
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Abstract 
Problems with the quality of medicines abound in countries where 
regulatory and legal oversight are weak, where medicines are 
unaffordable to most, and where the official supply often fails to reach 
patients. Quality is important to ensure effective treatment, to 
maintain patient and health-care worker confidence in treatment, and 
to prevent the development of resistance. In 2001, the WHO 
established the Prequalification of Medicines Programme in response 
to the need to select good-quality medicines for UN procurement. 
Member States of the WHO had requested its assistance in assessing 
the quality of low-cost generic medicines that were becoming 
increasingly available especially in treatments for HIV/AIDS. From a 
public health perspective, WHO PQP’s greatest achievement is 
improved quality of life-saving medicines used today by millions of 
people in developing countries. Prequalification has made it possible 
to believe that everyone in the world will have access to safe, effective, 
and affordable medicines. Yet despite its track record and recognized 




In 1977, the World Health Organization (WHO) published the first Model 
List of Essential Medicines (Essential Medicines List, EML). The EML 
assisted health authorities in selecting products for primary health care. It 
introduced the idea that some medicines are more important than others. 
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Many later considered the first EML ‘a revolution in public health’.1After 25 
years, WHO made an equally important decision to prequalify medicines. 
WHO Prequalification of Medicines Programme (PQP)’s greatest 
achievement is sustained improved quality of life-saving medicines used 
today by millions of people in low- and middle-income countries. The 
historical background of this WHO programme, how it developed over the 
last 13 years, its main achievements, and some of the challenges ahead are 
the subject of this article. We conclude with recommendations for the 
programme’s future. 
The quality of medicines can help ensure effective treatment, maintain 
patient confidence in treatment, and prevent development of resistance. 
These problems are particularly prevalent in countries where regulatory 
oversight is weak (in about one third of low- and middle-income 
countries), where prices make medicines largely unaffordable to patients, 
and where official supply channels fail to reach patients.2 In 2001, so that 
United Nations (UN) procurement would select medicines of assured 
quality, WHO established the PQP. A review of the regulatory and 
procurement environment at that time helps one understand why such a 
programme was needed. 
Most international procurers doubted that Indian drug regulatory 
authorities could verify the quality of medicines. Yet India produced most 
generic medicines used in developing countries. Moreover, fixed-dose 
combinations (FDCs) of antiretroviral (ARVs) medicines and paediatric 
ARV formulations from India had no originator equivalents (medicines 
made and regulated in high-income countries), constituting another 
regulatory assessment challenge. Often national and international 
procurement organizations could not guarantee quality because their 
quality-assurance systems were limited in scope. WHO Member States 
requested WHO to assist procurement organizations by assessing the 
quality of increasingly available low-cost generic medicines. 
 
Given its mandate to set international pharmaceutical norms and 
standards, WHO was suited for this role. Initially WHO focused first on 
low-cost generic versions of medicines to treat HIV, tuberculosis (TB), and 
malaria. The programme evolved and expanded to increase the availability 
of safe and effective medicines of quality by covering: 
• essential medicines for reproductive health, diarrhoea, and 
neglected tropical diseases (NTDs); 
• quality control laboratories; 
• active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs); 
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• review of clinical research used to prove equivalence of generic 
medicines with their comparators; and 
• capacity of medicines regulators and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in developing countries of Africa and Asia; 
 
The WHO PQP has prequalified over 200 products for treatment of 
HIV/AIDS.3 Of 8 million people receiving treatment for HIV in 2012, 6.5 
million were receiving WHO-prequalified ARVs (Box 1).4 
 
Box 1: Timeline: WHO PQP. 
 
2001 (February): The Indian generic medicines manufacturer Cipla announces triple-
ARV AIDS treatment for $350 ppy 
2001 (March): WHO establishes the PQP 
2001 (November): WTO adopts the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health  
2002 (January): Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria created 
2002 (April): WHO publishes first list of 41 approved formulations of ARVs and other 
medicines used in the treatment of HIV, and at the same point WHO includes for 
the first time 12 ARV medicines in its EML 
2003 (January): US PEPFAR approved by Congress 
2003 (December): the first triple FDC for HIV treatment prequalified  
2003 (December): WHO and UNAIDS announce the 3 by 5 Campaign  
2004 (January): US FDA’s Tentative Approval mechanism established  
2004 (April): WHO PQP expands to include testing sites 
2004 (April): Scientific and technical principles for fixed dose combination drug 
products drawn up at the meeting of interested parties held in Botswana 
2004 (May): WHO PQP delists an ARV for the first time 
2005 (June): The WHO Expert Committee on Pharmaceutical Specifications adopts a 
regulatory guideline for assessment of fixed-dose combinations. 
2006 (September): UNITAID established as a new mechanism for the purchase of 
medicines for HIV,TB, and malaria financed by a tax on airline tickets 
2006: WHO PQP includes medicines for reproductive health 
2007: WHO PQP includes one medicine for use in pandemic influenza  
2008: WHO PQP includes zinc for the management of acute diarrhoea  
2008: UNITAID decides to fund the WHO PQP with a 5-year grant  
2010: WHO PQP begins to prequalify APIs 
2011: WHO and US FDA, also WHO and EDQM confirm confidentiality agreements that 
enable the exchange of confidential information and avoid repetition in 
assessments and inspections 
2013: WHO prequalifies first medicine for treatment of a NTD (lymphatic filariasis) 
2013: WHO merges its prequalification activities for diagnostics, medicines, and 
vaccines into one programme 
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The Global Health Environment Around the Turn of the Century 
 
Neither national governments nor donors placed quality assurance of 
essential medicines high on their agendas. WHO estimated that only one 
third of regulatory agencies met standards; the rest lacked resources, 
procedures, and enforcement capacity. UNICEF, the International 
Dispensary Association (IDA), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), were 
large international not-for-profit suppliers of essential medicines for 
national programmes and faith-based facilities. Their supplier selection and 
quality assurance mechanisms were generally considered adequate, and 
many bilateral donors and WHO programmes used their services. 
In 2000, only one in a thousand people living with HIV in Africa had 
access to treatment.5 Highly active ARV treatment was available in wealthy 
countries. Thus AIDS changed from a death sentence into a manageable 
chronic disease. However, the drugs (ARVs) were available only from 
originator companies, who controlled the patents. They produced small 
quantities carrying paralysing price tags – US$10 000–$15 000 per person 
per year (ppy).6 
Civil society and health professionals joined forces and campaigned for 
access to HIV treatment, adequate resources, and flexibility in patent rules 
– the last to enable production of generic ARVs. Controversies ensued over 
patents on ARVs following the introduction of new global rules on 
intellectual property (IP), international requirements to tighten national 
patent law. These patent restrictions largely prevented UNICEF, IDA, and 
MSF from distributing generic ARVs made in India. 
In 1995, following creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) came into force. TRIPS is a WTO agreement and laid out minimum 
standards for IP protection, including an obligation to provide 
pharmaceutical product patents of at least 20 years.7 Such patent protection 
did not exist in most developing countries. In 2001, the WTO Ministerial 
Conference, to facilitate access to low-cost generic medicines, discussed 
making implementation of IP standards in developing countries flexible. 
In November 2001, the Ministerial Conference adopted the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. Could TRIPS obligations be 
rebalanced with the need to protect public health, particularly with respect 
to affordable medicines? 
The Doha Declaration affirmed the sovereign right of governments to 
take measures to protect public health, including the use of compulsory 
licensing and parallel importation. Compulsory licensing enables a 
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competent government authority to license the use of a patented invention 
to a third-party or government agency without the consent of the patent 
holder. The holder of the compulsory license pays a royalty (adequate 
remuneration) to the patent holder. Parallel imports are cross-border trade 
in a patented product, without the permission of the manufacturer or 
publisher. Parallel imports take place when there are significant price 
differences for the same item in different markets. 
 
The Declaration also allowed least developed countries not to grant or 
enforce pharmaceutical product patents before 2016, taking away patent 
barriers to importing generic medicines from India. In 2002, this 
implementation deadline was extended to July 2021. These measures have 
become known as the ‘TRIPS flexibilities’. When the Indian drug firm Cipla 
announced in 2001 that it could supply triple-therapy ARVs for less than a 
dollar a day, it was evident that the role of emerging generic medicines 
producers would grow and become a key element of the response to 
demand for greater access to HIV treatment. 
In January 2002, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria was 
established after the endorsement of the G8 in 2001. It struggled to use its 
funds wisely. For new generic medicines, the Fund and other donors 
needed assurance that quality was acceptable. Although not yet a high-
profile issue, Fund staff understood the dangers for their new organization 
if large sums were spent on medicines of unknown or substandard quality 
or used for expensive branded products only. 
The case of TB medications was especially alarming. In 1999, WHO had 
received the disturbing results of a small pilot study by a research group in 
South Africa on the quality of FDCs for first-line (directly observed 
treatment, short-course, (DOTS)) treatment of TB (PB Fourie, personal 
communication 11 December 2013). Simple quality control tests had 
showed that the FDC tablets contained rifampicin, the key component of 
the combination, leading programme managers to believe that tablets met 
quality standards. Sophisticated testing, however, showed that in 6 out of 
the 10 samples, the rifampicin was not absorbed by the intestines of the 
patient, and was therefore clinically useless. If representative, the results 
suggested that more than half the world’s TB patients were receiving DOTS 
treatment without its most important component. Poorer treatment 
outcomes and increased resistance would result. The results were never 
published but passed on under confidential cover to the relevant regulatory 
agencies to act upon. The studies convinced WHO staff that there were 
serious problems with the quality of TB drugs used in public programmes. 
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Better quality assurance was needed, although most donors and health 
workers were unaware of the problems. These findings underlay WHO’s 
critical decision to start a quality assurance programme for essential 
combination medicines for TB. 
The new fixed-dose combination AIDS tablets produced by generic 
companies in India needed quality assurance. Most regulators in generic 
drug manufacturing countries – India, South Africa, and China – and in 
potential recipient countries had no experience with these ‘new’ products. 
This problem demanded a quick solution as the originator medicines were 
extremely expensive and the recommended treatments were not available 
in patient-friendly combination tablets. In India, patents did not prevent 
generic companies from developing fixed-dose combination of ARV drugs 
from different originators. Could inexpensive and more convenient 
products from India be trusted and did they have the same efficacy and 
safety profile as the originator products? National regulators in recipient 
countries, UNICEF, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) wanted 
to know. They requested WHO’s expert opinion. 
WHO could not immediately answer these questions. Thus WHO 
created a review process to apply assessment criteria used by stringent 
regulatory agencies to determine product safety, efficacy, and quality. The 
term ‘prequalification’ (PQ) refers to the outcome: after WHO approval, a 
product is deemed ‘prequalified’ to participate in UN procurement tenders. 
Products that have received approval by a stringent regulatory agency are 
already eligible for procurement. 
 
The Development of the WHO PQP 
 
Since 1996, the senior pharmaceutical advisers of all UN agencies – WHO, 
UNICEF, and Word Bank – had met every 6 months in the ‘Interagency 
Pharmaceutical Coordination’ (IPC) group, to coordinate their medicine 
policies and to ensure that their agencies complement rather than duplicate 
each other in the medicines components of their country support 
programmes. A recurrent IPC discussion topic was the wide divergence 
between UN agencies in quality requirements. 
The new prequalification programme fits this interagency 
environment. In 2001, the IPC accepted and endorsed the WHO/UN PQP as 
a UN interagency collaboration project. IPC wanted to streamline quality 
standards and policies on medicine procurement at WHO, UNICEF, World 
Bank, and later the Global Fund and UNFPA. 
The medicine prequalification programme approach was not new. The 
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Expanded Programme on Immunization established proof of concept over 
30 years. WHO tested and approved all children’s vaccines supplied by 
UNICEF. Prequalification was new for medicines and new in that WHO 
decided to approve medicine products even from countries where 
regulatory agencies were not up to international standards. (For vaccines to 
be prequalified, the national regulatory agency had to be pre-qualified as 
well). 
The new prequalification programme first took on fixed-dose 
combination medicines for TB, responding to the alarming rifampicin 
study. However, the global TB community and the Global Drug Facility 
that focuses on TB were slow to accept the study’s results. They continued 
to procure medicines without sufficient quality assurance procedures. In 
the meantime, the Global Fund had been established and global attention 
shifted towards HIV/AIDS. WHO too decided to shift pre-qualification 
attention to medicines for HIV/AIDS (Box 2). 
Verifying quality of medicines may appear a non-controversial activity, 
but early on the WHO PQP was criticized harshly, especially by high-
income countries. Its principal critics maintained that WHO should not 
help commercial generic producers gain access to new markets, 
presumably at the expense of ‘research-based companies’. 
In 2002, WHO published its first list of 41 approved formulations of 
ARVs and other HIV medicines. The International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, a trade organization representing the 
interests of large pharmaceutical companies, was quick to question whether 
WHO’s assessment standards were sufficiently strict. They warned against 
counterfeit and substandard medicines.8 
On 1 December 2003, WHO and UNAIDS declared the lack of 
HIV/AIDS treatment to be a global public health emergency. They 
launched the ‘3 by 5’ campaign, to get three million people on anti-
retroviral treatment (ART) by 2005. The political momentum of the 
campaign, combined with new funding from governments, the Global 
Fund, and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and later 
from UNITAID, allowed countries to begin purchasing HIV/AIDS 
medicines in large volumes. Yet to optimize buying power and cover all 
patients needing treatment, the price of the ARVs would have to be 
lowered. 
Everyone recognized FDCs as an important advance in HIV/AIDS 
treatment, particularly for resource-poor settings where the ‘one pill twice a 
day’ regimen would help increase adherence to treatment, reduce the risk 
of developing resistance, and simplify the supply chain.9 10 Indian firms 
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were the first to produce a FDC of a WHO-recommended first- line 
combination, although not the only ones to produce triple FDCs.11 The price 
of the first generic triple combination by Cipla was less than $140 ppy. The 
combination of lamivudine, stavudine, and nevirapine – compounds 
developed by three different originators – was sold under the name 
‘Triomune’. 
 




1. WHO lists for possible prequalification specific products with their recommended 
strength and presentation (tablet, injection, syrup). A product may be listed if it 
appears on the biennial WHO EML, or when a product is recommended in a new 
WHO treatment guideline and the maker has applied to put it on the next EML. 
(These are typically reviewed every 3–4 years). 
2. WHO then includes the product on an Invitation to Manufacturers to Submit an 
Expression of Interest (EOI) List for Product Evaluation that it publishes on the 
WHO/PQP Website. 
3. Any manufacturer of a product on that EOI may apply to have the product 
evaluated for inclusion in the WHO List of Prequalified Medicinal Products. To 
apply, each manufacturer must submit information to enable the international 
assessment teams convened by WHO to evaluate the product’s quality, safety, and 
efficacy. Submissions include comprehensive data on quality, safety, and efficacy, 
including details about the purity of all ingredients used in manufacture, stability of 
the finished products – tablets, capsules, oral liquids – in tropical climates, plus 
results of in vivo bioequivalence tests. These tests in healthy volunteers must prove 
that the product has the same absorption in the body as the originator product. The 
manufacturer must also open its manufacturing sites to inspection to assess 
compliance with WHO Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). (To avoid duplication, 
WHO also recognizes recent inspections carried out by stringent regulatory bodies). 
The WHO Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations 
adopts standards and procedures for prequalification based on the principles and 
practices used by the world’s leading regulatory agencies. 
4. A global team of assessors from developing and developed countries evaluates the 
data presented, and if satisfactory, dispatches a WHO inspection team of experts 
(also from developing and developed countries) to inspect the manufacturing site 
for compliance with GMP. If applicable, the team also examines the contract 
research organization that performed clinical testing relating to the product. The 
clinical testing must have been conducted in compliance with GCP and GLP. If the 
manufacturer’s product made at the inspected site meets all these standards, it 
may be added to the WHO List of Prequalified Medicinal Products.  
(Source: http://apps.who.int/prequal/) 
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Brand-name companies set the price of a similar combination, using single 
tablets – six pills per day – at a minimum of $562 ppy in developing 
countries. Because a three-in-one ARV product for first-line treatment, as 
recommended by WHO, was not manufactured by any research-based 
company, it had never been assessed or approved by any stringent 
regulator. Research-based companies were testing and producing only 
combinations of their own patent-protected products – not necessarily the 
best combinations from a medical perspective. The triple FDCs, produced 
only by generic companies, came to symbolize the great savings that 
generics could achieve. WHO’s prequalification of Cipla’s first generic FDC 
of three ARVs, a ground-breaking move, brought an important innovation 
to resource poor countries. 
Prequalification of a first generic FDC provoked a global debate about 
WHO’s role in making generic HIV/AIDS medicines accessible in 
developing countries. The new combination lacked an originator equivalent 
as a reference. Regulatory standards for FDCs, in general, were also 
lacking. WHO found itself in uncharted territory. A number of industry-
based groups were quick to condemn the prequalification of triple FDCs, 
arguing that because triple FDCs did not exist as originator products, safety 
and efficacy comparisons could not be made and new clinical trials should 
be performed.12 13 As the three compounds in the FDC were still under 
patent in many countries, this provoked further criticism. Some questioned 
the legality of WHO’s move.14 
The US administration of George W. Bush insisted on buying only 
originator branded products for its programmes. It defended this policy by 
referring to concerns about the quality of generics approved by WHO.15 The 
head of the United States PEPFAR, Randall Tobias, a former CEO of Eli 
Lilly, publicly questioned the rigour of WHO’s PQP. He told the Associated 
Press: ‘Maybe [FDC] drugs are safe and effective. Maybe these drugs are, in 
fact, exact duplicates of the research-based drugs [sold in the United 
States]. Maybe they aren’t. Nobody really knows’. He added that the 
United States does not want to contribute to an increase in ARV drug 
resistance because of ‘widespread or inappropriate’ use of the treatments. 16 
US refusal to accept WHO-prequalified AIDS medicines provoked 
responses from care providers dependent on access to lower-cost generic 
ARVs, as well as from politicians seeking to make life-saving medicines 
available in the developing world.17 18 
A breakthrough on the use of FDC ARVs came in March 2004 at a 
conference in Gaborone, Botswana. Co-sponsored by UNAIDS, WHO, the 
Southern African Development Community, and the US Department of 
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Health and Human Services, it focused on the safety, efficacy, and quality 
of FDCs, whether from innovator or generic sources. It tried to provide 
urgently needed guidance on the development, evaluation, and/or use of 
combination products for HIV, malaria, and TB. It also tried to encourage 
development of paediatric FDC formulations.19 Drug regulators of 23 
countries, care providers, NGOs, government officials, industry, treatment 
advocacy groups of people living with HIV, and UN agencies, gathered to 
draw up this guidance.  
In a great success for WHO, the conference’s guidance for the future 
regulation of FDCs confirmed the regulatory principle, proposed by WHO, 
that if three separate medicines have successfully been used clinically in 
combination therapy, there is no need for new clinical trials of an FDC of 
the same medicines in the same dosages.20 The only proof needed is that 
each of the compounds in the combination tablet achieves the same serum 
levels as did the original products when given separately. This principle, 
subsequently confirmed by WHO’s expert committee, implied that 
establishing bio-equivalency (BE) in such cases would be sufficient to 
determine interchangeability with the originator products given separately. 
This agreement between the leading regulators of the world paved the way 
for rapid approval of ARV combinations based on product quality and BE 
grounds alone. Had new clinical trials been required, market entry of 
generic FDCs would have been delayed for several years, (or even a decade 
for TB, where the relapse rate is an essential measure of efficacy). The 
meeting also gave many stakeholders the opportunity to rally and secure 
US Government support of procurement and use of generic ARVs.21 22 
The July 2004 report of the United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO) helped change US policy on the use of generic ARVs. The GAO 
identified serious problems for PEPFAR funding recipients caused by a 
lack of procurement guidance. Thus GAO recommended that the US 
Global AIDS Coordinator explicitly specify what activities PEPFAR was 
permitted to fund in national treatment programmes that use ARV drugs 
not approved for purchase by the Office.23 Unfortunately, the US 
Government was not yet ready to accept the WHO PQP and announced, 
with the support of the US Global AIDS Coordinator’s Office, that it would 
establish its own review process for generic and other ARV drugs to be 
procured with PEPFAR money. 
This ‘United States Food and Drug Administration (US FDA) Tentative 
Approval mechanism’ duplicated the WHO PQP. The global community 
quickly recognized it as a competitor to the WHO PQP that could 
undermine further development of WHO PQP.24 For most developing 
 65 
countries, however, WHO remained the only international agency with a 
global mandate to establish pharmaceutical standards for quality, efficacy, 
and safety, including the scientific justifications necessary to establish the 
bioequivalence of products. In 2004, supporters of WHO PQP sought to 
bolster the programme through a World Health Assembly resolution on 
HIV/AIDS that included a paragraph calling for strengthening of WHO’s 
prequalification project. The resolution asked that inspection and 
assessment reports on the listed products, aside from proprietary and 
confidential information, be made publicly available.25 Transparency of the 
WHO PQP has proved essential in creating and maintaining confidence 
among buyers, funders, and users of the approved medicines. 
 
A Crisis of Confidence 
 
Days after the heated debate in the Assembly, and while the WHO 
Executive Board was still meeting to discuss next steps, WHO was 
confronted with information that threatened to inflict severe damage on 
WHO PQP’s credibility. Following an informal warning and a follow-up 
inspection at Cipla’s manufacturing plant in India, inspectors reported to 
WHO’s headquarters by telephone from India that the bioequivalence 
studies for a key prequalified ARV product were seriously deficient. The 
inspectors suspected them to be fraudulent. Inspectors had not found 
proven lack of bioequivalence, but there was simply no good evidence of 
bioequivalence. WHO’s strict standards for bioequivalence studies, 
including inspection of the organizations that had performed the studies on 
the maker’s behalf, tracked recently adopted European guidelines. At the 
time, these were stronger than those of any other regulatory body. The 
subtle difference between ‘proof of lack’ and ‘lack of proof’ later created 
confusion among regulators, health workers, and patients. 
The information created a difficult situation for WHO. Only four 
originator and four generic ARV products had been prequalified. Besides 
pressure from some rich countries that objected to prequalified generic 
products, the activist community criticized WHO for having colluded with 
industrialized country interests to make the quality standards so high that 
generic products manufactured in low- and middle-income countries were 
largely excluded from prequalification. 
Technically, it was clear that the Cipla product had to be delisted until 
its bioequivalence had been properly established. However, immediate 
publication by WHO, during the Board meeting, risked inflaming and 
derailing ongoing political discussions as the evidence appeared to show 
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that generic products might be inherently unreliable. Was the justification 
for the entire prequalification programme flawed? Not publishing the 
information immediately, and later being exposed as having withheld 
damaging knowledge to protect a generic product, despite lack of proof of 
its quality and efficacy, would support allegations that WHO promoted 
generic medicines without regard to quality problems. 
WHO postponed publication of its findings until it received written 
confirmation from the inspectors. This gave WHO just enough time for the 
Executive Board to complete its meeting and for the delegates to travel 
home, avoiding an immediate and almost certainly acrimonious debate. 
Then, before publicly delisting the Cipla product, WHO informally told the 
treatment activist community and civil society organizations, asking them 
not to use the information to further attack the programme (see, for 
example, a message from Hogerzeil, H., Director of the Department of 
Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy at the WHO to Internet mailing lists: 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2004-September/006896.html, 
accessed 18 November 2013). The medical humanitarian organization MSF 
commented that being told about the flaws in the prequalification process 
demonstrated the programme’s strength. ‘MSF supports the WHO 
Prequalification Project and believes that on-going monitoring by the WHO 
is a sign of an efficient process. The rigour of this process ensures that 
companies are always striving to improve their assessment of quality’.26 
MSF’s statement helped counteract those who saw the delisting as an 
opportunity to criticize the programme as a whole. 
WHO described the decision to delist the Cipla product as ‘short-time 
pain for long-term gain’. The public delisting sent a shockwave through the 
Indian generic industry, and gave a clear signal that quality standards 
would continue to be demanded of all products submitted for evaluation. 
In November 2004, insistent WHO requests for confirmation of the proper 
bioequivalence testing of its ARVs also led Ranbaxy Laboratories, another 
generic maker, to withdraw of several products from WHO’s prequalified 
products list.  
Very few prequalified generic products remained for the treatment of 
HIV. Cipla did not submit genuine bioequivalence studies for its products. 
(In later years, Cipla once again became an important supplier of quality-
assured, low-cost ARVs.) Regulators, health workers, and patients found it 
difficult to understand why essential ARVs were withdrawn by WHO 
based on quality standards not yet applied to any other medicines in any 
jurisdiction. Many national AIDS programmes were seriously frustrated 
and confused by the withdrawal of essential products and struggled to find 
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alternative solutions. UNICEF refused a consignment of specially labelled 
ARV products that had already been shipped. An editorial in The Lancet 
though, hailed WHO’s move, stating that ‘…it shows that this little known 
part of WHO is effective and has teeth that can bite rapidly’.27 
The strength and independence of WHO medicines prequalification 
seemed to gradually diminish political opposition to the programme. The 
only remaining opposition comes as occasional complaints from ministers 
of health that the WHO PQP is too slow or too strict, that it makes it hard 
for their national generic industries to meet requirements. 
Ultimately, opposition to WHO PQP served to strengthen it. Yet two 
positive factors also helped it survive and grow: donor support and 
purchasing power. WHO began PQP with small amounts of donor funds 
not earmarked for a particular purpose. Then the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation recognized the power of the prequalification concept and 
provided steady support for the programme. Since its inception in 2006, 
UNITAID has also supported the programme. Its generous 4-year 
commitment for 2009–2012, now extended into 2013 and perhaps further 
for 2014–2016, secured the programme when WHO’s own resources were 
not equal to the demands from Member States and other stakeholders. 
The most important factor in the survival and growth of the WHO PQP 
was the Global Fund’s quality assurance policy for medicines procurement. 
Its policy restricts use of the Fund’s immense purchasing power to 
products approved by stringent regulatory authorities or prequalified by 
WHO. This policy came out of the IPC process designed to harmonize 
international procurement quality standards among UN agencies. Later 
UNFPA adopted a similar policy. As a result, the public sector market for 
non-prequalified medicines for AIDS, malaria and, later, TB and 
reproductive health medicines shrank. Companies were obliged to get 
stringent regulatory approval or WHO prequalification to compete in the 
international market (Box 3). 
 
Current Activities and Achievements of the WHO PQP 
 
Since its establishment in 2001, the WHOPQP has prequalified more than 
350 finished pharmaceutical products (FPPs). Only 20 products have been 
removed from the list, most upon request from the manufacturer. The 
original focus was prequalification of medicines for treating HIV/AIDS, TB, 
and malaria. In 2006, this range was expanded to cover medicines for 
reproductive health, in 2007 to cover a medicine for pandemic influenza, 
and in 2008 to cover zinc for the management of acute diarrhoea in 
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children.30 More recently, the Programme has started to evaluate the quality 
of medicines for treating NTDs. (For the 17 diseases identified as NTDs by 
WHO see: http://www.who.int/neglected_ diseases/ diseases/en/). 
Box 3: Relationship with the US FDA tentative approval programme. 
 
The time required for prequalification can vary enormously and depends 
on the quality of dossier and the manufacturer’s experience with stringent 
evaluation. Today WHO prequalification of a medicine can take as little as 
3 months, if the data presented are complete and demonstrate that the 
product meets all required standards. If a manufacturer responds quickly 
to questions from the assessment team, prequalification can be more rapid. 
WHO’s fastest prequalification of a generic was 6 weeks. 
In 2010, WHO started to prequalify APIs – the essential building blocks 
of medicines.31 In 2013, the WHO PQP approved 23 APIs. 
Testing sites – medicine quality control laboratories and commercial 
contract research organizations that perform bioequivalence studies – have 
been inspected since 2004. These inspections ensure that sites meet 
standards for good laboratory practice (GLP) and good clinical practice 
(GCP). 
A complete listing of prequalified products by disease category is 
available on the WHO Website http://apps.who.int/prequal/query/Product 
Registry.aspx).  The programme’s annual budget today is $15 million. 
The list of prequalified medicines has become a vital tool for any 
Generic producers did not seek the approval of the US FDA for their ARVs because patents 
prevented them from marketing their products in the United States. Hence, the US rules that 
prevent it from spending PEPFAR money on medicines not approved by the US FDA were 
essentially a rejection of generic ARVs in favour of US companies’ brand name products. 
However, some US politicians realized that PEPFAR’s resources would not stretch far if they 
had to be spent on expensive branded medications. 
In 2004, the US FDA, rather than providing expertise to the WHO PQP and in order to break 
through this deadlock, created its own mechanism for prequalifying medicines to be used for 
the treatment of HIV in developing countries and procured with US funds.28 The so-called US 
FDA Tentative Approval System also assessed overseas generic products for use by US-funded 
programmes, and paved the way for PEPFAR procurement of generic medicines. No generic 
FDCs were approved until 2006, delaying by two years use of WHO recommended regimens by 
PEPFAR recipients.29 
US FDA Tentative Approval was for HIV medicines only. No similar approval process was 
established for products to treat other diseases. In the President’s Malaria Initiative, WHO 
prequalification is relied upon. Now USAID has agreed to accept WHO/PQ as a quality 
standard, aligning itself with the Global Fund and UN interagency quality policies. In 2011 and 
after long discussions, WHO and US FDA reached an agreement that enabled them to 
exchange confidential information and thus avoid repeated assessments and inspections. 
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agency or organization purchasing of medicines in bulk, whether at 
country or international level, as demonstrated by the Global Fund. The 
WHO PQP has prequalified 85–90 per cent of market of ARVs, malaria, and 
TB medicines for the Global Fund, UNICEF, and UNITAID. It is widely 
used by NGOs and others, such as national procurement agencies. It helps 
assure that scarce resources for health stretch further and are not spent on 
products of unknown quality, safety, and efficacy. (Table 1)  
 
Table 1: WHO prequalified finished pharmaceutical products(FPPs) per year 
 
WHO prequalified FPPs per year 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
HIV 29 18 22 23 18 27 
Tuberculosis 5 7 5 7 19 17 
Malaria 6 3 1 1 10 7 
Reproductive health 0 3 5 3 0 10 
Influenza 0 6 1 0 0 0 
NTD 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Zinc 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
WHO Prequalification and National Regulators 
 
The programme promotes interaction and close collaboration with and 
between national drug regulatory agencies, in both developing and 
wealthy countries. The legitimacy of the WHO PQP’s decisions derives in 
part from this collaboration, and from its solid and transparent procedures 
and standards. The standards come out of an international consensus 
process conducted with Member States. The process concludes with review 
and adoption by the WHO Expert Committee on Specifications for 
Pharmaceutical Preparations. Transparency builds confidence. The WHO 
PQP goes beyond the current information sharing practices of national 
drug regulators. 
The Programme has raised the bar for quality assurance. Its standards 
are recognized and promoted by others, helping expand quality medicines 
production. Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) licenses, for example, oblige 
producers to play by the WHO PQP’s rules.32 
WHO PQP assessments have always been managed and led by WHO, 
but they are executed by designated assessors and inspectors from WHO 
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Member States. The Programme also trains regulatory personnel and 
manufacturers from low- and middle-income countries. On-the-job 
involvement in dossier assessment and site inspections are offered each 
year to selected regulatory personnel from low-income countries. Training 
programmes for medicines regulators and manufacturers reach about 1300 
participants annually, the most extensive in the world.33 
In 2011, WHO developed a procedure to promote accelerated approval 
by national regulatory authorities of products already prequalified by 
WHO, reducing duplication of regulatory effort. The procedure speeds up 
access to markets and patient access to treatment. In total, 15 countries are 
now testing the procedure on two products.34 The East African Community 
(EAC) relies on the WHO PQP regulatory format and standards for 
regional regulatory harmonization. The EAC medicines regulatory 
harmonization project serves as a model for the continent-wide African 
Medicines Regulatory Harmonization Initiative spearheaded by the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development.  
To build capacity, especially for regulators from developing countries, 
in 2007 WHO created a rotating position at the WHO headquarters in 
Geneva. National regulatory assessors and inspectors work for 3 months in 
Geneva getting first-hand experience with WHO PQP, also interacting with 
other WHO units and departments that have roles in medicines regulation. 
 
Prequalification and Innovation 
 
WHO promotes and supports a public health approach to innovation in 
several ways. Recent editions of the WHO EML,35 and the two WHO 
reports on Priority Medicines for Europe and the World of 200436 and 
2013,37 identified missing essential medicines, medicines that should exist 
but do not, such as ARV combinations for children, zinc tablets for the 
treatment of diarrhoea, and injectable long-term contraceptives. These 
reports encourage innovation in neglected areas. 
Early in product development, the WHO PQP can specify what 
regulatory requirements will ultimately be applied to the newly developed 
products – data on safety and product stability, for example – avoiding 
delays and conserving resources of not-for-profit drug development 
partnerships and others developing products. 
Finally, WHO prequalification publishes an independent assessment of 
the product, making it eligible for procurement through international 
funding. It then supports rapid regulatory approval in recipient countries. 
Rapid uptake of a new product encourages innovation. 
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Saving Lives and Saving Money 
 
From a public health perspective, WHO PQP’s greatest achievement is 
improved quality of key medicines used by millions of people in 
developing countries. In a study of 12 958 ARV purchase transactions 
between 2002 and 2008, Brenda Waning concluded that five ARVs 
recommended by WHO in 2003 constituted 98 per cent of the ARVs 
purchased in 2004–2006. The price of the major FDCs decreased from $484 
per person in 2002 to $88 in 2008. Purchases of new ARVs recommended by 
WHO in 2006 increased 16–20 times in the 2 following years. By 2008, 85–88 
per cent of the ARVs procured by PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and UNITAID 
were prequalified.38 
The programme has saved money both directly and indirectly. In 2006, 
the Clinton Health Access Initiative and McKinsey estimated WHO PQP 
contribution to increased public access to low-cost quality generics. On the 
basis of the use of first-line ART in Africa since 2004, every dollar invested 
in the prequalification programme saved $200 in public medicine 
procurement.39 The programme has maintained this positive benefit/cost 
ratio: in 2009 the estimated return on investment was $170 of savings for 
every dollar spent on prequalification. 
Saving for PEPFAR from buying generics has also been sizeable. A 
report by PEPFAR, Supply Chain Management Systems (SCMS), and 
USAID concluded: ‘$1.1 billion in taxpayer money [had been] saved [over 
six years] by procuring generics rather than branded ARVs’.40 
 Use of generics effectively doubled the number of patients who could 
be treated for the same funds. PEPFAR’s products were qualified through 
the US FDA fast track system. Would the US FDA system have been 
created without WHO PQP? Perhaps the indirect impact of the programme 
may be as great as its direct impact. 
All global health donors would seem to favour WHO prequalification. 
Yet WHO PQP’s funding continues to depend on the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and UNITAID. The two contributed 80–90 per cent of the 
WHO PQP budget in 2013. Money strapped WHO could not help pay for 
the WHO PQP. A narrow funding base brings risks, including donor- 
driven priority setting. UNITAID’s mandate, for example, to focus on HIV, 
TB, and malaria41 is fine, but from a public health perspective, other 
priorities for prequalification exist, such as insulin and low-cost medicines 
for chronic diseases. 
To establish financial sustainability for WHO PQP, WHO has 
introduced a fee-based system whereby companies applying for 
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prequalification of their products may be charged a fee. However, will this 
fee-based mechanism jeopardize WHO PQP’s full independence? 
 
The Future of the WHO Prequalification Programme 
 
The recent revision of the WHO HIV treatment guidelines, recommending 
treatment initiation when CD4 cell count falls to 500 cells/mm3 or less 
(instead of 350 cells/mm3) means that 26 million people in low- and middle-
income countries are eligible for ARV treatment compared with 10 million 
under the 2010 guidelines.42 Continued access to low-cost quality ARVs in 
FDC formulation remains critical. 
How long will the prequalification programme be needed, and how 
long will it need public funding? The simple answer to that question is: as 
long as UN agencies procure medicines for low- and middle-income 
countries; or until the WHO PQP is no longer needed to provide assistance 
to national regulatory agencies that lack capacity to assess the quality of the 
medicines their countries produce or import. However, that day is still far 
in the future.43 
A more nuanced response is also possible. The WHO PQP has always 
improved both the quality of generic first-line ARVS produced in low- and 
middle-income countries, and the capacity of their national regulators to 
assess the quality of these products. A long list of internationally approved 
products indicates a mature market for these medicines. The WHO 
prequalification programme has become less urgent, as regulators in 
producing countries or in regional regulatory centres of excellence can now 
manage the assessment. This is where WHO PQP has taken us farthest. The 
situation is stable unless new domestic manufacturers enter the market or 
programmes recommend new first-line medicines. 
Less far along are therapeutic groups for which very few products have 
been prequalified (for example, new first-line ARV combinations, second-
line TB medicines, zinc, misoprostol, and oxytocin), or where un-assessed 
or substandard products are still widely procured (for example, 
contraceptives). Here prequalification can help stimulate a mature market 
of quality-assured products. As long as very few products are prequalified, 
the WHO Expert Review Process can help UN agencies select the least risky 
products, pending their prequalification.  
Least far along are therapeutic areas where hardly any good-quality 
generic medicines are available in low- and middle-income countries, and 
whose national regulators lack experience in evaluating those products. 
Examples include insulin for diabetes and anti-snake venom. WHO 
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medicines prequalification has not begun, but could presumably make an 
important contribution. The same applies for ‘new’ products produced or 
marketed only in countries without stringent regulatory agencies, such as 
the dapivirine vaginal ring, a microbicide to prevent HIV transmission. 
Creating a mature medicines market for first-line ARVs for use in 
developing countries took about 10 years of large-scale public 
procurement. The prequalification programme could continue for a long 
time, with a slowly changing range ofessential medicines of great public 
interest, each in its own market development cycle. Future funding could 
then remain project-based and time-limited. Dedicated funds would be 
raised for certain medicines for the period necessary to create a mature 
market. Large-scale procurers and their funders could then contribute 
financially to the programme to assure the quality of the products and to 
work towards market sustainability. 
 
Pressure on the Development of New Generics 
 
The more widespread patenting of pharmaceuticals in countries 
traditionally suppliers of generic medicines may affect the work of the 
WHO PQP. Generic companies concerned about legal action by patent 
holders may find it too risky to develop generic versions of new medicines, 
slowing down availability of newer, second- and third-line ARVs. Will new 
results from the Medicines Patent Pool offer a solution? Patent licenses 
negotiated by the Patent Pool attempt to assure development of low-cost 
generic versions of new molecules. Similarly, generic medicines may be 
produced as a result of a compulsory license or a direct voluntary license 
agreement between the patent holder and a generic manufacturer. 
 
Some of first generic companies to have WHO prequalify their early 
products (Cipla Ltd., Ranbaxy Laboratories) have improved quality 
performance to the point where industrialized country markets are open to 
them. Good-quality generic manufacturers may then be tempted to shift to 
markets where prices are more attractive, to the detriment of production of 
cheap generics for Africa. There may be a continued need to prequalified 




The last 13 years have underscored the importance of the WHO PQP for 
public health. Without it, the goal of WHO’s ‘3 by 5’ programme or 
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reaching 10 million people with ARTs would not have been achieved as 
quickly and inexpensively or at all. Donor money would likely have been 
wasted on products of unknown quality with potentially devastating 
effects for public health. The Programme is a good example of far-sighted 
concerted international action by the UN system, supported by NGOs and 
donors.  
Donors and buyers of medicines must still demand quality assurance 
in their procurement and resist the primitive temptation to procure only 
the cheapest medicines. Failure to do so paralyses the effectiveness of the 
WHO PQP. TB programmes, for example, continued too long purchasing 
medicines of uncertain quality – thereby removing an incentive for 
manufacturers to invest in better quality. Users of medicines in the 
reproductive health and family-planning domains continue to buy 
products of unknown quality. 
The WHO PQP has become a global public good that has helped save 
millions of lives. Most international organizations and many governments 
that procure and supply medicines depend on the WHO PQP. Yet very few 
choose to contribute financially to its work. The Global Fund spends 
around $610 million per year on medicines and other pharmaceutical 
products. (The Global Fund, 3 September 2013, personal communication). 
PEPFAR spent $1.2 billion on medicines procurement over 5 years.44 The 
$15 million annual budget for the WHO PQP represents less than 2 per cent 
of the annual amount spent on medicines by these two organizations alone. 
Reliance on two donors is risky. It is time a consortium of public and 
private global health donors create a sustainable funding base. WHO PQP 
is essential to assure their products’ quality. It is the strongest mechanism 
currently in place to create sustainable regulatory systems in low- and 
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Abstract 
Millions of people, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, 
lack access to effective pharmaceuticals for a number of reasons, 
including unaffordability. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted at 
the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 recognised the importance of 
intellectual property for the development of new medicines, as well as 
the concerns about its effects on medicines prices. It outlined a 
number of mechanisms WTO Members can use to promote access to 
medicines, which have become known as ‘TRIPS flexibilities’ and 
include compulsory licensing of medicines patents and the 
pharmaceutical transition for least-developed countries (LDCs). This 
study documents the use by countries of TRIPS flexibilities to access 
lower priced generic medicines. We compiled a database of instances 
of the use of TRIPS flexibilities by countries over the period 2001-2016. 
We found 176 instances of the use of or intention to use TRIPS 
flexibilities by 89 countries. Of the 176 instances, 100 (56.8%) 
concerned compulsory licences, including public non-commercial use 
licences, and 40 (22.7%) concerned instances of the use of the LDC 
pharmaceutical transition. The remaining cases concerned parallel 
import (1), patent exception (3), and non-patent-related measures (32). 
Of the instances documented, 152 (86.4%) were executed. The 
instances covered products to treat 14 different diseases. However, 
137 (77.8%) of the instances concerned medicines for HIV/AIDS 
and/or related diseases. Our study shows that integrating the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities in medicines procurement provides a legal and 





Challenges posed by the high prices of antiretroviral medicines in the late 
1990’s, coupled with the widespread patenting of these medicines, resulted 
in efforts to develop greater flexibility in the implementation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).1 In 2001, the Ministerial Conference of 
the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (Doha Declaration).2 The Doha Declaration, while 
recognising the importance of intellectual property in the development of 
new medicines, also recognised the concern of the effects of intellectual 
property on medicines pricing. The Doha Declaration lists a number of 
measures that countries can take to ensure access to medicines for all, 
including the use of compulsory licensing to produce or purchase lower-
priced generic medicines. Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration lifted the 
obligation to grant and enforce medicines patents and data protection for 
LDC Members, initially until 1 January 2016. The TRIPS Council 
formally adopted a decision implementing paragraph 7 in 20023 and later 
extended it until at least 2033.4 The UN designates 48 countries as LDCs, of 
which today 36 are WTO Members.5 
Compulsory licensing (CL) is the right granted by a government 
authority to make use of a patent during the patent term without the 
consent of the patent holder, for instance, for the production or supply of 
generic medicines. The government can also grant the authorization for its 
own use, called ‘public non-commercial use’ in Article 31 of TRIPS, and is 
also known as 'government use' (GU). A public non-commercial use licence 
can be assigned to a state agency, department, or a private entity. Upon the 
issuance of a CL or GU, the patent holder is generally entitled to adequate 
remuneration for the use of the patent.6 
The extent to which countries have deployed TRIPS flexibilities in the 
procurement of medicines remains underreported. Previous studies have 
documented well-known and widely publicized cases of compulsory 
licensing but did not take into account the usage of TRIPS flexibilities in 
procurement.7 8 There are several statements in the literature that 
perpetuate the belief that since 2001 the use of TRIPS flexibilities has been 
sporadic and limited.9 10 11 
While we recognize that the TRIPS Agreement offers a range of 
flexibilities that are relevant for pharmaceutical and patenting policies of 
countries, including the right of countries to define and apply patentability 
criteria and to refuse to grant patents for certain subject matter (e.g. plants or 
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animals), this study focuses on those measures that can be directly applied in 
procurement and supply of medicines. In that respect, compulsory licensing, 
the LDC pharmaceutical transition, parallel import and patent exceptions are 




The research is based on a database of instances of the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities by countries over the period 2001-2016, identified and collected 
by one of the authors on an ongoing basis since 2007. For 164 of 176 instances 
identified, information from primary sources is available: patent letters held 
by procurement agencies (non-public documents); legal documents such as 
licenses; and legal notifications such as declarations to use the LDC 
pharmaceutical transition, which were obtained from governments or 
procurement agencies, court documents and country notifications to the 
WTO. Eight instances were found in secondary literature12 and official 
reports.13 Additionally, two instances were identified through personal 
communication with an NGO representative directly involved in the case 
who could confirm their existence,14 and one was reported by a civil society 
organization.15 Of the 12 instances without primary sources, nine were not 
executed; this explains the absence of formal legal or government 
documentation. We made a final verification of our capture of all instances 
through a targeted search in Lexis Nexis, Medline and Web of Science, using 
the following search terms: ‘compulsory license pharmaceutical’ OR 
‘compulsory licence pharmaceutical’ OR ‘compulsory licensing 
pharmaceutical’ OR ‘government use pharmaceutical’ OR ‘non-commercial 
use pharmaceutical’ and screening of specialised list servers.16 This search 
yielded one more instance for the database. 
We use the term ‘instances’ to refer to the following events: the 
announced intention by government to invoke a TRIPS flexibility, a request 
or application to invoke a TRIPS flexibility by a third party, the executed 
use of a TRIPS flexibility, and the cases in which a government declared 
there to be no relevant patents in the territory. 
We categorized the instances according to the disease for which the 
measure was invoked, along with the WTO country classification at the 
time the instance occurred: developed countries (DevC), developing 
countries (DCs), least-developed countries (LDCs); observers (countries in 
accession negotiation) and non-members. For each instance, we identified 
the relevant products and verified the patent status of the products 
concerned using the Medspal database (medspal.org), government 
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documentation, and other information in the public domain to determine 
whether the use of a TRIPS-flexibility measure was indeed required to 
access the generic products (for example, if no valid patent existed, the use 
of a TRIPS flexibility would not have been necessary). For the instances that 
were not executed, we collected and analysed information about the 




We collected 176 instances between 2011–2016 of government actions to 
ensure access to patented medicines, of which 144 involved the use of one 
of the following TRIPS flexibilities: compulsory licensing including public 
non-commercial use, the LDC pharmaceutical transition, parallel import, 
and the research exception. 
Out of the 176 instances, 100 concerned compulsory licensing or public 
non-commercial use. Of those, 81 instances were executed. 19 were not 
executed because the patent holder had offered a price reduction or a 
donation (six cases) or had agreed to a voluntary license (five cases); in one 
case, no relevant patent existed that warranted the pursuit of the measure; 
five cases were rejected on legal or procedural grounds; one application 
was withdrawn by the applicant; and one application was pending since 
2005 without a response. 
We found 40 instances of the use of the LDC pharmaceutical transition 
by a total of 28 countries of which two were developing countries that 
erroneously invoked the LDC transition, three were observers, and one was 
a non-WTO Member. 
 
Table 1. Frequency per type of measure 
 
type of measure frequency percentage 
compulsory licence 48 27,3 
public non-commercial use 
(government use) 52 29,5 
LDC pharmaceutical transition 40 22,7 
no patents 26 14,8 
research exemption 3 1,7 
parallel import 1 0,6 
import authorisation 6 3,4 
total 176 100,0 
 81 
We found one instance of the use of parallel import and three instances of 
the use of the research exception for the supply of generic medicines used 
in a clinical study. In 26 instances countries informed the supplier that 
there were no relevant patents in the territory; however, this was only the 
case in 4 of the 26 instances. 
Six instances concerned import authorizations for products without 
reference to the patent status of the products for which the authorization 
was granted. Of these six instances, four concerned the importation of a 
product for which patents existed in the territory, the other two concerned 
non-WTO Members 
 



















HIV** 2 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 1% 
Cancer 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
Other 6 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 6 3% 
DC 
HIV 51 29% 1 1% 3 2% 4 2% 0 0% 17 10% 76 43% 
Cancer 11 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 11 6% 
Other 9 5% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 12 7% 
LDC             
HIV 12 7% 26 15% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 38 22% 
Cancer 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Other 0  8 5% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 8 5% 
NON-WTO MEMBER 
HIV 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 1% 4 2% 
Cancer 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0  
Other 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0  
WTO OBSERVER 
HIV 7 4% 2 1% 0 0% 2 1% 0 0% 6 3% 17 10% 
Cancer 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0  
Other 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
TOTAL 100 57% 40 23% 3 2% 6 3% 1 1% 26 15% 176 100% 
 
* import authorisation in case of patent but without reference to CL/GU or LDC transition 
**HIV=HIV and related diseases 
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Table 2 presents the various diseases for which the flexibilities were used. 
As can be seen from the table, 74/140 (52.9%) instances of CL/GU and the 
LDC pharmaceutical transition were for HIV/AIDS and related diseases. 
25% of LDCs instances (10/40) specified that the decision concerned all 
medicines. In 12/176 (6.8%) cases the flexibilities were used for cancer 
medication. 
The use of flexibilities over time is presented in figure 1 which shows 
the use of CL/GU and LDC pharmaceutical transition peaking during the 
years 2004 -2008. 
 




Our study shows that during the period 2001–2016 countries have made 
extensive use of TRIPS flexibilities and reports previously unreported use. 
CL/GU and the LDC pharmaceutical transition were the most frequently 
used measures (79.5% of instances). The most comprehensive published 
database to date lists 34 potential CLs in 26 countries. We also documented 
26 cases in which procurement of generic medicines took place after a 
statement of “no patent” was made. Strictly speaking this statement is not a 
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TRIPS flexibility. However, in only four of these 26 instances there were 
indeed no relevant patents; in 22/26 cases with a patent in force generic 
supply nevertheless took place. All these cases concerned HIV medications, 
which points to a more flexible attitude towards IP protection in the context 
of the global HIV response. In the vast majority of cases, the application of 
the TRIPS flexibilities was driven by the procurement of medicines for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS and related diseases. 
In 1998, the WHO published the first guide with recommendations to 
Member States on how to comply with TRIPS while limiting the negative 
effects of patent protection on medicines availability.17 The political 
momentum of the WHO “3 by 5” initiative for HIV treatment, combined 
with HIV treatment activism and new funding from governments, the 
Global Fund, and the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), allowed countries to scale up the procurement of antiretroviral 
medicines. The new global funding mechanisms provided procurement 
guidelines that encouraged countries to purchase low-priced medicines. 
The Global Fund, for example, encouraged its recipients ‘to attain and to 
use the lowest price of products through competitive purchasing from 
qualified manufacturers.’ The Fund also specifically encouraged ‘recipients 
in countries that are WTO Members to use the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement and interpreted in the Doha Declaration, including the 
flexibilities therein, to ensure the lowest possible price for products of 
assured quality.’18 World Bank guidelines for the procurement of HIV 
medicines provided practical guidance to governments on how to use 
various TRIPS flexibilities in the procurement of HIV medicines.19 
Antiretroviral medicines (ARVs) were the first class of new essential 
medicines that were widely patented20 and medicines procurement 
agencies did not have experience with the supply of such products. In the 
late nineties, concern about possible patent infringement suits was common 
among the suppliers of medicines. This concern was based on the fact that a 
number of legal disputes had broken out.21 Patent holders threatened 
procurement organizations that supplied generic HIV medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa with legal action.22 23 Procurement agencies therefore sought 
assurance that they could supply ARVs without the risk of legal action by 
patent holders. The 2001 Doha Declaration offered a much-needed 
clarification on WTO Members’ legal rights regarding intellectual property 
and public health, that would become important in offering such 
assurances. It was also an important political statement of support to 
countries that were struggling to provide access to high priced medicines 
while complying with the TRIPS Agreement. 24 
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The increased funding for HIV treatment explains the increase of 
instances in the use of the TRIPS flexibilities after 2003 (see figure 1). The 
use of the flexibilities has helped create and sustain the generic competition 
that has brought HIV medicines prices down. By 2008, 95% (by volume) of 
the global donor-funded ARV market was comprised of generic medicines, 
primarily from India, where these medicines were not patented and offered 
fixed-dose combinations of ARVs that were not available elsewhere.25 By 
2008 certain companies had issued non-assert statements (commitments not 
to enforce their patents)26 or engaged in voluntary licensing, often in 
response to the threat of a compulsory licence. 
The employment of TRIPS flexibilities to treat HIV/AIDS decreased 
after 2008. By then voluntary licensing had become more common and in 
2010, with the support of UNITAID, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) was 
founded. The MPP negotiated voluntary licenses to enable the production 
and supply of generic HIV medicines. Countries within the territorial scope 
of the MPP licenses therefore no longer need to invoke TRIPS flexibilities 
for HIV. The territorial scope of the MPP licences for adult formulations 
covers 87% to 91% of people living with HIV in developing countries and 
99% for paediatrics. 27 
Today 93% of people with HIV who have access to ARVs use generic 
products.28 This would not be the case if the decrease in the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities had meant that countries were switching back to originator 
products. The MPP’s disease scope now also includes hepatitis C and 
tuberculosis (TB). The Lancet Commission on Essential Medicines Policies 
recommends inclusion of all new essential medicines in the scope of the 
work of the MPP.21 
It is interesting to note that most of the instances documented by this 
study were invoked and executed in day-to-day procurement practice and 
took place without much publicity. This procurement practice was very 
effective, especially for the supply of generic HIV medicines. This relatively 
unknown utilization of the TRIPS flexibilities in regular drug procurement 
is in stark contrast with the publicity attracted by some instances in middle- 
income countries. Compulsory licenses issued by Brazil,29 Thailand,30 and 
India,31 for example, became causes célèbres because of the harsh responses 
they provoked by the US and EU, which discourage the uptake of TRIPS 
flexibilities.32 For example, when India issued a compulsory licence in 2012 
for a cancer medicine it provoked an out-of-cycle review by the US Trade 
Representative.33 In 2016, Colombia sought support from the WHO to issue 
a compulsory license for the cancer drug imatinib, a medicine included in 
the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines.34 The country had come under 
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strong pressure from the US and Switzerland to abandon its plans to issue 
this license, with the US officials threatening the withdrawal of financial 
support for Colombia’s peace process.35 These disputes show that effective 
use of TRIPS flexibilities remains politically sensitive. An important 
observation from our study is that the majority of the cases of TRIPS 
flexibilities were actually successfully executed. 
There are, therefore, lessons to be learned from the procurement 
practices of ARVs for the future procurement of other new essential 
medicines when they are patented and highly priced. Due to the 
globalization of intellectual property norms through international trade 
law, new essential medicines for diseases such as cancer, tuberculosis, and 
hepatitis C will likely be widely patented.36 In 2015, the WHO added a 
number of new, high-priced medicines to their Model List of Essential 
Medicines. Initiatives by pharmaceutical companies for the facilitation of 
access to medicines outside of the field of HIV are weak and predominantly 
based on donations or small-scale patient based price discounts.37 Global 
funding for medicines outside HIV, TB, and malaria is lacking, which 
makes greater efficiency in the procurement of lower-cost medicines all the 
more important. Furthermore, in the face of increasingly widespread 
pharmaceutical patenting and hence nations’ problems to provide access to 
high-priced medicines, the use of TRIPS flexibilities may become more 
relevant and urgent. 
Our study shows that public non-commercial use of a patent and the 
LDC pharmaceutical transition have been applied effectively by 
governments in the procurement of medicines to offer the required legal 
assurances to suppliers of generic products. These mechanisms can also be 
legally used for medicines other than those for HIV/AIDS treatment. The 
procurement processes of generic medicines for new expensive medicines 
can be streamlined through the use of standard license models for this 
purpose.38 
The use of TRIPS flexibilities also remains important for countries that 
are excluded from voluntary licenses, including those of the MPP. The 
reason is that generic products produced under a voluntary license may be 
supplied to a country outside the scope of that licence if the importing 
country has issued a compulsory licence.39 The flexibilities also remain 
important for disease areas in which voluntary licenses or other access 
initiatives do not exist, such as cancer and other non-communicable 
diseases. 
Government non-commercial use of patents is not new. In the sixties 
and seventies of the last century, some European governments and the US 
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routinely used this method. The call to reinstate use of this measure in 
high-income countries to battle high medicines pricing is getting louder, as 
seen in France,40 the UK,41 Ireland,42 The Netherlands,43 Chile,44 and the 
US.45 With only a veiled reference to the high price of hepatitis C medicines, 
the Italian government recently gave its citizens the right to import more 
affordable generic versions of medicines for personal use.46 In 2016 the 
German Federal Patent Court issued a compulsory license for the ARV 
medicine raltegravir, quoting urgent public interest of the patients and 
health risks of the non-availability of the ARV.47 
The use of TRIPS flexibilities therefore is an important tool for 
countries to fulfil their human rights obligations to provide access to 
essential medicines as part of the progressive realization of the right to 
health.48 Alongside the legal obligation of states, pharmaceutical companies 
also have a responsibility to provide access to medicines, including through 
voluntary licensing. 49 The MPP could therefore expand to include all new 
essential medicines, so that these medicines can become available as 
generics well before the patents expire in low and middle-income 
countries. In the absence of such licenses, governments can use the TRIPS 
flexibilities as part of regular procurement. 
Regrettably, while the need for government resolve and action to bring 
down the price of medicines of patented products is growing, the policy 
space to do so is narrowing because of TRIPS-plus provisions resulting 
from trade agreements. 50 TRIPS-plus provisions render the remedies in the 
TRIPS Agreement, such as compulsory licensing, less effective by putting 
restrictions on their use. An example is limiting the grounds for 
compulsory licensing to cases of emergency situations, which would make 
the use of compulsory licensing in regular procurement nearly impossible.35 
Further, the political response from high-income countries to the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities by certain middle-income countries is a significant 
obstacle to their routine use. The strong political responses to the plans of 
even a few countries to issue a compulsory licence for cancer medications 




Our study shows that the use of TRIPS flexibilities has been effective in the 
procurement of generic essential medicines in particular those for HIV, and 
has been more widespread than is commonly assumed. In light of many 
countries’ problems providing access to high-priced patented medicines, 
the employment of TRIPS flexibilities becomes even more relevant. TRIPS 
 87 
flexibilities should not be regarded as a measure of last resort, but can 
routinely be considered in the procurement of generic versions of 
expensive new essential medicines, with adequate remuneration to the 
patent holder. This will help create and sustain the necessary generic 
competition that has proven effective in bringing medicines prices down 
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The challenge of providing access to high-priced patented medicines 
is a global problem affecting all countries. A decade and a half ago the 
use of flexibilities contained in the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
in particular compulsory licensing, was seen as a mechanism to 
respond to high-price medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS in 
low- and middle-income countries. Today a number of upper-income 
European Union (EU) Member States is contemplating the use of 
compulsory licensing in their efforts to reduce expenditure on 
pharmaceutical products. EU regulation of clinical test data protection 
and the granting of market exclusivity interfere with the effective use 
of compulsory licensing by EU Member States and can even prevent 
access to off-patent medicines because they prohibit registration of 
generic equivalents. 
EU pharmaceutical legislation should be amended to allow waivers to 
data and market exclusivity in cases of public health need and when a 
compulsory or government use license has been issued. Such an 
amendment can be modelled after existing waivers in the EU Regulation 
on compulsory licensing of patents for the manufacture of pharmaceutical 
products for export to countries with public health problems outside the EU. 
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Allowing a public health/compulsory license exception to data and 
market exclusivity would bring greater coherence between EC 
regulation of medicinal products and national provisions on 
compulsory licensing and ensure that Member States can take measures 
to protect public health and promote access to medicines for all. 
 
 
Protection of clinical test data, and exceptions to data exclusivity to allow 
registration of generic medicines 
 
This paper addresses the issue of clinical test data regulation in the 
European Union which currently prohibits the use of the originator’s pre-
clinical and clinical test data in the processing of a marketing authorization 
for a generic medicine for a period of eight years. This is called the data 
exclusivity. After the eight years have passed the regulatory authorities can 
process the generic company’s application for marketing authorization but 
the product may not be put on the market until ten years has passed after 
the initial marketing authorization of the originator product. This is called 
market exclusivity. Under certain circumstances, an additional one year of 
market exclusivity may be obtained, for example when the originator 
company is granted a marketing authorization for a significant new 
indication. This system of data and market exclusivity is also known as the 
8+2+1 rule. The EU pharmaceutical legislation has no exception to this rule, 
which means that EU countries cannot register a generic product during 
the data/market exclusivity period, even when the medicine is needed for 
compelling public health reasons or emergencies or when a compulsory or 
government use license has been issued on a medicine patent. This paper 
will make recommendations for necessary changes to the EU 
pharmaceutical legislation to enable individual EU Member states to grant 
public health exceptions to data/market exclusivity and to make effective 
use of compulsory licenses. 
 
Data exclusivity and TRIPS 
 
Data exclusivity and market exclusivity are not requirements of 
international intellectual property law. While Article 39.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement requires governments to protect undisclosed test data submitted 
for the registration of new chemical entities against unfair commercial use, it 
does not oblige countries to confer exclusive rights over data related to 
marketing approval to the originator company.1 The scope of TRIPS Art. 
39.3 is limited to the protection of undisclosed data required by a national 
 93 
authority as a condition for obtaining marketing approval for a medicine, 
which ‘utilize new chemical entities,’ provided that the generation of the 
data involved a considerable effort.2 Article 39.3 of TRIPS therefore leaves 
ample flexibility for a data protection regime that allows the marketing 
authorisation of generic medicines. It also leaves flexibility to deal with 
regimes, as in the EU, where TRIPS-plus data exclusivities are granted. 
However, as discussed further below, the EU medicines legislation 
goes well beyond the requirements of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement Art.39.3 in granting exclusive rights that form an obstacle to the 
effective use of compulsory licensing by EU Member States regardless of 
the reasons for the licence and even in emergency situations. 
In a 2006 letter to the European Generic Medicines Association, which 
was seeking clarification on whether data exclusivity would apply in case 
of an emergency compulsory licence for the flu medicine Tamiflu within 
the European Union, the European Commission acknowledged that the 
‘Community pharmaceutical acquis does not currently contain any 
provision allowing a waiver of the rules on data exclusivity and marketing 
protection periods’.3 The European Commission, however, has yet to take 
any initiative to propose such a waiver in pharmaceutical legislation. 
 
Compulsory licensing for public health 
 
The WTO TRIPS4 includes provisions for compulsory licensing, a 
mechanism whereby a government grants third parties or itself the right to 
use a patent without the consent of the patent holder. When a government 
grants itself the right to make use of a patent, this is called ‘government 
use’, or ‘public non-commercial use’.5 Government use or public non-
commercial use of a patent can be particularly useful in public procurement 
of medicines. A government may also authorise a third party to act on 
behalf of the government, for example, a medicines procurement agent, to 
perform certain acts that otherwise would have constituted a patent 
infringement. Payment of adequate remuneration – a reasonable royalty – 
to the patent holder is required when a compulsory licence is granted. In 
the case of government use, in case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, and in cases where a compulsory licence 
is issued to correct anti-competitive practices, there is no requirement to 
first seek a voluntary licence. 6 7 
The government is free to determine the grounds for granting a 
compulsory licence. Some countries’ domestic law includes specific 
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grounds for issuing a compulsory licence such as ‘high prices’ of medicines, 
or a ‘lack of access to medicines’. For example, French patent law 
authorises government use upon request by the minister of health when 
medicines are ‘only available to the public in insufficient quantity or 
quality or at abnormally high prices’.8 
In 2001 the WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health9 provided a welcome clarification of the flexibilities10 11 contained in 
the TRIPS Agreement for the purpose of public health and specifically to 
promote ‘access to medicines for all’.12 With the background of trade 
pressure on low- and middle-income countries that contemplated the use 
of compulsory licensing and other TRIPS-flexibilities, the Doha Declaration 
took away any doubts about the legality of such measures. Subsequently, 
low- and middle-income countries have used TRIPS flexibilities on a large 
scale to facilitate the supply of low-cost generic medicines used for the 
treatment of HIV.13 
More recently, interest in the usage of TRIPS flexibilities for a broader 
range of health products has been growing. The UN High Level Panel on 
Access to Medicines recommended the use of TRIPS-flexibilities and the 
implementation of legislation that facilitates the issuance of compulsory 
licences ‘designed to effectuate quick, fair, predictable and implementable 
compulsory licenses for legitimate public health needs’.14 The Lancet Commission 
on Essential Medicines Policies recommended that national patent 
legislation allow for easy deployment of TRIPS flexibilities, effective 
automatic licensing of essential medicines in the absence of voluntary 
agreements, and regulatory test data protection rules that provide the 
necessary flexibility to register products submitted by licensees.15 These 
recommendations echo those from the Global Health Law Committee of 
the International Law Association.16 The European Parliament has adopted 
a resolution on options for the EU for improving access to medicines, 
which includes the use of compulsory licensing by EU Member States.17 
 
High medicines prices, compulsory licensing and data exclusivity in the 
European Union 
 
A decade and a half ago, the use of TRIPS flexibilities and in particular 
compulsory licensing was seen primarily as a mechanism to respond to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in low- and middle- income countries. Today, a number of 
EU Member States, including high-income countries, struggle to formulate 
an effective response to high-priced patented medicines. In the UK, the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has 
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recommended against making the breast cancer medicine trastuzumab 
emtansine available through the National Health Service because of the 
high price, while recognising that the medicine is effective.18 In Italy the 
government has authorised the importation of generic direct-acting 
antiviral medicines for the treatment of hepatitis C on an individual basis to 
increase access to these medicines.19 In Switzerland, patients denied access 
to new hepatitis C treatment can receive reimbursement by some insurance 
companies when they source generic medicines for the treatment in India at 
a lower price.20 
Governments have signalled that they lack the negotiating power to 
obtain good results in price negotiations concerning patented products,21 22 
despite the fact that production-cost data show that medicines can often be 
made for a fraction of the price demanded by the originator company. 
[Table 4] The Dutch ministers of health and international trade wrote in the 
Lancet about the challenges of negotiating with patent holders: “Patent and 
intellectual property exclusivities are the only cornerstone of the current 
model. Companies can ask the price they like. This will no longer do. We 
need to develop alternative business models.”23 
 
Table 4: Price of selected essential medicines and cost of production 30 31 32 
 
medicine originator price intro us cost of production 
tuberculosis  
bedaquiline $ 30000 ( 6 month) $ 48–101 
hepatitis C   
sofosbuvir (SOF) $ 84000 (12 week) $68–136 
SOF+ledipasvir $ 95000 (12 weeks) $ 193 
simeprevir $ 66360 (12 weeks) $130–270 
daclatasvir $ 63000 (12 weeks) $10–30 
cancer  
imatinib $ 30000–$100000 (1y) $ 119–159 
trastuzumab $54000 (1 y) $ 242 
 
Patients and medical professionals and in some cases health authorities 
in high-income countries have become more vocal in asking their 
governments to address the patent barriers to accessing lower-priced 
medicines and to invoke compulsory licensing.24 25 26 27 28 29 
Referencing the lawful production or importation of affordable generic 
medicines through the use of compulsory licences will strengthen the hand 
of governments in price negotiations and is an effective remedy if price 
negotiations fail to deliver the desired result. There are lessons from the 
past when government use was routine in the procurement of medicines 
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for use in national health systems; for example, in the sixties and seventies 
in the UK, compulsory licensing had become common practice in 
government procurement by the NHS. Attempts by the industry to halt this 
practice at the time failed.33 
However, the ability of the EU to provide more affordable access to a 
patent-protected medicine through a compulsory licence may be hindered 
if the originator company’s product simultaneously benefits from data 
exclusivity. Data exclusivity refers to exclusive rights granted to the 
original manufacturer of a medicine over the use of test data required for 
the registration of the product. These exclusive rights are distinct from 
patent rights in that they are granted by the medicines regulatory 
authority34 in relation to safety and efficacy data submitted for the approval 
of originator medicines. 
According to the EU Regulation for the authorisation and supervision 
of medicinal products,35 a generic medicine may only be authorised with 
reference to the originator’s registration file once eight years of data 
exclusivity has passed, and may only be placed on the market ten years 
after the initial marketing authorisation for the originator product has been 
granted. This marketing period may be extended to 11 years in cases of 
new indications that have a significant clinical benefit over existing 
indications.36 This means that a generic applicant cannot submit a market 
authorization based solely on bioequivalence data before the expiration of 
eight years and instead would have to provide self-generated pre-clinical 
and clinical trial test data, which generic companies typically do not do. 
Additionally, such clinical trials would mean an unnecessary duplication of 
studies37 and raise ethical questions. In the EU data and market exclusivity 
applies to both small molecules and biologics. 
At present, EU pharmaceutical legislation does not provide for 
exceptions to the eight to ten years data and market exclusivity. Even in 
cases of national emergency or other situation of urgency, there are no 
explicit waivers foreseen in EU law to address the need to authorise the 
marketing of a generic product before the aforementioned exclusivity 
periods expire. Even though issuing a compulsory licence to overcome 
patents blocking the use of a generic medicine is a matter of national law, 
regulatory requirements for EU-wide marketing authorisation, including 
data exclusivity, are a matter of European pharmaceutical legislation. These 
concurrent legal systems lack coherence, both with regards to the effective 
use of compulsory licensing by EU Member States and with respect to 
public interest exceptions to data exclusivity more broadly. 
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Case of Romania 
In 2016, the government of Romania contemplated issuing a compulsory 
licence for the hepatitis C medicine sofosbuvir, which, in Europe, was only 
available from the originator company at a price of around 50.000 euro for a 
12-week treatment.38 Since the registration of a generic version of sofosbuvir 
is not possible before the expiry of the data exclusivity in 2022,39 Romania, 
like any other EU Member State, cannot give effect to a compulsory licence. 
Further, the EU market exclusivity for sofosbuvir expires at the earliest in 
2024. The case of Romania reveals the obstacles to the effective use of 
compulsory licensing created by EU data exclusivity. 
 
Use of DE waivers in voluntary licences aimed at ensuring access to 
medicines 
 
The need to provide data exclusivity waivers to ensure effective availability 
of generic medicines is often acknowledged in voluntary licences. For 
example, all Medicines Patent Pool40 (MPP) licences include a data 
exclusivity waiver to facilitate regulatory approval of generic medicines 
manufactured by MPP’s licensees. These waivers are necessary to ensure 
that generic manufacturers that sign MPP licences are not prevented from 
registering their products in countries which are part of the licensed 
territory and which grant test data exclusivity. For instance, Guatemala is 
included in the territory of the MPP licences with ViiV Healthcare for 
paediatric formulations of dolutegravir (DTG) and for adult formulations 
of DTG and DTG/abacavir (ABC). The licences specifically state that: 
ViiV shall provide any Sublicensee with NCE Exclusivity or other 
regulatory exclusivity waivers to the extent required by the 
applicable regulatory authorities in order to manufacture or sell 
Product in the Territory in accordance with the terms of the 
Sublicence. ViiV shall further provide to any Sublicensee such 
consents which it has the legal capacity to give as are necessary to 
enable such Sublicensee to perform its obligations.41 
 
As indicated in the patent database Medspal,42 the formulations of DTG 
50mg and ABC/DTG/3TC 600/50/300 mg are protected by test data 
exclusivity in Guatemala until 11 November 2020 and 29 November 2021 
respectively. However, MPP licensees will nevertheless be able to register 
and market generic versions of these formulations in Guatemala before the 
expiration of these rights, based on the waiver included in the MPP licence 
agreements. 
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Gilead has also included the following waiver of data exclusivity in its 
licence agreements for sofosbuvir: 
Gilead agrees to provide Licensee with NCE Exclusivity, or other 
regulatory exclusivity, waivers as may be required by the applicable 
regulatory authorities in order to manufacture or sell Product in the 
Territory, provided such manufacture and sale by Licensee is compliant 
with the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Licensee agrees not to 
pursue or obtain regulatory exclusivity on any Product in any country 
within the Territory.43 
Even though Gilead obtained test data exclusivity for sofosbuvir 400 
mg until 14 July 2021 in Guatemala, for instance, Gilead licensees cannot 
not be barred from registering and selling generic versions of SOF 400mg 
during this data exclusivity period in Guatemala, which is included in the 
licensed territory. Governments, including in the EU, should be able to 
provide similar data exclusivity waivers. 
 
Data exclusivity waivers in national legislation in other jurisdictions 
 
Some middle- and high-income countries, all of them members of the WTO 
and thus subject to the TRIPS Agreement, provide for explicit data 
exclusivity waivers in medicines regulations or in relation to the use of 
compulsory licences in patent laws, with a view to facilitating generic 
medicines registration and sales where necessary to protect public health. 
For example, Section 5 of Malaysia 2011 Directive of Data Exclusivity,44 
entitled Non-Application of Data Exclusivity, provides that 
Nothing in the Data Exclusivity shall: 
(i) apply to situations where compulsory licenses have been issued or 
the implementation of any other measures consistent with the 
need to protect public health and ensure access for all; or 
(ii) prevent the Government from taking any necessary action to 
protect public health, national security, non-commercial public 
use, national emergency, public health crisis or other extremely 
urgent circumstances declared by the Government. 
 
In Chile, Article 91 of Law 19.996, as amended in 2012,45 provides that test 
data exclusivity shall not be applied as follows: 
(b) Where, for reasons of public health, national security, public non-
commercial use, national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency declared by the competent authority, it is 
justified to terminate the protection referred in Article 89 (e.g. on 
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test data exclusivity). 
(c) The pharmaceutical or agrochemical product is the subject of a 
compulsory license in conformity with the provisions of this law. 
 
In Colombia, Article 4 of Decree 2085 of 2002 on data exclusivity provides 
that,  
‘The protection referred to in this Decree does not apply in the 
following cases […] c) where necessary to protect the public, as 
qualified by the Ministry of Health’.46 
 
Other exceptions in the US: trade agreements and the New Trade Policy 
exception 
 
The US data/marketing exclusivity rule on previously unapproved 
chemical entities (new small molecule medicines) is that there are five years 
of marketing exclusivity and that a generic may not apply for tentative 
marketing approval until after the fourth year and may do so only if the 
applicant certifies that the underlying patent is invalid or that the medicine 
will be non-infringing. Final or tentative approval is not available until at 
least the end of the fifth year.47 48 If the original period of exclusivity is 
extended with three years because of new clinical trial data involving a 
previously approved chemical entity, e.g., for a new use or new 
formulation, an application for tentative approval is possible any time 
during the three years.49 For biologics, the effective marketing exclusivity 
term provided by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act is 12 
years from the date the reference product was first licensed; there is data 
exclusivity preventing even applications for tentative approval for the first 
four years.50 
As with the EU, there is no express exception in US law to 
data/marketing exclusivity on medicines or biologics. However, the 10 May 
2007 New Trade Policy51 in the US authorized an express public health 
exception to data/market exclusivity in the event of a compulsory licence or 
other public health need. Implementation flexibility to that effect was 
included in several US developing-country free-trade agreements (FTA), 
including FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and Peru: 
For pharmaceutical products, Article 16.10.2(e)(i) provides an exception 
to the data exclusivity obligations for measures to protect public health in 
accordance with the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (the ‘Doha Declaration’). Thus, where a Party 
issues a compulsory licence in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS 
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Agreement and the Doha Declaration, the data exclusivity obligations in 
Chapter Sixteen will not prevent the adoption or implementation of such a 
public health measure. In addition, in a case in which there is no patent on 
the pharmaceutical product, and, therefore, no need to issue a compulsory 
licence, the data exclusivity obligations in Chapter Sixteen will not prevent 
the adoption or implementation of such a measure.52 
The advantage of the US New Trade Policy approach is that it allows 
countries to disregard data/marketing exclusivity if they take measures to 
protect public health, regardless of whether a compulsory licence needs to 
be issued or not – depending on the patent status of the medicine in 
question. 
 
Existing EU legislation containing waivers or exceptions to data and 
market exclusivity 
 
Waivers to data exclusivity and market exclusivity rules do exist in the EU 
Regulation on compulsory licensing of patents for the manufacture of 
pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health problems 
outside the EU.53 This regulation implements the WTO ‘August 30 2003 
decision’, which provided a waiver to the TRIPS Article 31(f) requirement 
that production under a compulsory licence be predominantly for the 
domestic market. This restriction seriously hampered the use of 
compulsory licensing by countries that were dependent on the importation 
of medicines. The 30 August 2003 waiver recently became a permanent 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.54 Article 18 of the EU Regulation 
addresses the situation in which the applicant for a compulsory licence for 
manufacture and export of a medicine outside the EU may use the scientific 
opinion procedure of the European Medicines Agency (EMA),55 56 or any 
similar national procedures, to assess quality, safety, and efficacy of 
medicines intended exclusively for markets outside the EU. It provides 
waivers to exclusivity rules necessary to obtain such opinions from the 
EMA or national authorities.57 58 
Certain EU trade agreements establish, in regards to test data, that 
Member States may provide exceptions to exclusivity for reasons of public 
interest and for situations of national emergency or extreme urgency when 
it is necessary to allow access to certain data to third parties. Such a 
provision can be found, for instance, in Article 231(4) of the EU-Peru 
Agreement which reads: ‘[t]he Parties may regulate exceptions for reasons of 
public interest, situations of national emergency or extreme urgency, when it is 
necessary to allow access to those data to third parties.’59 In practice, this means 
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that the EU and Peru, both party to this agreement, may provide and use 
data exclusivity waivers to ensure effective use of compulsory licence. The 
waiver may also be relevant for non-patented products that benefit from 
exclusivity in the market because of data exclusivity. 
For example, in Peru, daclatasvir, used in the treatment of hepatitis C, 
is patented until 2027 and benefits from a five-year data exclusivity period 
set to expire in July 2019.60 If the relevant Peruvian authority issues a 
compulsory licence to authorise the supply of generic daclatasvir, the 
medicines agency can ignore the data exclusivity and provide the necessary 
marketing authorisation for the generic product. 
Peruvian law includes a specific exception to data exclusivity that 
allows the registration authority to authorise third parties to use 
pharmaceutical test data for reasons of public health and situations of 
national emergency or extreme urgency. In addition, the legislation 
specifically authorises third parties to use or refer to the test data in their 
application to obtain registration in case of a compulsory licence.61 
The EU trade agreements create rights and obligations for all parties to 
the agreement, and therefore further strengthens the case for regulating 
explicit exceptions to data and market exclusivity in cases where a 
compulsory licence and/or other measures in the interest of public health 
are taken in the EU or by EU Member States. 
 
Recommendation for greater legislative coherence in the EU 
 
The right of governments to grant compulsory licences, including for 
public non-commercial use, is acknowledged in international law, 
including in TRIPS. Effective use of such licences requires a waiver of data 
exclusivity for the approval and marketing of licensed generic medicines. 
However, such waivers do not exist under EU law and as a result, an entity 
authorized to make use of the patent to supply a generic medicine under a 
compulsory licence still might not be able to do so because it cannot obtain 
a marketing authorisation from the relevant medicine regulatory authority. 
This lack of legal coherence within the EU renders national compulsory 
licensing provisions useless with respect to EMA approved medicines 
protected by data exclusivity. 
Some patent holders recognise the need to address the barrier to 
market entry that data exclusivity can create. They therefore include 
relevant waivers in voluntary licence agreements, to ensure that licensed 
rights can be used effectively by licensees. For example, all licence 
agreements of the Medicines Patent Pool contain such waivers. The need 
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for data exclusivity waivers is also recognised in the US New Trade Policy 
of 2007 and certain bilateral trade agreements to which the EU is a party. 
Since a compulsory licence is a government remedy for the absence of a 
voluntary licence, the government should also be able to attach conditions 
to the licence including a waiver of data and market exclusivity.62 Further, 
data and market exclusivity waivers should also be available in situations 
where a needed medicine is not protected by a patent but a public health 
concern requires its availability. 
The EU regulation on the grant of compulsory licensing for export does 
contain waivers for data and market exclusivity. These waivers allow 
European regulatory authorities to review dossiers of such licensed generic 
medicines to address third countries needs for affordable medicines. A 
similar waiver should be available to facilitate effective use of compulsory 
licensing or other measures needed for the advancement of public health 
within the European Union. 
There is an urgent need to bring coherence to EU law now that Member 
States are under pressure to seek ways to ensure the availability of new 
essential medicines without undue burden on their health budgets. EU 
health ministers have recognised that steps need to be taken to address the 
effects of highly priced patented medicines on their budgets.63 Legal 
coherence can be achieved by inserting the following provision into the EU 
legal framework governing medicinal products for human use: 
‘The protection periods set out in article 14 (11) of Regulation 726/2004 
shall not apply in cases where it is necessary to allow access to and the use 
of pharmaceutical test data to register a generic of a reference medicinal 
product, which is or has been authorised under article 6 of Directive 
2001/83/EC, for reasons of public interest including public health, in case of 
compulsory licensing of patents, including for public non-commercial use, 
and in situations of national emergency or extreme urgency.’  
In cases other than compulsory licensing and public non-commercial 
use of patents where adequate remuneration for the patent holder is 
required, payment of an adequate remuneration for the use of test data to 
the holder of the marketing authorisation of the reference medicinal 
product could be required. The adequacy of the remuneration could be 
determined based on an audited disclosure of direct drug development 
expenditure by the originator.64 Alternatively, the royalty guidelines for 
non-voluntary use of a patent on medical technologies published by the 






Amending EU legislation to introduce waivers of data and market 
exclusivity requirements will ensure that European patients can benefit 
from flexibilities in patent law and that data and market exclusivities do 
not undermine EU Member States’ ability to take measures needed to 
protect and promote public health. The proposed amendment would bring 
greater coherence between European regulation of medicinal products and 
national provisions on compulsory licensing in EU member States. The 
ability to effectively apply compulsory licensing will also strengthen the 
position of EU Member States in price negotiations with pharmaceutical 
companies. When such negotiations do not bring a satisfactory result, 
Member States can resort to compulsory licensing and produce or import 
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A patient’s experience 
 
Bina is a single mother with three children. Just after the youngest was 
born, Bina tested positive for pulmonary tuberculosis. After a few months 
of treatment she felt better and stopped the treatment. A year later she 
began coughing again, and she was diagnosed with drug-resistant 
tuberculosis. Following this she needed daily injections for at least 6 
months, as well as many pills. Bina was terrified: she was not sure how to 
keep up with the treatment and continue supporting her children at the 
same time. She begged the doctors for another medicine that was easier to 
use and less toxic. They told her that this medicine did not exist, and that she 
should consider herself lucky to live in an area with a hospital that could 




The present system of developing new medicines is in crisis, as it largely 
fails to produce much-needed products to address the health needs of 
millions of people.1 When new essential medicines are developed, market 
exclusivity, through patents or other mechanisms, allows for pricing that 
potentially makes them unaﬀordable, even in HICs.2 3 
In many cases missing essential medicines are not even developed at 
all. Even though the early stages of R&D of medicines has large public 
investment, the process of taking them to market is largely carried out by 
for-profit companies. Pharmaceutical companies and their shareholders are 
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typically reluctant to invest in developing medicines for patient 
populations that do not represent a profitable market or for diseases 
predominantly aﬀecting LMICs.4 
The problems of high prices and missing essential medicines are 
related, and both disproportionately aﬀect people in LMICs. This section 
presents a summary of the complex and political problems ingrained in the 
current patent-based-innovation system.5 6 It examines the initiatives to 
address the system’s deficiencies, and proposes concerted global actions 
and public policy interventions to lay the foundation for sustainable 
approaches to essential medicines development.  
 
Key problems of the current innovation system 
 
WHO,7 8 The Lancet’s Commission on Global Health 2035,9 and the UN10 
have all oﬀered lists of missing essential medicines. Some important unmet 
public health needs include heat-stable insulin and oxytocin,11 shorter 
treatments for latent and active tuberculosis, single-day treatments of 
malaria, and treatments for multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. Essential 
diagnostics are also needed, such as a point-of-care test to distinguish 
between bacterial and viral infections of the upper respiratory tract.12 Some 
essential medicines do exist but have been abandoned—these are no longer 
produced in volumes that meet global demand because they are not 
suﬃciently profitable. Examples include snake anti-venoms and benzathine 
benzylpenicillin. 
A major category of missing essential medicines reflects a historic lack 
of attention to the specific needs of children. Between 1995 and 2005, 107 
(44%) of the 243 medicines authorised in Europe by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) had a potential paediatric use, but no data on use 
in children were available at the time of authorisation.13 In 2007, WHO 
published the first Model List of Essential Medicines for Children76 and 
launched the Make Medicines Child Size campaign.14 A key example is the 
gap in paediatric treatments for HIV—2·6 million children are living with 
HIV (88% of them in sub-Saharan Africa),15 but this statistic has not 
attracted suﬃcient commercial R&D investments.16 
The alarming crisis in antimicrobial development is another example.17 
A market-driven R&D system will not invest in new life-saving 
antimicrobials if their use will have to be rationed from the start to prevent 
resistance.18 The failure to respond to the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak 
showcases another example.19 Clinical testing of an Ebola virus vaccine has 
shown promising results,20 but it took 11 000 deaths and extensive political 
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mobilisation to take the vaccine candidate oﬀ a shelf, where it had been 
sitting for 10 years after initial development by the Public Health Agency of 
Canada.21 Extensive R&D activity only started when the outbreak 
threatened richer populations. By October 2015, 31 molecules for Ebola 
virus treatment were under commercial development. 
The issue of missing essential medicines has been discussed for 
decades. In 1990, only $1.6 billion (5.3%) of $30 billion spent annually on 
health research was oriented to the needs of LMICs.22 In a widely quoted 
study by Médecins Sans Frontières, only 15 (1.1%) of 1393 new medicines 
developed between 1975 and 1999 were for tropical diseases and 
tuberculosis, which account for 12% of the global disease burden.23 Between 
2000 and 2011, only 37 (4.4%) of 850 newly approved products were for 
neglected diseases, most of which were new formulations or combinations 
of existing medicines.24 Similarly, in December, 2011, of nearly 150 000 
registered clinical trials, only 1.0% were for neglected diseases. By October, 
2015, only 167 (2·3%) of 7217 products in active development were for 19 of 
64 listed neglected diseases (Commission’s analysis of the data). Some 
work is being done, but it covers only part of the need. 
The failures of market-driven R&D go beyond neglected diseases. An 
analysis of 1345 new medicine approvals in Europe revealed that no real 
breakthroughs occurred between 2000 and 2014; only 9% of new medicines 
oﬀered an advance, and 20% were possibly helpful.25 51% of newly 
marketed medicines were modified versions of existing medicines, adding 
little to the treatment armamentarium. Nowadays, the R&D eﬀorts 
therefore yield very few truly innovative products that respond to essential 
public health needs. 
New essential medicines that are unaﬀordable to most people can also 
be considered as missing. High prices are a direct result of the reliance on 
the market monopoly granted by the patent system for the financing of 
R&D. High prices of new pharmaceutical products have long aﬀected 
LMICs, but are increasingly being felt in HICs as well, and medical 
specialists in the USA26 and the UK27 28 29 30 have started to protest. 
 
Lessons learnt from initiatives to promote R&D of missing essential 
medicines 
 
Not-for-profit R&D initiatives start to bear fruit 
Several not-for profit Product Development Partnerships for neglected 
diseases have been established in recent years. In the Product Development 
Partnerships approach, R&D investments are funded up-front through 
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philanthropic and public financing, so companies do not need to recoup the 
full costs of R&D afterwards through high medicine prices. Examples 
include the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), the Medicines 
for Malaria Venture, the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development, the 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, the Foundation for Innovative New 
Diagnostics, Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation, and the Program for 
Appropriate Technology in Health. Some governments and major 
philanthropic actors, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, have 
committed substantial funding to these initiatives. New industry R&D 
platforms have been created, and new incentives for industry involvement 
developed.31 32 
 
Table 5: Key achievements of not-for-profit Product Development Partner- 
ships and their partners 
 
 disease medicine 
DNDi with Sanofi Malaria Artesunate-amodiaquine 
DNDi with Farmanguinhos/Cipla Malaria Artesunate-mefloquine 
DNDi with Laboratório 
Farmacêutico do Estado de 
Pernambuco (LAFEPE) 
American trypanosomiasis 
(Chagas Disease) Paediatric benznidazole 
Institute for OneWorld Health 
(iOWH) Leishmaniasis Paromomycin 
MMV with Novartis Malaria Artemether-lumefantrine dispersible tablets 
MMV with Guilin Malaria Injectable artesunate 
MMV with Sigma-Tau Malaria Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine 
MMV with Shin Poong Malaria Pyronaridine-artesunate 
MMV with Guilin Paediatric malaria Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine and amodiaquine 
DNDi African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) 
Nifurtimox and eflornithine 
combination therapy 
DNDi Visceral leishmaniasis (East Africa) 
Sodium stibogluconate and 
paromomycin combination therapy 
DNDi Visceral leishmaniasis (Asia) 
Liposomal amphotericin B, 
miltefosine, and paromomycin 
combination therapy 
Data from European Union Product Development Partnership Coalition. May 7, 2015. 
DNDi=Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative. MMV=Medicines for Malaria Venture 
 
These initiatives are starting to bear fruit (table 5). For example, DNDi has 
developed six new treatments since 2003, and expects to complete 10–12 
additional new treatments by 2023. DNDi is expanding its scope from 
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neglected diseases to HIV, hepatitis C, and antimicrobial resistance.33 These 
initiatives have also provided important insights into the true cost of R&D 
(Box 4). Yet the research agenda of these initiatives largely follows the 
priorities of donor governments and foundations. A transparent priority-
setting process is missing. As a result, some important therapeutic areas are 
hardly covered, such as diabetes, cancers and other NCDs, and mental 
disorders. 
 
Box 4: Developing a new medicine: how much does it cost? 
 
The real costs of pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) are often kept as trade 
secrets. In 2016, industry-supported estimates set the average cost for medicines developed 
between 1995 and 2007 at US$2.5 billion per new product. In 2012, an industry-funded 
study by the Oﬃce of Health Economics came to an estimate of $1.506 billion for 
development cost per new product. These figures are used by the pharmaceutical industry 
to justify high medicine prices, but have been challenged by others.34 35 Even some in the 
industry have expressed scepticism. GlaxoSmithKline’s chief executive oﬃcer, Sir Andrew 
Witty, called the $1 billion figure “one of the great myths of the industry.”36 Light and 
Warburton37 estimated that the net investment by the industry to discover important new 
medicines amounts to 1.2% of sales. Table 6 summarises the R&D cost estimates published 
since 1991. 
 
Table 6: Estimates of R&D cost from diﬀerent sources and years 
Estimates of R&D costs in US$ 
DiMasi et al (1991)38 $231 million (expressed in 1987 dollars) 
Oﬃce of Technology Assessment, US Congress 
(1993)39 
$140–194 million 
(expressed in 1990 dollars) 
DiMasi et al (2003)40 $802 million 
Oﬃce of Health Economics (2012)41 $1.5 billion 
DiMasi et al (2016)42 $2.5 billion 
 
In 2001, the Global Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug Development estimated the costs of 
successfully developing a new chemical entity to treat tuberculosis to be approximately $37–
40 million (excluding the costs of failure). This cost covers preclinical development ($4.9–5.3 
million), pharmaceutical development (>$5.3 million), and phases 1 to 3 of clinical 
development ($26.6 million). Including the costs of unsuccessful projects would increase the 
total costs to $76–115 million.43 
The Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative estimated that R&D expenditure for an 
improved treatment (ie, a combination product using existing molecules) would be between 
$10 and $40 million. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative’s cost for the development 
of a new chemical entity is estimated at €100–150 million, on the basis of the real cost for 
products developed by the Product Development Partnership and including cost of failures.44 
These estimates do not include in-kind contributions by the industry. 
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The Commission concludes that international agreement should be sought 
on a global list of missing essential medicines with due regard of the needs 
of LMICs. R&D on the listed diseases should be supported by dedicated 
funds, and the list should be regularly updated. 
 
Alternative incentives signal interest for change 
 
In the past decade and a half, new push and pull incentive mechanisms 
have been established. Some new donors, such as UNITAID and the 
Japanese Global Health Innovative Technology Fund (which includes 
private companies, among others), have increased funding for R&D of 
missing essential medicines. The Longitude Prize established a prize fund 
of £10 million in 2014 for the development of a point-of-care diagnostic test 
to determine whether (and which) antibiotics are appropriate in a given 
case.45 These initiatives are too new to show definitive results yet, but they 
signal public and private interest in new ways to incentivise innovation. 
The Commission supports the assessment of these alternate incentives. 
 
Regulatory incentives show mixed results 
 
New initiatives such as the UN Prequalification Programme managed by 
the WHO and the EMA’s Article 5846 adapt regulatory activities to global 
health purposes. Under Article 58, the EMA provides scientific 
assessments, in coordination with WHO, of medicinal products for human 
use in markets outside the EU.47 
Since 2007, US federal legislation has allowed for priority review 
vouchers (PRVs). However, PRVs have been criticised because there is no 
provision that the product should be made available and aﬀordable, and 
PRVs can also be used for products already registered outside of the USA 
or by a company that did not invest in the R&D.48 49 A marketed 
antituberculosis medicine, bedaquiline, was oﬀered for prices of around 
$3000 in MICs and $900 in LICs. Yet in the USA it was marketed for $30 000 
per treatment, despite having received a PRV and fast-track approval by 
the US Food and Drug Administration. Eﬀorts are underway to include 
access and novelty requirements into the legislation.50 
New regulations to encourage paediatric medicine development have 
been introduced by the USA51 and the EU.52 As of 2008, all new applications 
in the EU must include data for children (0–17 years) unless a specific 
waiver is approved. An increase in new paediatric formulations is 
possible,53 yet the costs to society might become higher than the actual R&D 
 113 
investment. Whether these innovations meet priority needs or are primarily 
used to extend the market exclusivity of products with predominantly 
adult indications remains unclear.54 55 In 2016, the EU initiated a review of 
R&D incentive mechanisms, including those for paediatric R&D, to 
strengthen the balance of pharmaceutical systems in Europe.56 
Regulatory approval of new essential medicines poses great challenges, 
for example with onerous studies needed for new paediatric formulations57 
or assessments of new medicines for neglected diseases not prevalent in 
countries with stringent regulatory authorities. The Commission asserts 
that assessments of new medicines for neglected diseases should be led by 
regulatory authorities in the aﬀected areas. These institutions will probably 
need further strengthening to do such reviews, through enhanced 
collaboration with stringent regulatory authorities and the WHO/UN 
Prequalification Programme. Regional regulatory initiatives within zones 
with similar disease patterns should also be supported. 
 
The costs of R&D are not transparent 
 
High prices for medicines are justified by the pharmaceutical industry as 
compensation for the costs of R&D and the high failure rate. However, the 
real costs of R&D are not well known (Box 4). In 2014, industry-supported 
estimates set the average cost for medicines developed between 1995 and 
2007 at $2.5 billion per new product (table 6).58 Although direct 
comparisons are not possible because of the lack of comparative datapoints, 
R&D cost data from not-for-profit developers show that substantial 
innovations are possible for much less, especially for small molecules. For 
example, DNDi’s real cost for the development of a new chemical entity 
including the cost of failures is estimated at €100–150 million, or about 7% 
of the industry figure.59 The Commission argues for transparency in the 
costs of R&D to enable eﬀective dialogue and decision making on 
aﬀordable pricing of new essential medicines, and a fair return on R&D 
investments. 
 
Public funding of R&D: the public often pays twice 
 
Initial pharmaceutical research is often largely funded from public funds, 
such as the US National Institutes of Health or the European Horizon 2020 
programme. For childhood cancers, virtually all research funding comes 
from the National Cancer Institute, private foundations, and philanthropic 
sources.60 However, the final commercialisation steps of the development 
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process are usually done by for-profit pharmaceutical companies, which 
obtain the intellectual property rights from publicly funded research 
institutes, thus controlling the technology, including decisions about 
commercialisation and pricing.61 
Medicines should be priced such that the public does not pay twice for 
innovation: first through government-funded scientific research and then 
through high medicine prices. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health Paul Hunt has noted that, “[b]ecause of its critical social function, a 
patent on a life-saving medicine places important right-to-health 
responsibilities on the patent holder. These responsibilities are reinforced 
when the patented life-saving medicine benefited from R&D undertaken in 
publicly funded laboratories.”62 The student movement Universities Allied 
for Essential Medicines lobbies for responsible licensing by universities. 
The Commission recognises the need to actively manage and protect the 
public interest in the proceeds of state-funded research. 
 
Patent pooling supports generic manufacturing 
 
As a direct result of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property of 2008,63 UNITAID 
established an MPP for HIV medicines in 2010. The MPP initially focused 
on patents related to HIV medicines to promote low-cost generic 
production and the development of fixed-dose combinations and paediatric 
formulations. The MPP has expanded its mandate to cover hepatitis C and 
tuberculosis. In November, 2015, the MPP signed an agreement with 
Bristol-Myers Squibb that allows supply of generic daclatasvir in 112 
LMICs.64 Separate from the MPP, Gilead Sciences Inc has licensed patents 
for its hepatitis C virus medicines for use in 101 LMICs.65 Unfortunately, 
some MICs are excluded from these licences and must continue to rely on 
TRIPS flexibilities to access low-priced generics (appendix 5). Generics 
companies that produce hepatitis C virus and HIV medicines under a 
licence agreement with the MPP and Gilead Sciences Inc are mostly 
allowed to supply generic product to a country that makes use of TRIPS 
flexibilities.66  
After 5 years of operation of the MPP, millions of people have 
benefited and impressive financial savings have been achieved (Box 5). The 
Commission concludes that there is great potential for expanding access to 




























TRIPS flexibilities have been used widely but are under threat 
 
Patents present substantial challenges to medicines availability. However, 
flexibilities in patent law have been used by a number of countries to 
secure access to generic medicines. The most frequently deployed 
flexibilities are compulsory licensing of medicines, government use of 
patents, and the waiver that allows LDCs to postpone granting or enforcing 
medicines patents and test data protection until 2033. 
These options have been used more widely than is usually assumed. 
New figures70 show that since 2001, there have been 34 instances of 
compulsory licensing (CL) of medicines by 24 countries, 51 instances of 
government use of patents by 35 countries, and 32 of non-enforcement of 
Patent licences and agreements 
 
• Patent licences signed on 12 priority antiretroviral medicines with six patent holders, and 59 
sub-licences with 14 generic manufacturers. 
• One licence on a treatment for hepatitis C virus infection for 112 low-income and middle-
income countries. 
• One agreement to increase access to treatment of cytomegalovirus retinitis. 
• One agreement for antiretroviral medicines as nanomedicines, for all 135 low-income and 
middle-income countries and two high-income countries in Africa. 
 
Eﬀect on production and supply 
 
• Generic companies with MPP licences have supplied more than 7 million patient-years of 
WHO-recommended antiretroviral drugs in 117 countries, including 41 countries that were 
previously unable to benefit from generic competition for such medicines. 
• MPP licences enable manufacturing and sale of generic adult antiretroviral medicines to 87–
93% of people with HIV in the developing world, which includes all 34 low-income countries 
and 55–80% of middle-income countries. 
• MPP sublicensees supplied 4.3 million patient-years of tenofovir disoproxil fumarate in the 




• In 2011–12, in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Tunisia the price 
of tenofovir- containing products dropped to a median of 13% of the price before the 
agreement (2010–11).67 
• MPP agreements have led to antiretroviral medicines procurement savings of US$119·6 
million between 2010 and 2015. 
• The total direct global savings generated by the MPP68 are estimated at $2·2 billion by 2028, 
implying that for every dollar spent, the global community gains $40.69 
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patents by 24 World Trade Organization LDC Members. The peak of these 
instances falls between 2004 and 2008, coinciding with increased global 
funding for HIV. Although originally focused on HIV, 23 out of 85 total 
instances of CL and government use have concerned non-HIV medicines, 
including seven instances for cancer medicines between 2008 and 2014, of 
which five were granted. These measures have improved access to 
medicines. For example, in Thailand, CLs for erlotinib, docetaxel, letrozole, 
and clopidogrel save the health-care system $142 million per year.71 
In the past decade and a half, some countries have amended their 
patent laws to reflect health concerns. For example, India rewards 
innovation72 but prevents trivial patents and so-called ever-greening of 
patents.73 South Africa has proposed introducing patent examination to 
limit the number of inappropriate patents.74 Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Cambodia have all excluded medicines from patentability, pursuant to 
Decisions of the Council for TRIPS of June 27, 2002 (IP/C/25), and of June 
11, 2013 (IP/C/64).75 In December, 2015, the Organisation Africaine De La 
Propriété Intellectuelle amended the Bangui Agreement to allow its LDC 
members to postpone granting of patents and protection of regulatory test 
data until 2033.76 
However, the plethora of trade agreements with TRIPS-plus provisions 
is a serious threat to the policy and legal space that TRIPS provides. 
Examples of such provisions are patent linkage, data exclusivity, extension 
of the patent terms and scope, and restrictions on grounds for compulsory 
licensing and parallel importation. Some or all of these provisions appear 
in various trade agreements,77 78 79 in World Trade Organization accession 
agreements such as those with China and Cambodia, and in the Trans 
Pacific Partnership Agreement. It’s intellectual property chapter is 
promoted as the new standard for global trade rules.80 81  
The Commission believes that governments must make full use of all 
available TRIPS flexibilities and enable their eﬃcient use through national 
legislation. Governments should stop making TRIPS-plus demands in trade 
agreements and resist any pressure to include TRIPS-plus provisions in 
their national laws. The Commission believes that the drive for ever-higher 
levels of intellectual-property protection through trade agreements should 
be stemmed and will probably require intervention at the multilateral level. 
 
Many pharmaceutical companies neglect their social responsibility 
 
Globalised norms for patent protection and very high prices for new 
products make for a very successful pharmaceutical business model, thus 
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satisfying the needs of investors. However, it is increasingly clear that this 
approach endangers the progressive realisation of global health equity 
objectives and human rights. The global community has laid out a vision of 
health care as a human right in treaties such as the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which enshrined the 
right to health and was ratified by more than 160 countries. The right to 
essential medicines is a key component of the right to health,82 83 and this 
also implies certain human rights obligations for pharmaceutical 
companies.84 
Some pharmaceutical companies fail to acknowledge their unique role 
in society as the providers of life-saving medicines. One assessment of five 
large pharmaceutical companies showed that their corporate social 
responsibility approaches were inconsistently applied.85 419 In some cases, 
oﬃcial company credos are not in fact reflected in the company’s actions. 
For example, Johnson & Johnson publicly commits to striving to reduce 
costs and maintain reasonable prices, yet the company does not license its 
HIV medicines patents to the MPP;86 and one HIV medicine, darunavir, was 
priced at $810 per patient per year in certain LMIC markets for both a 600 
mg dose and only declined to $663 by 2015.87 In the USA, the price of 
Novartis’ imatinib for the treatment of chronic myeloid leukaemia has 
tripled since 2001,88 to $92 000 per year, although the company received 
orphan drug incentives for its development and the number of users 
continues to rise.89 It also vigorously defends its patents in LMICs that 
strive to have access to imatinib.90 91 AbbVie charges MICs $740 per patient 
per year for lopinavir/ritonavir (more than twice the price of $231 per 
patient per year in LDCs); this price has not changed since 2012. A price of 
more than $3500 per patient per year was quoted for lopinavir/ ritonavir in 
2014 in Malaysia. Investors’ profit-seeking has been blamed when 
companies fail to arrange for access pricing.92 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers in LMICs are also expected to contribute 
to public health needs. However, many fail to produce essential medicines, 
or to produce them according to acceptable quality standards.93 Academic 
institutions, when seeking to increase the commercial value of their 
research, also have an insuﬃcient focus on developing missing essential 
medicines.94 
 
Towards a global R&D framework that assures access and innovation 
 
The initial focus on R&D for neglected diseases in developing countries has 
driven many international policy developments in this area.95 However, a 
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simplistic dichotomy between developed and developing countries is no 
longer appropriate. LMICs are experiencing an epidemiological transition, 
with increasing prevalence of NCDs. Certain neglected tropical diseases 
and emerging diseases also pose a threat to HICs, due to climate change 
and international travel.96 97 98 Therefore, high prices of patented newly 
developed essential medicines aﬀect everyone in all settings. 
 
Market failure or public policy failure? 
 
The lack of private sector investment in developing medicines for 
diseases aﬀecting people without purchasing power or for small patient 
populations is often described as market failure. The Commission 
disagrees. Relying on a profit-driven R&D model to respond to public 
health needs represents a public policy failure. As Nobel laureate Sir 
John Sulston said, “We have to recognize that the free market, as good a 
servant as it is, is a bad master. We cannot take important global decisions 
on the basis of the free market alone.”99 432 Inadequate regulation of the 
business sector to protect and promote human rights is also a public 
policy failure.433 The Commission concludes that government intervention, 
including at the international level, is needed to ensure markets respond 
to public health needs, and to hold private sector partners accountable, 
including with regards to their responsibility to protect and promote 
human rights. 
 
Public spending, public policy—the urgent need for global action 
 
The imperative for governments to act is pressing. The global market of 
pharmaceutical products was almost $1 trillion in 2013, and is expected to 
have reached $1.2 trillion by 2017.100 The market share of LMICs, 
particularly those in Asia and Latin America, is growing at a rapid pace.101 
The global medicines market represents money the public spends, either 
out of pocket, or through health insurance, social security schemes, or tax-
based government-provided health care. Yet as previously described, 
industrial investment in R&D for neglected diseases remains very low. In 
2013, public and private investment for R&D in 34 neglected diseases was 
$3.2 billion, of which pharmaceutical corporations only contributed $401 
million. The latter amount represents only 0.8% of total industrial R&D 
spending of $51.2 billion in 2014.102 
Not-for-profit R&D initiatives have compensated for some deficiencies 
of the current system, but they cannot provide a permanent solution to the 
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underlying fundamental problem of an innovation system relying on 
market exclusivity. The Commission believes that governments need to 
proactively set public health-based research priorities for so-called essential 
R&D and not leave these priorities to pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Governments also need to finance new models of biomedical innovation 
that address access from the early stages of development, such as the 
Global Health Innovative Technology based in Japan. The massive 
spending on pharmaceuticals through increasingly higher pricing of 
medicines can be repurposed to shape a new R&D framework. As countries 
cannot do this on their own, it will require international agreement and 
regulation. 
 
Delinking R&D costs from the price of medicines 
 
The concept of delinking costs from prices is based on the premise that 
costs and risks associated with R&D should be rewarded, and incentives 
for R&D provided by means other than through the price of the product.103 
If the R&D cost of new medicines did not have to be recouped through 
high prices, those medicines would be free of market exclusivity and could 
be made more widely available and more aﬀordably priced through better 
competition. 
The Commission supports proposals to progressively delink the cost of 
R&D for priority medicines from the price of the products, and to develop 
new ways of sharing the cost burden of innovation internationally. As 
James Love suggested at the hearing of the UN High Level Panel on Access 
to Medicines in March 2016: “Let’s outcompete the patent-based 
innovation.” For example, countries could contribute to the development of 
missing essential medicines in amounts proportionate to their economic 
development. This contribution would reflect that R&D of essential 
medicines is a global public good, and would help to ensuring that the 
fruits of R&D eﬀorts are accessible to all. 
 
Public policy must be expressed in a global R&D framework 
 
In 2006, WHO stated that “access to drugs cannot depend on the decisions 
of private companies, but is also a government responsibility.”104 In 2008, 
after intense negotiations, WHO members adopted the Global Strategy and 
Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property 
(GSPA).105 The GSPA encourages needs-driven research rather than purely 
market-driven research and contains many practical recommendations. 
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Several proposals have been made for new policy frameworks and, in 
particular, new international agreements on medical R&D to achieve the 
two objectives of innovation and access.106 The first proposal was made by 
Hubbard and Love in 2004.107 439 Over the years, their proposal has received 
support from an increasing number of governments, scientists, Nobel 
laureates, civil society organisations, and other experts.108 109 110 In 2015, 
representatives of research and international organisations also called for a 
Global Biomedical R&D Fund and Mechanism for Innovations of Public 
Health Importance.111 Separate global financing mechanisms for innovation 
have been discussed for neglected diseases, antimicrobials, and Ebola virus, 
which all lack suﬃcient commercial market opportunities. As these are 
priorities for LICs, MICs, and HICs alike, the medical tools to address them 
should be considered as global public goods. All R&D needs should be 
reconciled within a global umbrella framework for funding and 
coordinating R&D that not only emphasises innovation but also secures 
access. 
The need for new global approaches was reinforced by UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s call for a new deal at the establishment of the High-
Level Panel for Access to Medicines in November 2015.112 The scope of this 
panel’s investigation was “to review and assess proposals and recommend 
solutions for remedying the policy incoherence between the justifiable 
rights of inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public 
health in the context of health technologies.”113 
WHO member states will continue to discuss the monitoring, 
coordination, and financing of health R&D, taking into account the report 
of the UN Panel114 and that of the WHO Consultative Expert Working 
Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination,115 
which recommended the establishment of a biomedical R&D treaty (Box 6). 
The talks about a new R&D framework are likely to be intensely political, 
as were the negotiations for the GSPA. It will be important for clear R&D 
priorities to inform this process.116 
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Box 6: An international agreement on research and development (R&D)117  
 
The necessary practical details of a new medical R&D framework will need 
to be negotiated. These global discussions on R&D priorities provide 
opportunities for national governments, WHO, and the UN to fulfil their 
obligations to present a bold new global framework for achieving the dual 
objectives of health-need driven R&D and equitable access to its 
products.121 122 
 
Pooling patents of new essential medicines promotes universal access to innovation 
 
On the basis of the positive outcomes of the MPP, the Commission 
concludes that there is a wide scope for patent pooling for other essential 
medicines (as defined by WHO or national committees). To this end, the 
current MPP could be expanded into an Essential MPP (or EMPP). This 
expansion would create an opportunity for companies to license patents for 
the purpose of creating a competitive generic market of essential medicines, 
in line with their responsibility to protect and promote human rights.123 
Patents of medicines developed under the new research agreement or new 
financing mechanisms could also be licensed. The EMPP should use a 
tiered royalty system to remunerate patent holders and to contribute to 
R&D expenditure at levels proportionate to the economies of the countries 
where the medicines are used.124 
 
Several proposals have been made for an international agreement on medical R&D to achieve 
the two objectives of financing needed innovations, and equitable access to those innovations. 
Key features of such an agreement include: 
• R&D priorities driven by health needs rather than commercial potential 
• Binding obligations on governments to invest in R&D 
• Equitable distribution of contributions across countries 
• Measures to improve the regulatory environment 
• Measures to ensure aﬀordability of the end product 
• Access-maximising licensing practices to deal with intellectual property issues 
• Innovative approaches to promote R&D while delinking its cost from the ultimate sale price 
 
Such an agreement could be crafted under the auspices of WHO, whose constitution allows for 
its 194 member states to negotiate formal international law.118 While both formal and informal 
norms (such as guidelines or global strategies) can influence the behaviour of states and other 
actors, binding international law oﬀers several potential advantages. An important precedent 
was set with the 2005 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the first public health 
agreement negotiated within WHO, which has contributed significantly to global tobacco 




The Commission notes that a patent owner’s refusal to license an 
essential medicine to the EMPP would satisfy the condition for granting a 
compulsory licence under TRIPS Article 31, which requires the grantee to 
have made eﬀorts to obtain authorisation from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions.125 There is no such 
requirement in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency, or public 
non-commercial use.126 Governments should also ensure that national 
patent legislation allows for easy deployment of TRIPS flexibilities, 
eﬀective automatic licensing of essential medicines in the absence of 
voluntary agreements, and regulatory rules for protection of test data that 
provide the necessary flexibility to register products submitted by 
licensees.127 
 
The pharmaceutical industry should live up to its special responsibilities 
 
Instances of important achievements when industry is open to 
collaboration are apparent. Examples have included the MPP, collaborative 
research for vaccines,128 and neglected diseases research. In recent years, 
some firms have made listings of their patents available. In 2016, 
GlaxoSmithKline announced that it will not file or enforce patents in LICs, 
license its patents in LMICs, make its patent landscape more transparent, 
and commit its future oncology medicine patents to patent pooling.129 459 
These hopeful developments might set important precedents. Yet the deep 
changes implied by a new global R&D framework will also require a 
general culture change in the industry and among its investors. 
Detailed descriptions of what would be expected from the industry 
have been formulated since 2001. For example, the UN Special 
Rapporteur130 and the Human Rights Council131 have defined the human 
rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies. These responsibilities 
include refraining from actions that limit accessibility, such as pursuing 
stronger intellectual property protection, and also taking all reasonable 
steps to make new medicines accessible to all those in need, within a viable 
business model. Company violations of these human rights principles give 
national governments a strong justification to impose corrective measures, 
such as compulsory licences for domestic production or importation. 
The ATM Index is an independent review mechanism by which the 
policies and practices of large pharmaceutical companies with regard to 
LMICs are assessed every two years. The ATM Index is strongly based on 
human rights principles and has been refined over time in collaboration 
with the industry. 
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The Commission believes that moving away from an exclusively profit-
oriented approach, towards a more patient-centred and public-centred, 
socially-responsive, open, and collaborative enterprise, would improve 
global health and the reputation of the pharmaceutical industry. As a result 
of the special nature of its products, the pharmaceutical industry has a 
unique role in society. It should now live up to this special responsibility, 




Access to new essential medicines is a key component of UHC and of the 
progressive realisation of the right to health. Some of the developments 
described in this section represent real progress and will help bring new 
essential medicines to the market; and for certain diseases they will bring 
medicine prices down. Yet the recommended policies are often restricted to 
certain therapeutic areas (eg, HIV, neglected diseases, or paediatric 
formulations), and they are not sustainable when largely dependent on 
charitable contributions. While repairing some of its excesses, these partial 
solutions leave the existing system in place. 
With the current patent-based innovation system, the feasibility of 
achieving or maintaining UHC is seriously at risk. The Commission 
therefore believes that business as usual will not resolve the problems with 
R&D, and that concerted global action is the only way forward. A new 
global R&D policy framework is needed to drastically adapt the current 
model and to reduce its reliance on market exclusivity as the main driver of 
innovation. The Commission concludes that a more public health-oriented 
R&D system is needed, but recognises that no country can tackle this issue 
on its own. International public policy should play a much greater role in 
setting R&D priorities and financing, and in coordinating new approaches 
to promote access to new essential medicines. 
Practically, the Commission concludes that governments need to define 
a list of missing essential medicines to be provided under UHC schemes. 
Governments and non-governmental organisations need to make the 
necessary R&D financing mechanisms available for these identified needs. 
The price of new essential medicines can then be delinked from 
development costs and the products can be made widely available and 
aﬀordable through non-exclusive licensing agreements. The resultant 
decrease in price can provide the financial space to more directly finance 




The Commission’s analysis shows that challenges of access to new essential 
medicines are directly associated to the failure of the current R&D system 
to develop much needed new medicines. The Commission makes the 
following recommendations for stronger public policies on R&D, including 
at the international level. 
 
1. Governments and WHO must take international public leadership for 
priority setting for essential R&D, with due regard for the public health 
needs of LMICs. This should include developing a list of missing 
essential medicines, within the context of the WHO Global Health R&D 
observatory and in close connection with the WHO Model List of 
Essential Medicines. The WHO mechanism to identify missing essential 
medicines should be further developed, with the involvement of all 
relevant stakeholders. 
2. Governments must lead the process towards a global R&D policy 
framework and agreements, which include new financing mechanisms 
to ensure that missing essential medicines are developed and made 
aﬀordable. Such mechanisms should be based on transparent estimates 
of the real cost of R&D; they might include a pooled fund for global 
health R&D, prize funds, targeted research partnerships and advance 
market agreements, and licensing of related patents, leading to an 
increasing number of new priority products with an aﬀordable price 
which is delinked from R&D costs (known as progressive delinking). 
3. The international community must create a general EMPP. Such a pool 
could be hosted and managed by the current MPP. Companies should 
license their patents related to essential medicines to the EMPP under a 
set of conditions. Patents of medicines developed under the new 
research agreement or any other new financing mechanism could also 
be licensed through the EMPP. The EMPP should use a tiered royalty 
system to remunerate the patent holder and to contribute to R&D 
expenditure. 
4. Governments and national stakeholders must develop and implement 
comprehensive national action plans to guarantee equitable access to 
new essential medicines, including open knowledge innovation, fair 
licensing practices, support for a patent pool for essential medicines, 




5. The pharmaceutical industry must better align its R&D priority setting 
with global health needs, and develop access strategies to make 
medically important innovations available to all in need. To this end 
the industry could determine a certain percentage of its profits to 
reinvest in R&D for medicines that are not commercially attractive, but 
are deemed essential from a public health perspective. Equitable access 
strategies should include broad licensing of patents and technology 
transfer to enable generic medicines production; and equitable pricing 
mechanisms. The policies and practices of pharmaceutical companies 
should be independently assessed by international mechanisms, such 






1  WHO. Research and development to meet health needs in developing countries: strengthening 
global financing and coordination. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2012. 
2  Ward JW, Mermin JH. Simple, effective, but out of reach? Public health implications of HCV 
drugs. N Engl J Med 2015; 373: 2678–80. 
3    Hollande F. Towards a global agenda on health security. Lancet 2016; 387: 2173–74. 
4  WHO. Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011. 
5 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH). Public health, 
innovation and intellectual property rights. 2006. http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ 
report/en/ index.html (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
6  WHO Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development (CEWG). Financing and 
coordination. Research and development to meet health needs in developing countries: 
Strengthening global financing and coordination. April 2012. http://www.who.int/phi/ 
cewg_report/en/index.html (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
7  Kaplan W, Laing R. Priority Medicines for Europe and the World (WHO/EDM/PAR//2004.7). 
2004.http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/68769/1/WHO_EDM_PAR_2004.7.pdf (accessed 
July 4, 2016). 
8  Kaplan W, Wirtz VJ, Mantel-Teeuwisse A, Stolk P, Duthey B, Laing R. Priority medicines for Europe and 
the World 2013 update. 2013. http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/priority_medicines/ 
MasterDocJune28_FINAL_Web.pdf?ua=1 (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
9  Jamison DT, Summers LH, Alleyne G, et al. Global health 2035: a world converging within a 
generation. Lancet 2013; 382: 1898–955. 
10 UN Commission on Life-Saving Commodities for Women and Children. Commissioners’ Report. 
Aug 31, 2012. http://www.unfpa. org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Final%20UN%20Commission% 
20 Report_14sept2012.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
11 UN Commission on Life-Saving Commodities for Women and Children. Commissioners’ Report. 
Aug 31, 2012. http://www.unfpa. org/sites/default/fi les/pub-pdf/Final%20UN%20Commission% 
20 Report_14sept2012.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
12  Mendelson M, Røttingen JA, Gopinathan U, et al. Maximising access to achieve appropriate 
human antimicrobial use in lowincome and middle-income countries. Lancet 2016; 387: 188–98. 
13  Saint Raymond A. Regulatory aspects of drug development in children: change and resistance to 
change. Expert Rev Clin Pharmacol 2010; 3: 593–95. 
126 
14  Finney E. Children’s medicines: A situational analysis. 2011. http://www.who.int/childmedicines/ 
progress/CM_analysis.pdf?ua=1 (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
15 Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation. About Pediatric AIDS. http://www.pedaids.org/ 
pages/about-pediatric-aids (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
16 Access to Medicine Foundation. The Access to Medicine index 2014. http://www.accessto 
medicineindex.org/sites/2015.atmindex.org/files/2014_accesstomedicineindex_fullreport_clicka
blepdf.pdf (accessed April 9, 2016). 
17 WHO. Global action plan on antimicrobial resistance. 2015. http:// www.who.int/antimicrobial-
resistance/global-action- plan/en (accessed Oct 1, 2016). 
18 Outterson K. New Business Models for Sustainable Antibiotics. London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2014. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/ public/ 
Research/Global%20Health/0214Sustainable Antibiotics.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
19  Fox M. “No Market”: scientists struggle to make Ebola vaccines, treatments. NBC News (New 
York, NY) July 29, 2014. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/no-market-
scientistsstruggle-make-ebola-vaccines- treatments-n167871 (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
20 Henao-Restrepo AM, Longini IM, Egger M, et al. Efficacy and effectiveness of an rVSV-vectored 
vaccine expressing Ebola surface glycoprotein: interim results from the Guinea ring vaccination 
cluster-randomised trial. Lancet 2015; 386: 857– 66. 
21  Jones SM, Feldmann H, Ströher U, et al. Live attenuated recombinant vaccine protects 
nonhuman primates against Ebola and Marburg viruses. Nat Med 2005; 11: 786–90. 
22  The Commission on Health Research for Development. Health research: essential link to equity 
in development. 1990. http://www. cohred.org/downloads/open_archive/ComReports_0.pdf 
(accessed July 19, 2015). 
23 Trouiller P, Torreele E, Olliaro P, et al. Drugs for neglected diseases: a failure of the market and a 
public health failure? Trop Med Int Health 2001; 6: 945–51. 
24 Pedrique B, Strub-Wourgaft N, Some C, et al. The drug and vaccine landscape for neglected 
diseases (2000–11): a systematic assessment. Lancet Glob Health 2013; 1: e371–79. 
25  Année du medicament. Rev Prescrire 35 (376):132-136, 2015. English summary available online. 
http://english.prescrire.org/ en/1 09B561E03CAD2313B7046521B310752/Download.aspx 
(accessed April 10, 2016). 
26  Bach PB, Saltz LB, Wittes RE. In cancer care, cost matters. New York Times (New York, NY), pA25, 
Oct 15, 2012. http://www. nytimes.com/2012/10/15/ opinion/a-hospital-says-no-to-an-11000-
a-month-cancer-drug.html?_ r=0 (accessed April 10, 2016).  
27 Moberly T. Exclusive: PCTs ‘blacklist’ drugs backed by NICE. Nov 24, 2011. 
http://www.gponline.com/News/article/1105156/ExclusivePCTs-blacklist-drugs-backed-NICE/ 
(accessed April 10, 2016). 
28    Rawlins M. Michael Rawlins: playing fair on treatments. Health Serv J 2012; 122: 18. 
29  Lyons J. Sue NHS to stop drug rationing: Watchdog urges patients to take action against health 
trusts which deny them expensive medicine. Mirror (London) Aug 3, 2012. 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/ news/uk-news/nice-urges-patients-to-take-action-1214102 (accessed 
April 10, 2016). 
30  McKee S. NHS trusts unlawfully denying patients NICE drugs. PharmaTimes (London), Aug 7, 
2012.http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/12-08-07/NHS_trusts_unlawfully_denying_patients_ 
NICE_drugs.  aspx (accessed April 10, 2016). 
31 Gaffney A, Mezher M. Regulatory explainer: everything you need to know about FDA’s priority 
review vouchers. July 2, 2015, updated March 2, 2016. http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/ 
News/2015/07/02/21722/ Regulatory-Explainer-Everything-YouNeed-to-Know-About-FDA%E2% 
80%99s-Priority-Review-Vouchers/ (accessed April 10, 2016). 
32 Pécoul B, Balasegaram M. FDA voucher for leishmaniasis treatment: can both patients and 
companieswin?http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2015/01/20/fda-voucher-leishmaniasis 
treatment-can-patients-companies-win/ (accessed April 10, 2016). 
 127 
33 Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative. Business plan 2015—2023. http://www.dndi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/03/DNDi_ Business_Plan_2015-2023.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
34 Light DW, Warburton R. Demythologizing the high costs of pharmaceutical research. Biosocieties 
2011; 6: 34–50. 
35 Love J. KEI comment on the new Tufts Study on Drug Development Costs. Nov 18, 2014. 
http://keionline.org/node/2127 (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
36 Hirschler B. GlaxoSmithKline boss says new drugs can be cheaper. http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/03/14/us-glaxosmithklineprices-idUSBRE92 D0RM20130314(accessed July11, 2016). 
37 Light DW, Warburton R. Demythologizing the high costs of pharmaceutical research. Biosocieties 
2011; 6: 34–50. 
38 DiMasi JA, Hansen RW, Grabowski HG, Lasagna L. Cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry. J Health Econ 1991; 10: 107–42. 
39 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Pharmaceutical R&D: costs, risks, and rewards. 
OTA-H-522. February 1993. http:// govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_1/DATA/1993/9336.PDF 
(accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
40 DiMasi JA, Hansen RW, Grabowski HG. The price of innovation: new estimates of drug 
development costs. J Health Econ 2003; 22: 151–85. 
41 Mestre-Ferrandiz J, Sussex J, Towse A. The R&D cost of a new medicine. December 2012. 
https://www.ohe.org/ publications/rdcost-new-medicine (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
42 DiMasi JA, Grabowski HG, Hansen RW. Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: new estimates 
of R&D costs. J Health Econ 2016; 47: 20–33. 
43 Global Alliance for TB Drug Development. Executive summary for the economics of TB drug 
development. October 2001. http://www.tballiance.org/downloads/publications/ TBA_ 
Economics_Report_Exec.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
44 Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative. An innovative approach to R&D for neglected patients. 
Ten years of experience and lessons learned by DNDi. 2013. http://www.dndi.org/2014/ 
advocacy/ten-yearsof-experience-and-lessons-learned- by-dndi/ (accessed July 22, 2016). 
45 Kiddell-Monroe R, Greenberg E, Basey M. Re:Route: a map of the alternative biomedical R&D. 
2015. http://altreroute.com/ (accessed July 6, 2016). 
46 European Parliament, Council of the European Union. Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human 
and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency. March 31, 2004. 
http://ec.europa.eu/ health/fi les/eudralex/vol-1/reg_2004_726/reg_2004_ 726_en.pdf 
(accessed Sept 29, 2016). 
47 European Medicines Agency. Article 58 applications: regulatory and procedural guidance. 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/document_listing/document
_listing_000157.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac05800240d1 (accessed Feb 28, 2016) 
48 Pécoul B, Balasegaram M. FDA voucher for leishmaniasis treatment: can both patients and 
companies win? http://blogs.plos. org/speakingofmedicine/2015/01/20/fda-voucher-
leishmaniasistreatment-can-patients-companies-win/ (accessed April 10, 2016). 
49 Doshi P. US incentive scheme for neglected diseases: a good idea gone wrong? BMJ 2014; 349: g4665. 
50 Médecins Sans Frontières. Health groups ask senate for changes to FDA priority review voucher 
program for neglected diseases. Nov 19, 2015. http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/ 
article/healthgroups-ask-senate-changes-fda-priority-review-voucher-programneglected-
diseases (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
51 United States Government Publishing Offi ce. One hundred twelfth congress of the United States 
of America at the second session. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s3187enr/ 
pdf/BILLS- 112s3187enr.pdf (accessed April 10,2016). 
52 European Medicines Agency. Paediatric regulation EU. http://www. ema.europa.eu/ 
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/ regulation/document_ listing/document_listing_000068.jsp (accessed 
April 10, 2016). 
128 
53  Olski TM, Lampus SF, Gherarducci G, Saint Raymond A. Three years of paediatric regulation in 
the European Union. Eur J Clin Pharmacol 2011; 67: 245–52. 
54 Prescrire Who benefits from the European Paediatric Regulation? Nov 28, 2012. 
http://english.prescrire.org/Docu/DOCSEUROPE/20121128_ EN_ResponsePediatricRegul.pdf 
(accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
55  Hoppu K, Hogerzeil HV. Global aspects of drug development. In: Seyberth HW, Rane A, Schwab 
M, eds. Pediatric clinical pharmacology. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011: 353–372. 
56 Council of the European Union. Council conclusions on strengthening the balance in the 




Member+States (accessed June 21, 2016). 
57 Sam T, Stevens R. R&D pharmaceutical industry perspective on specifi cations for pediatric 
medicines. http://www.unicef.org/ supply/fi les/8_Tom_Sam_-_IFPMA_-_R_and_D_ 
Pharmaceutical_ Industry_Perspective.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
58 The Economist. The price of failure. A startling new cost estimate for new medicines is met with 
scepticism. Economist (London) Nov 29, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/ 
business/21635005-startling-new-cost-estimate-new-medicines-met-scepticism-pricefailure 
(accessed July 31, 2016). 
59  Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative. An innovative approach to R&D for neglected patients. 
Ten years of experience and lessons learned by DNDi. 2013. http://www.dndi.org/ 
2014/advocacy/ ten-yearsof-experience-and-lessons-learned- by-dndi/ (accessed July 22, 2016). 
60  Adamson PC, Houghton PJ, Perilongo G, Pritchard-Jones K. Drug discovery in paediatric 
oncology: roadblocks to progress. Nat Rev Clin Oncol 2014; 11: 732–39. 
61  Reichman J, So A, Sampat B, Cook-Deegan R, Weissman R, Kapczynski A. Is Bayh-Dole good for 
developing countries? Lessons from the U.S. experience. PLoS Biol 2008; 6: e262. 
62 Hunt P. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health, annex: mission to GlaxoSmithKline, UN Doc. No. 
A/HRC/11/12/ Add.2. May 5, 2009. New York, NY: United Nations, 2009. 
63 WHO. Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011. 
64  Medicines Patent Pool. The Medicines Patent Pool signs licence with Bristol-Myers Squibb to 
increase access to hepatitis C medicine Daclatasvir. Geneva: Medicines Patent Pool, Nov 23, 
2015.http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/the-medicines-patent-poolsigns-licence-with-bristol-
myers-squibb-to-increase-access-tohepatitis-c-medicine-daclatasvir/ (accessed Aug 8, 2016). 
65 Gilead. Chronic Hepatitis C Treatment Expansion – Generic Manufacturing for Developing 
Countries. August 2015. https:// www.gilead.com/~/media/fi les/pdfs/other/hcv%20generic%20 
agreement%20fast%20facts%20021616.pdf (accessed Aug 8, 2016). 
66 ‘t Hoen EF. Indian hepatitis C drug patent decision shakes public health community. Lancet 2016; 
387: 2272–73. 
67  Medicines Patent Pool Progress and achievements of the medicines patent pool 2010–2015. 
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/wpcontent/uploads/WEB_Progress_Report_2015_EN.pdf 
(accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
68 Medicines Patent Pool. Progress and achievements of the medicines patent pool 2010–2015. 
http://www.medicines patentpool.org/wpcontent/uploads/WEB_Progress_Report_2015_EN.pdf 
(accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
69  Burrone E, Perry G. Ensuring new medicines reach those in most need. Lancet HIV, 2: e362–63. 
70 ‘t Hoen E. Private Patents and Public Health: Changing intellectual property rules for access to 
medicines. http://accesstomedicines. org/resources/ (accessed July 24, 2016). 
71 Mohara A, Yamabhai I, Chaisiri K, Tantivess S, Teerawattananon Y. Impact of the introduction of 
 129 
government use licenses on the drug expenditure on seven medicines in Thailand. Value Health 
2012; 15 (suppl): S95–99. 
72 Hogerzeil HV, Liberman J, Wirtz VJ, et al, for the Lancet NCD Action Group. Promotion of access 
to essential medicines for noncommunicable diseases: practical implications of the UN political 
declaration. Lancet 2013; 381: 680–89. 
73 Government of India. The patents act, section 3: what are not inventions. Part (d). 1970. 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ IPActs_Rules/ updated_Version/sections/ps3.html (accessed July 9, 2016). 
74 Malebona PM. Intervention at the 134th session of the World Health Organization’s Executive 
Board under agenda item 9.7. Jan 23, 2014. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2014. 
75 Boulet P, ‘t Hoen E. Procurement of patented medicines by SADC Member States: a report for 
SADC Member States and the future SADC Pharmaceutical Procurement Services (SPPS) based 
on the lessons learned during the Trade, TRIPS and Access to Medicines project 2012–2014. 
https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/286925982_Procurement_of_ Patented_Medicines_ 
by_SADC_Member_States (accessed March 3, 2016). 
76 Article 46 Organisation Africaine De La Propriete Intellectuelle (Oapi). Accord De Bangui Instituant 
Une Organisation Africaine De La Propriete Intellectuelle, Acte Du 14 Decembre 2015. http:// 
www.oapi.int/index.php/fr/toute-lactualite/579-le-benin-signelaccord-de-bangui-revise (accessed 
Sept 29, 2016). 
77 Office of the United States Trade Representative. CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central 
AmericaFTA).https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic- 
central-america-fta (accessed July 6, 2016). 
78 Malpani R. All costs, no benefits: how the US-Jordan free trade agreement affects access to 
medicines. J Generic Med 2009; 6: 206–17.  
79 Secretariat NAFTA. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 2014. https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Legal- Texts/ North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement (accessed July 6, 2016). 
80 UNITAID. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: implications for access to medicines and 
public health. 2014. http://www.unitaid. eu/images/marketdynamics/publications/TPPA-
Report_ Final.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
81 van Onselen L. TPP IP chapter “a disaster for global health”. http:// www.macrobusiness. 
com.au/2015/10/tpp-ip- chapter-a-disaster-forglobal-health/ (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
82 United Nations Economic and Social Council. General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights). Geneva: United Nations, 2000. 
83 Hogerzeil HV. Essential medicines and human rights: what can they learn from each other? Bull 
World Health Organ 2006; 84: 371–75. 
84 Hunt P. The right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
A/61/338, 2006, 19–21. http://www. who.int/medicines/areas/human_rights/A61_338.pdf 
(accessed July 6, 2016). 
85 Salton R, Jones S. The corporate social responsibility reports of global pharmaceutical fi rms. 
BJHCM 2015; 21: 21–25. 
86 Johnson & Johnson. Our Credo values. http://www.jnj.com/aboutjnj/jnj-credo (accessed July 6, 
2016). 
87 Access Campaign MSF. Untangling the web of antiretroviral price reductions. 18th edn. July 2016. 
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/ untangling-web-antiretroviral-price-reductions (accessed July 
6, 2016). 
88 Experts in Chronic Myeloid Leukemia. The price of drugs for chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) is a 
refl ection of the unsustainable prices of cancer drugs: from the perspective of a large group of 
CML experts. Blood 2013; 121: 4439–42. 
89  Gagnon MA. New drug pricing: does it make any sense? Prescrire Int 2015; 24: 192–95. 
90  Silverman E. Novartis, Colombia face off over cancer drug cost. STATNews (Boston, MA), June 14, 
2016.https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/06/14/novartis-colombia-drug-costs/ (accessed 
130 
Aug 13, 2016). 
91 ’t Hoen E. A victory for global public health in the Indian Supreme Court. J Public Health Policy 
2013; 34: 370–74. 
92 Crow D. Valeant: the harder they fall. Financial Times (London), March 28, 2016. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dbc52fa8- f0d6-11e5-9f20-c3a047354386.html#axzz4Dj7y9Xms 
(accessed July 6, 2016). 
93 Kaplan WA. Local production and access to medicines in low- and middle-income countries. A 
literature review and critical analysis. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011. 
94 Stephens P, Leufkens HGM. Research and Development. In: World medicines situation, 2011. 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011. 
95 World Health Organization. Macroeconomics and health: investing in health for economic 
development: report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 2001. 
http://www.who.int/ macrohealth/infocentre/advocacy/en/ investinginhealth02052003. pdf 
(accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
96  Jennings G. Emerging infection diseases: global risks, global strategy. A global village. Oct 5, 
2011. http://www.aglobalvillage.org/ journal/issue5/the-right-to-health/emerging-infectious-
disease/ (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
97  Hotez P. The disease next door: how the world’s nastiest and leastknown outbreaks are afflicting 
some of the world’s wealthiest countries. March 25, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/ 
2013/03/25/ the-disease-next-door/ (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
98  Kelly JC. First Zika virus in continental United States confirmed in Texas. Medscape Medical News 
(New York, NY), Jan 11, 2016. 
99   Sulston J. Presentation. Neglected Diseases Group Meeting; Penang, Malaysia; Feb 6–7, 2004. 
100 Pharmaceutical Commerce. IMS Institute projects global pharmaceutical market of $1·17–1·20 
trillion in 2017. Jan 20, 2014. http://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/business-and-fi nance/ 
imsinstitute-projects-global-pharma-market-of-1-17-1-20-trillion-in-2017/ (accessed July 31, 
2016). 
101 IMS Health Institute for Healthcare Informatics. Global medicines use in 2020: outlook and 
Implications. 2015. http://www.imshealth. com/en/thought-leadership/ims-institute/reports/ 
global-medicinesuse-in-2020 (accessed April 10, 2016). 
102 PhRMA. Biopharmaceutical research industry 2015 profi le. April 2015. http://www.phrma.org/ 
sites/default/fi les/pdf/2014_PhRMA_ PROFILE.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
103 WHO. Trilateral study: Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation. Intersections 
between public health, intellectual property and trade.’ http://www.wto.org/english/ 
res_e/booksp_e/ pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
104 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH). Public health, 
innovation and intellectual property rights. 2006. http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ 
report/en/ index.html (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
105 WHA. Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property. 
Resolution 61.21. Geneva: World Health Assembly, 2008. 
106 Moon S, ’t Hoen E. Medicines for the World: a global R&D treaty could boost innovation and 
improve the health of the world’s poor—and rich. The Scientist (Midland, ON), Oct 1, 2012. 
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32664/title/ Medicines-for-the-World/ 
(accessed July 7, 2016). 
107 Hubbard T, Love J. A new trade framework for global healthcare R&D. PLoS Biol 2004; 2: E52. 
108 Governments of Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, and Suriname. Proposal for WHO discussions on 
a biomedical R&D treaty. 2015. http://www.who.int/phi/Bangladesh_Barbados_Bolivia_ 
Suriname_R_DTreaty.pdf (accessed July 7, 2016). 
109 Dentico N, Ford N. The courage to change the rules: a proposal for an essential health R&D 
treaty. PLoS Med 2005; 2: e14. 
110 Health Action International Global, Initiative for Health and Equity in Society, Knowledge Ecology 
 131 
International, Medecins Sans Frontières, Third World Network. An essential health & biomedical 
treaty. 2011. http://www.who.int/phi/news/phi_1_joint_ submission_en.pdf (accessed July 11, 2016). 
111 Balasegaram M, Bréchot C, Farrar J, et al. A global biomedical R&D fund and mechanism for 
innovations of public health importance. PLoS Med 2015; 12: e1001831. 
112 UNDP. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issues call for new deal on medicines. Dec 11, 2015. 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/12/11/secretar
y-general-banki-moon-issues-call-for-new-deal-on-medicines.html (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
113 UNDP. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issues call for new deal on medicines. Dec 11, 2015. 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/12/11/secretary
-general-banki-moon-issues-call-for-new-deal-on-medicines.html (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
114 UN. The United Nations Secretary-General’s high-level panel on access to medicines. Final 
report. 2016. http://www. unsgaccessmeds.org/fi nal-report/ (accessed Oct 8, 2016). 
115 WHA. Follow up of the report of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and 
Development: Financing and Coordination (resolution WHA 66.22). Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2013. 
116 Agitha TG. Alternative incentive models delinking R&D costs from pharmaceutical product price. 
JIPR 2013; 18: 491–98. 
117 Moon S, Bermudez J, ’t Hoen E. Innovation and access to medicines for neglected populations: 
could a treaty address a broken pharmaceutical R&D system? PLoS Med 2012; 9: e1001218. 
118 WHA. Constitution of the World Health Organization. Basic Documents, forty-fi fth edition. October 
2006. http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (accessed July 7, 2016). 
119 Nikogosian H. WHO framework convention on tobacco control: a key milestone. Bull World 
Health Organ 2010; 88: 83. 
120 Velasquez G, Seuba X. Rethinking global health: a binding convention for R&D for 
pharmaceutical products (research paper 42). 2011. http://www.southcentre.int/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/ RP42_Rethinking-global-health_EN.pdf (accessed July 7, 2016). 
121 El Said M, Kapczynski A. Access to Medicines: the role of intellectual property law and policy. 
Working paper prepared for the 3rd Meeting of the Technical Advisory Group of the Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law, July 7–9, 2011. http://www. unsgaccessmeds.org/the-process/ 
(accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
122 Seuba X. Global Health Law Committee of the International Law Association Submission to the 
UN High Level Panel. Feb 22, 2016. http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/22/ 
contributionxavier-seubaon-behalf-of-global-health-law-committeeof-the-international-law-
association (accessed April 10, 2016). 
123 UN. Guidelines for pharmaceutical companies. Document A/63/263; p. 6-12. New York, NY: UN 
General Assembly, 2008. 
124 Love J. Remuneration guidelines for non-voluntary use of a patent on medial technologies. 
Health Economics and Drugs TCM Series no. 18 (WHO/TCM/2005.1). 2005. http://www.who.int/ 
hiv/amds/ WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf (accessed Feb 28, 2016). 
125 WHO. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, part II – standards concerning the 
availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights, article 31. https://www.wto.org/ 
english/ docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm (accessed July 7, 2016). 
126  WHO. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, part II – standards concerning the 
availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights, article 31. https://www.wto.org/ 
english/ docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm (accessed July 7, 2016). 
127 Global Health Law Committee of the International Law Association. Submission to the UN High-
Level on Access to Medicines by the Global Health Law Committee, 2016. 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ groningen-centre-for-law-and-governance/onderzoekscentra/ 
ghlg/ ila-ghlc-proposal1-hlp-process-update.pdf (accessed July 6, 2016). 
128 IDRI. IDRI and Sanofi Pasteur team with philanthropy to develop new model for vaccine 
development. Oct 15, 2015. http://idri.org/ press-10-15-15.php (accessed July 6, 2016). 
132 
129 GSK. GSK expands graduated approach to patents and intellectual property to widen access to 
medicines in the world’s poorest countries. March 31, 2016. http://www.gsk.com/en-
gb/media/pressreleases/2016/gsk-expands-graduated-approach-to-patents-andintellectual-
property-to-widen-access-to-medicines-in-the-world-spoorest-countries/ (accessed April 1, 
2016). 
130 UN. Guidelines for pharmaceutical companies. Document A/63/263; p. 6-12. New York, NY: UN 
General Assembly, 2008. 
131 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Guiding principles on business and human 




Conclusions and Reflections on the Future 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the research project, and how they 
address the individual research questions described in chapters 2-6. It also 
comments on the methodology, and concludes with reflections on the 
future and suggestions for further research. 
The HIV treatment crisis of the late nineties and early 2000s, and the 
civil society activism and political engagement it generated, drove a policy 
process that changed some of the international rules on intellectual 
property (IP) and the approach to their implementation. These policy 
processes introduced new flexibilities and strengthened existing flexibilities 
in IP law that have become known as TRIPS flexibilities. The global effort 
to improve access to treatment for HIV and other diseases also created new 
global health financing mechanisms, and new mechanisms to facilitate the 
availability of quality-assured generic medicines, such as the World Health 
Organization's Prequalification Program (PQP). These developments 
provided the conditions for the large-scale production, purchase, and use 
of generic low priced medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. The 
widespread use of the TRIPS flexibilities has been pivotal to access lower-
priced essential HIV medications in those countries where patents formed a 
barrier to making the medicines available. 
Considering the growing burden of non-communicable diseases, 
including in low and middle-income countries, and the drive towards 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC), the key question this thesis addresses 
is: Can intellectual property solutions developed to address the HIV/AIDS 





Chapter 2 documented the legal and policy developments that drove the 
change in the approach to IP and public health against the backdrop of the 
AIDS crisis of the late nineties. Policy processes at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and specifically the adoption of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001, offered important 
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clarification of the existing flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement. 
These processes also created new legal options for LDCs that allow them to 
postpone granting and enforcing medicines patents and data protection 
until at least 2033, and new provisions for compulsory licensing for 
production and export of generic medicines. 
The role of international organisations other than the WTO, including 
the Human Rights Council, the WHO, and civil society organisations, have 
been essential in moving the subject of IP out of the exclusive realm of 
trade negotiations. As a result, public health considerations, including the 
protection of the human right to health, became more central in multilateral 
discussions on IP at both the WTO and WIPO.1 The Doha Declaration 
demonstrated international political support for the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities. This support was a significant signal that intellectual property 
protection serves the public interest, an interest beyond that of IP rights 
holders, which are mostly commercial companies. 
We can conclude that the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration 
provide the necessary legal flexibility to address IP challenges to access to 
medicines in general and that this flexibility has been used for the supply of 
HIV medicines. However, our study could not determine whether political 
support will emerge for the use of the TRIPS flexibilities for other diseases 
than HIV. 
 
Chapter 3 addressed the question how the UN guaranteed the quality of 
generic HIV medicines. Overcoming patent barriers to generic medicines is 
only one prerequisite to access; another essential condition is ensuring that 
the medicines are of acceptable quality. Quality assurance of medicines 
may sound like a purely technical endeavour but, in reality, it can be mired 
in political controversy, as described in chapter 3. The UN, through the 
WHO Prequalification of Medicines Program (PQP), succeeded in assuring 
the quality of HIV medicines at a global scale. 
The following aspects played an essential role in the success of the PQP 
programme. The programme had rigorous review procedures and acted in 
a transparent manner, which helped instil confidence in its work. It was 
supported through resolutions of the World Health Assembly, which were 
important to garner political support, to regularly assess progress, and to 
strengthen its mandate. The PQP maintained its independence from 
industrial interests. It did not work in isolation, as it collaborated with 
national regulators from high, middle and low-income countries. In doing 
so it emphasised transfer of knowledge to and capacity building of 
regulators from less-resourced countries. An important aspect contributing 
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to the power and effectiveness of the PQP was the fact that global health 
donors demanded from their recipients that they buy prequalified 
medicines. This condition convinced manufacturers to collaborate with the 
PQP because it restricted the market for those manufacturers who did not 
wish to submit their dossiers to the WHO PQP. The PQP could also show 
its high economic value through its contributions to lowering the price of 
WHO recommended fixed-dose ARVs and other medicines. The economic 
value of the prequalification work helped in continued fundraising for the 
programme. 
Our findings are relevant today because the PQP will continue to play 
an important role in quality assurance of new essential medicines beyond 
HIV, such as hepatitis C medicines and biologics. The PQP has become a 
global public good, which requires public financing to sustain it. The 
current pressure on the WHO to move to a partially self-financed model, 
which in reality means a user-financed model in which the manufacturers 
pay, carries significant dangers with regards to the sustainability and 
independence of the PQP Program. Global health donors that chose not to 
pay for the program directly now risk having to pay the price for the lack of 
quality assured affordable medicines later. 
 
Chapter 4 presented the study of the practical use of the TRIPS flexibilities 
by governments in the procurement of medicines in the years 2001 – 2016. 
Prequalified generic antiretroviral medicines, including FDCs produced at 
a low price in India, could not be made available in countries where 
originator companies held patents. The use of the TRIPS flexibilities 
became important in lifting the barrier posed by these patents. However, 
the extent to which the flexibilities were used in practice was not really 
known until the development of the database of instances of the use of the 
TRIPS flexibilities that formed the basis for the study. The general belief 
was that its use was rather limited. 
Our study identified 176 instances of the use of or intention to use 
TRIPS flexibilities by 89 countries, of which 81 were WTO Members. Of the 
176 instances, 100 (56.8%) concerned compulsory licences, including public 
non-commercial use licences, and 40 (22.7%) concerned instances of the use 
of the LDC waiver. The remaining cases concerned parallel import (1), 
patent exception (3), and non-patent-related measures (32). Of the instances 
documented, 152 (86.4%) were executed. The instances covered products to 
treat 14 different diseases. However, 137 (77.8%) of the instances concerned 
medicines for HIV/AIDS and/or related diseases. In conclusion, the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities by countries in the procurement of generic medicines in 
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particular ARVs has been significant in lifting patent monopolies. The use 
of the flexibilities was initially driven by the procurement of medicines for 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS. However, it is noteworthy that out of the 176 
instances 12 concerned cancer treatments. These instances, most of which 
occurred after 2010, may point at an increase in uptake of TRIPS flexibilities 
for non-communicable diseases, in particular in middle-income countries 
that have the medical infrastructure to provide cancer treatment and are 
confronted with growing demands from their populations for expensive 
patented medicines. All in all, our study therefore shows that the use of 
TRIPS Flexibilities has been effective in accessing lower-priced generic 
medicines; and could remain so in the future. 
Availability of generic medicines requires registration by national 
regulatory authorities. Rules on clinical test data protection (data 
exclusivity), which prohibits regulatory authorities from registering a 
generic medicine for a certain period independent of its patent status, may, 
however, form an additional barrier to access. 
 
Chapter 5 presented an analysis of the European Union regulation of 
clinical test data protection, and examined how it relates to the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities, specifically compulsory licensing of medicines in the 
EU. The main finding of our study is that EU regulation of clinical test data 
protection and the granting of market exclusivity interfere with the 
effective use of compulsory licensing (including public non-commercial use 
of patents by the government) by EU Member States, and can even prevent 
access to off-patent medicines as no remedies for such exclusivities are 
available. We recommend amendments to the EU pharmaceutical 
legislation to provide waivers to data- and market exclusivity in cases of 
public health need and when a compulsory licence or government use 
license has been issued. Such an amendment can be modelled after existing 
waivers in EU Regulation “on compulsory licensing of patents relating to 
the manufacture of pharmaceuticals for export to countries with public 
health problems”2 outside the EU. 
Many of the challenges of high medicines pricing described in this 
thesis have their roots in the financing model of pharmaceutical research 
and development, which is predominantly based on the granting of market 
exclusivities through patents or otherwise (see Chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 therefore addresses the question how a public health 
approach to innovation and access can be achieved.3 A public health 
approach to innovation and access is based on the Availability, 
Accessibility, Acceptability and Quality (AAAQ) human rights framework, 
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and ensures that the R&D agenda reflects health needs, produces medicines 
that are adapted to the population they are meant for, and are affordable 
and accessible to that population. Our study describes the commercial 
approach to R&D, which is based on developing products that provide the 
highest return on investment and therefor leaves important health needs 
unmet. This is often described as a market failure. However, we conclude 
that relying on a profit-driven R&D model to respond to public health 
needs rather represents a public policy failure, and we therefore recommend 
public policy responses. 
 
We formulated the following recommendations for action by governments, 
the WHO and the health care industry: 
1) Governments and WHO must take international public leadership 
for priority setting for essential R&D, with due regard for the public 
health needs of low- and middle-income countries, including 
developing a list of missing essential medicines. 
2) Governments must lead the process towards a global research and 
development policy framework and agreements, which include new 
financing mechanisms to ensure that missing essential medicines are 
developed and made affordable leading to an increasing number of 
new priority products with an affordable price that is de-linked 
from R&D costs (“progressive delinking”). 
3) The international community must create a general Essential 
Medicines Patent Pool. It can do so by expanding the current 
Medicines Patent Pool's mandate. Companies should license their 
patents related to essential medicines to the EMPP under a set of 
conditions. 
4) Governments and national stakeholders must develop and 
implement comprehensive national action plans to guarantee 
equitable access to new essential medicines, including open 
knowledge innovation, fair patent licensing practices, support for a 
patent pool for essential medicines, full use of TRIPS flexibilities 
when needed, and rejection of TRIPS-plus provisions. 
5) The pharmaceutical industry must better align its R&D priority 
setting with global health needs and develop access strategies to 
make medically essential innovations available to all in need. 
 
In summary, the public policy response to the R&D challenges must be 
expressed in a global response that includes new rules governing the 
sharing of benefits and cost of the innovation efforts. We conclude that the 
138 
necessary practical details of a new medical R&D framework will need to 
be negotiated by countries and that such negotiations are likely to be 
contentious. The global discussions on R&D priorities taking place at the 
WHO provide opportunities for national governments, WHO, and the UN 
to present a bold new global framework for achieving the dual objectives of 
health-need driven R&D and equitable access to its products consistent 
with human rights principles. 
 
Reflections on methodology. 
 
The selection and formulation of the research questions were driven by 
questions arising from my direct experience working on access to 
medicines for NGOs and governments over a period of 17 years. Therefore, 
the approach for selecting the topics was problem-based – rooted in 
practical experiences of barriers to accessing new essential medicines. 
While there are benefits of direct involvement in the research topic, there is 
also the risk of “insider” bias. I would not want to pretend that the 
perspectives I give in this work are not influenced by direct involvement in 
policy processes over a decade and a half. Neither do I pretend that the 
work represents the perspectives of all players involved in the policy 
processes. There is also value in being a participant observer in policy 
analysis, because of unique access to information and experts not readily 
available to the external researcher.4 I sought to remedy possible insider 
bias through collaboration with others, including researchers from other 
disciplines, and through the collection and presentation of robust empirical 
data on the use of TRIPS flexibilities (Chapter 4). A vital strength of the 
direct experience-based approach is that it allowed me to build an 
extensive database of instances of the use of TRIPS flexibilities over the 
years. While most cases included in the database are supported by original 
documents, or through cross-referencing with cases reported in the 
literature, or through consultation with colleagues, a few could not be fully 
verified at this stage. There is also a potential for missing cases, particularly 
those that have occurred but triggered a concession and were never made 
public. We intend to make the database public in the future, inviting others 
to contribute cases to it and keeping it updated as a useful tool for further 
research, including by others. 
The fact that information and data were collected over a 17-year period 
made it possible to document and reflect on the political and legal 
developments over time, rather than presenting and analysing a single 
situation or event of a particular moment. The direct involvement in some 
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of the policy processes described in this thesis also offered direct access to 
data and information and access to experts in various fields, that otherwise 
would have been harder to obtain. The work experience strengthened the 
multidisciplinary character of the studies, which were often carried out in 
collaboration with medical, pharmaceutical and social science professionals 
from different regions of the world. 
 
Reflections on Main Findings 
 
So now we can return to our main research question: can the positive 
experiences of the last two decades to ensure equitable access to essential 
medicines for AIDS also be applied to other new essential medicines? 
The deployment of TRIPS flexibilities has been effective in advancing 
the human right to access to essential medicines, particularly in the case for 
HIV, on a larger scale than is usually recognised in the literature or by 
policy makers. In addition, we can conclude that flexibilities in the TRIPS 
Agreement can indeed be lawfully deployed to access lower-priced 
medicines by countries that have made provisions for it in their national 
laws. The use of TRIPS flexibilities therefore plays an important role in 
advancing the availability, accessibility, and acceptability components of 
the AAAQ human rights framework. Are there reasons to believe that they 
would not work for other diseases? 
The political responses from the US and the EU to the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities by certain middle-income countries is a significant obstacle to 
their routine use outside the realm of HIV.5 6 For example, when India issued 
a compulsory licence in 2012 for a cancer medicine it provoked an out-of-
cycle review by the US Trade Representative.7 In 2016 Colombia came under 
pressure from Switzerland and a group of influential US senators for its 
plans to issue a compulsory licence for a leukaemia treatment, imatinib 
(Gleevec, marketed by Novartis).8 The price of Gleevec in Colombia was 
approximately USD 20,000 while the GNI per capita was USD 7,780. The US 
senators’ response was particularly harsh because it linked the outcome of 
the compulsory licence process to the approval of US financing for the still 
fragile peace process in Colombia (the “Paz Colombia” Initiative).9 The 
patent holder, Novartis, threatened with an Investor-State dispute settlement 
(ISDS) procedure under the Swiss- Colombian bi-lateral investment 
agreement.10 Such strong political responses to the plans of one country to 
issue a compulsory licence are likely to have a chilling effect on others. To 
date, Colombia seems to have yielded to this political pressure and has not 
proceeded with the compulsory licence for imatinib. 
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Such strong negative responses from high income-countries to LDCs 
making use of the TRIPS transition periods and specifically the LDC 
pharmaceutical waiver may be exceptional. However, LDCs may also have 
capacity problems in making full use of the TRIPS flexibilities.11 Many 
LDCs have not amended their laws to take full advantage of the options 
they have under the TRIPS Agreement.12 On the other hand, this may not 
pose significant barriers in reality, as LDCs may leave their laws 
unchanged and simply declare that until the end of the transition period in 
2033, they will not enforce legal provisions relating to pharmaceutical 
product patents and test data protection.13 Such declarations by LDCs have 
in practice helped the import of generic ARVs and are a powerful tool in 
the procurement of medicines. However, this solution is not open to other 
countries. 
We conclude that the use of TRIPS flexibilities is possible, provided 
that countries make the necessary changes in their national policies and 
legislation, and resist external political pressure not to use them. LDCs are 
in a strong position to apply the pharmaceutical waiver until at least 2033. 
With regards to safeguarding the quality of the medicines, the WHO 
prequalification programme, working with national governments and 
manufacturers, has performed an essential role. Since the mid-2000 the 
TRIPS-flexibilities have also been used to advance access to medicines for 
the treatment of non-communicable diseases, in particular cancer, but on a 
much smaller scale. It is too early to predict whether the PQP mechanisms 
will also be deployed for these medicines in the same routine manner than 
it was used in the procurement of HIV medications. An important reason 
for the slow uptake is the lack of global health funding for the purchase of 
essential medicines outside the areas of HIV, TB and malaria and lack of 
global funding for the PQP programme as a whole. 
There are other options to consider, in support of a wider use of 
flexibilities. The Medicines Patent Pool has eased the need for the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities to access HIV and certain HCV medicines in the 
countries that are part of the licence territory. However, no such licensing 
mechanisms exist yet for other diseases, such as non-communicable 
diseases. We have recommended in the report of The Lancet Commission 
on Essential Medicines Policies (Chapter 6) that the MPP expands to 
include all new essential medicines, so that these medicines can become 
available as generics well before the patents expire in all low and middle-
income countries. The MPP is currently studying the feasibility of this 
proposal. 
Our research has shown that the political mobilisation around HIV 
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drove many of the policy and legal changes necessary to address the 
human right to access to medicines. These policy changes also included 
changes in WHO’s approach to the Model List of Essential Medicines 
(EML) to allow for the inclusion of medicines that are not yet available at 
an affordable price. In the past, affordability – which in practice usually 
meant availability as a generic – was a prerequisite for inclusion of a 
product in the EML. Since 2002 the Model List also includes new essential 
medicines that are available from a single source only, are often widely 
patented and are expensive. Affordability is no longer a prerequisite for 
inclusion in the EML, but listing now implies that governments and other 
stakeholders should make efforts to make new essential medicines 
affordable and available. In other words, affordability has become a 
consequence of inclusion in the EML. Identifying and confirming the public 
health benefit of a new medicine can also help to call for a human rights 
approach to price and patent interventions, as the basis for further political 
support. 
 
The national application of WHO’s listing of highly-priced medicines on 
the EML (namely, to ensure equitable access at affordable price) faces 
numerous challenges. The patent status of an essential medicine can be an 
important impediment to achieving an affordable price and to a 
government's obligation to fulfil its population's right to essential 
medicines. This is the case when the patent holder refuses cooperation 
through fair pricing, or licensing of the relevant patents. It should be noted 
here that refusal to licence patents pertaining to an essential medicine to the 
MPP would satisfy the requirement under article 31 of TRIPS to have made 
efforts to reach a voluntary agreement.14 In such case the government has a 
valid reason and even the obligation under human rights law to intervene 
and to proceed with non-voluntary licensing, or to invoke other TRIPS 
flexibilities. The use by governments of TRIPS flexibilities when required is 
no longer “just an option” but a duty. Such interventions will be 
particularly important against the backdrop of the growing political 
momentum to address the lack of treatment of non-communicable diseases, 
the rising medicines prices, and the drive towards Universal Health 
Coverage as part of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Recently, the call for the use of TRIPS flexibilities can also be heard in 
high income countries. However, many high-income countries have self-
imposed limits on the use of these measures. For example, many high-
income countries including all member states of the European Union have 
opted out of the use of the WTO mechanism for compulsory licensing for 
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export as a beneficiary. This means that they can produce and export 
medicines under a compulsory licence but they cannot import medicines 
that can only be produced under a compulsory licence. This decision was 
taken in 2003 when the WTO adopted the waiver to the restrictions in 
TRIPS article 31 (f). Possibly, in 2003, countries were not as concerned 
about high medicines pricing in their own territories as they are today.  
EU data exclusivity rules (Chapter 5) that interfere with the effective 
use of compulsory licensing constitute another example of limits to 
effective use of TRIPS flexibilities. In high-income countries including the 
UK, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands and the USA, the call on 
governments to issue a compulsory license for high priced medicines and 
to stop rationing of medicines is getting louder. And the growing burden of 
high medicines pricing on health budgets is an issue of considerable 
concern in all countries. It is therefore important, in low, middle and high-
income countries alike, to halt the erosion of the TRIPS flexibilities and to 
ensure that regulations on medicines and IP allow for the effective use of 
TRIPS flexibilities when needed. 
In addition to reasons of self-interest to protect efficacy of TRIPS 
flexibilities, there is a compelling human rights argument to dissuade high-
income countries from the pursuit of TRIPS-plus norms in other countries. 
States are under an international human rights obligation to facilitate access 
to essential medicines in other countries, and to provide the necessary aid 
when required.15 They are to assist low and middle-income countries in 
realizing their core obligation to provide access to essential medicines to 
their population.16 Insisting on TRIPS-plus requirements such as those 
made in several trade agreements contravenes this human rights duty. In 
this context, it was significant that after the USA withdrew from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the remaining negotiating parties suspended 
clauses from the draft agreement pertaining to TRIPS-plus requirements in 
the area of pharmaceuticals, such as data exclusivity and patent term 
extensions.17 
 
Reflections on the Future 
 
The use of the TRIPS flexibilities can offer immediate relief in a situation 
where an essential medicine is patented, is too highly priced, and the 
patent holder refuses to collaborate through lowering the price or licensing. 
But the flexibilities do not address the underlying reason of high medicines 
pricing. 
The problem of high pricing is rooted in the financing mechanism for 
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pharmaceutical innovation, which is based on granting market monopolies 
through patents or regulatory exclusivities. A patent-based innovation 
system also neglects important health needs when profitability cannot be 
assured. This is, for example, the case in the area of antibiotics, neglected 
tropical diseases, diseases with a small patient population, and children’s 
formulations. It will be important to explore new incentive mechanisms for 
pharmaceutical R&D that do not rely on high prices to finance 
pharmaceutical R&D. The need for fundamental change is increasingly 
recognised internationally. For example, the UNHLP recommends the 
initiation by the UN Secretary-General of “a process for governments to 
negotiate global agreements on the coordination, financing, and 
development of health technologies. This includes negotiations for a 
binding R&D Convention that delinks the costs of research and 
development from end prices to promote access to good health for all.” 18 
This concept of delinking is based on the premise that costs and risks 
associated with the development of new essential medicines should be 
rewarded, and incentives for R&D provided, by other means than 
through the price of the product. 
This recommendation is echoed by The Lancet Commission on 
Essential Medicines Policies which also recommends a new policy 
framework and agreements to ensure missing essential medicines are 
developed and marketed at an affordable price based on delinkage 
principles. 
In June 2016, the European Council highlighted the need to address the 
shortcomings of the current innovation model in the Council Conclusions on 
strengthening the balance in the pharmaceutical systems in the EU and its 
Member States.19 The European Council tasked the European Commission 
with evaluating the different incentive mechanisms and rewards for 
pharmaceutical innovation, and to analyse the current EU legislative 
instruments such as the marketing authorisation system, the 
supplementary protection certificate (patent), the orphan drug regulation,20 
and paediatric drug development incentives. These instruments aim at 
incentivising and encouraging investment in the development of new 
medicines but also lead to higher prices. It would be important that the 
studies currently being carried out by the Commission result in 
recommendations for changes in European legislation (Chapter 5). 
The right to essential medicines is a key component of the right to 
health. The point could be made that the development of new essential 
medicines should then also be guided by human rights principles. This is 
currently not widely accepted, where commercial corporations set the 
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priorities for pharmaceutical drug development and make decisions on 
spending on new drug development. The Lancet Commission 
recommendations on delinkage could provide a practical application of 
human rights-based framework for pharmaceutical innovation. 21,22 
The development of such a R&D framework requires international 
collaboration and a commitment to a multilateral approach. The current 
political climate is not conducive to international collaboration. However, 
the challenge of high medicines pricing, which is now a global problem, 
may bring likeminded countries together and start an international 
discussion. The development of new systems for sharing the cost and the 
benefits of pharmaceutical R&D will require that powerful industries, 
strongly attached to patent monopolies, and their home governments, be 
engaged. The policy failure to rely on the markets for medicine innovation 
can only be redressed with governments in the driver seat. 
 
This study has documented the international processes that have led to 
important policy and legal changes in the field of intellectual property to 
improve access to expensive essential medicines. Additional research and 
analysis on how to foster changes in pharmaceutical innovation systems 
will be needed to inform the current policy debates from a public health 
and human rights perspective. Some suggestions for further research are 




Box 1: Suggestions for further research 
 
The data base of the use of TRIPS Flexibilities which we developed as part of this Ph.D. project 
provides an important and unique source for further research involving other disciplines. For 
example: 
- Economic analysis to estimate the savings in global health spending as a result of the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities. 
- Further detailed legal analysis of the individual cases. 
- Continue monitoring and documenting the use of TRIPS flexibilities, to determine over a 
longer period at what scale governments deploy the measures outside the field of HIV. 
 
Other areas of further research are: 
- The role of competition law, in conjunction with remedies, such as compulsory licencing and 
government use to investigate and address high pricing of patented products. 
- A human rights approach to new models for pharmaceutical research and development. 
- Implementation of policy recommendations, such as those made by the UN High-Level Panel 




The success of international efforts to secure access to affordable treatments 
for HIV has shown the potential of TRIPS flexibilities and of licensing of 
medicines patents. It is now both possible and necessary to translate these 
experiences in a wider uptake of TRIPS flexibilities for other diseases, 
including non-communicable diseases. To this end, countries should 
review and update their national legislation and resist international 
political pressure to refrain from using the TRIPS flexibilities. Countries 
should collaborate to develop new frameworks for health needs driven 
innovation and new innovation financing mechanisms that do not depend 
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The issue of access to medicines has become an increasingly visible problem 
throughout the world. The HIV/AIDS crisis of the late nineties, when 8000 people a 
day died of AIDS in developing countries for lack of treatment, drew attention to 
intellectual property and specifically the effects of pharmaceutical patents on 
medicines. In 1996, antiretroviral medicines (ARVs) had become available in high-
income nations, but the high price of ARVs made treatment unavailable to the vast 
majority of people living with HIV in low and middle-income countries. The HIV 
treatment crisis was a public health crisis but also had become a human rights 
crisis. 
The HIV/AIDS crisis brought the international community together to 
formulate a response to facilitate access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and 
care. This response included: increased flexibility in the implementation of 
intellectual property protection related to medicines, changes in the World Health 
Organization Model List of Essential Medicines, the establishment of a new 
international approach to assuring the quality of the medicines and global health 
financing mechanisms. The global availability of ARVs increased thanks to a 
combination of lower priced generic medicines, and the new health financing 
mechanisms that funded the procurement of these medicines. The result was 
dramatic; millions of people gained access to effective treatment of their disease. 
Progress in treatment access would have been impossible without increased 
availability of low-priced generic medicines. 
This thesis describes the solutions that the international community has 
developed to overcome intellectual property barriers to produce and disseminate 
low-priced generic medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS; and aims to respond 
to the question whether the solutions developed to address the HIV/AIDS crisis 
can also be deployed to improve access to other, new and expensive essential 
medicines, for example those needed to provide treatment for non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs). 
This thesis addresses the question by examining the different approaches to 
intellectual property in the area of medicines and addresses the following specific 
research questions: 1) How did HIV/AIDS lead to changes in intellectual property 
law and policy? 2) How did the UN guarantee the quality of generic medicines for 
HIV? 3) To what extent have governments used the TRIPS flexibilities in practice to 
access lower priced medicines? 4) How does data exclusivity form a barrier to the 
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use of TRIPS flexibilities? 5) How to achieve a public health approach to innovation 
and access? 
The HIV crisis led to changes in intellectual property law and policy through 
practical legal tools, known as TRIPS flexibilities, that can be used by countries to 
overcome patent barriers to access generic medicines. Effective treatment also 
requires that these medicines are of assured quality. The World Health 
Organization responded by developing the Prequalification of Medicines Program 
(PQP) and donors began to demand that only quality assured medicines were 
purchased. The PQP was essential in facilitating the international trade in lower 
priced generic medicines, in particular ARVs. Quality assurance and TRIPS 
flexibilities are important elements in advancing the availability, accessibility, and 
acceptability components of the human right to health framework. 
This study provides data on the extent to which governments used TRIPS 
flexibilities in practice, particularly in the procurement of medicines. The study 
identifies 176 instances of the use of TRIPS flexibilities for the purpose of providing 
access to medicines during 2001-2016. The deployment of TRIPS flexibilities to deal 
with patents blocking access to generics has been effective in the procurement of 
generic medicines and has been more widespread than has been described so far. 
Patents are not the only hurdle to access to generic medicines. Data 
exclusivity, for example, prohibits medicines regulatory agencies from registering 
an equivalent generic product for a certain period of time. The European Union 
implements data and other market exclusivities through the European Medicines 
Agency which affects all of its member states. Data and market exclusivity can 
hamper the effective use of compulsory licensing, a key TRIPS flexibility by EU 
member states. This problem is examined in this thesis which recommends 
amending the EU medicines regulation to introduce waivers of data and market 
exclusivities needed for the effective use of compulsory licensing by EU member 
states. 
To reach sustainable solutions to innovation and access, a new approach to 
research and development (R&D) is needed. The pharmaceutical industry claims to 
depend on high drug prices and profits for funding of new drug development. 
This approach alone has led to many problems, including lack of attention to 
significant global health problems as well as the problem of high drug prices. A 
different approach to the development of new essential medicines requires 
alternative priority setting and financing models for R&D that do not rely on high 
medicines prices. This thesis concludes that governments need to define the 
priorities for R&D and make the necessary R&D financing mechanisms available. 
The price of new essential medicines could then be delinked from development 
costs and the products can be made widely available and aﬀordable at generic 
prices through non-exclusive licensing agreements. 
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This thesis has documented the international processes that have led to 
important policy and legal changes in the field of intellectual property to improve 
access to medicines. Much of this change was driven by the need to formulate a 
response to the HIV crisis. There are no legal barriers to deploying the legal tools to 
access lower priced generic medicines more generally. HIV/AIDS offer, important 
lessons that can be applied for today's challenges in other diseases. However, the 
deployment of the TRIPS flexibilities, in particular by middle income countries, 
remains a political challenge because of the opposition by high income countries. 
Evolving approaches in intellectual property and financing of innovation 
consistent with the human right to health are necessary to assure access to essential 
medicines throughout the world. Additional research and analysis on how to 
foster changes in pharmaceutical innovation systems are needed to inform the 









Toegang tot medicijnen is wereldwijd een steeds zichtbaarder en groter probleem 
geworden. Tijdens de hiv/aids-crisis van de late jaren negentig, stierven in 
ontwikkelingslanden elke dag 8000 mensen aan aids omdat voor hen geen 
behandeling beschikbaar was. Dit vestigde de aandacht op het intellectuele 
eigendomsrecht en vooral op de effecten van het geneesmiddelen octrooisysteem. 
In 1996 waren antiretrovirale geneesmiddelen (ARVs) beschikbaar gekomen in 
rijkere landen, maar de hoge prijzen die de octrooihoudende bedrijven vroegen 
voor de medicijnen, maakten toegang tot de behandeling erg moeilijk voor de 
overgrote meerderheid van de mensen met hiv in lage- en 
middeninkomenslanden. De hiv/aids-crisis was in eerste instantie een 
volksgezondheidscrisis maar bleek ook een mensenrechtencrisis te zijn. 
De hiv/aids-crisis bracht de internationale gemeenschap bijeen op zoek naar 
een oplossing voor het probleem van de toegang tot (genees-)middelen die nodig 
zijn voor preventie, diagnostiek en behandeling van hiv/aids. De maatregelen die 
hieruit voortkwamen, omvatten onder meer: een grotere flexibiliteit in de 
(toepassing van) octrooiwetgeving met betrekking tot geneesmiddelen, 
aanpassingen van de lijst van essentiële geneesmiddelen van de Wereld-
gezondheidsorganisatie (WHO), een nieuwe internationale benadering om de 
kwaliteit van de geneesmiddelen te waarborgen en invoering van nieuwe 
financieringsmechanismen voor gezondheidszorg. De wereldwijde beschikbaar-
heid van ARVs is verbeterd dankzij een combinatie van lager geprijsde generieke 
geneesmiddelen en de nieuwe financieringsmogelijkheden voor de aankoop van 
deze geneesmiddelen. Het resultaat was indrukwekkend; miljoenen mensen 
hebben toegang gekregen tot een effectieve behandeling van hun ziekte. Deze 
vooruitgang zou niet mogelijk zijn geweest zonder de verbeteringen in de toegang 
tot laaggeprijsde generieke geneesmiddelen. 
De oplossingen die de internationale gemeenschap ontwikkelde om de 
belemmeringen die voortkomen uit intellectuele eigendomsrechten te beperken, 
worden hier beschreven. Met name octrooien vormden een belemmering voor de 
productie en verstrekking van laaggeprijsde generieke geneesmiddelen voor de 
behandeling van hiv/aids. De centrale vraag van dit proefschrift is: kunnen 
vergelijkbare maatregelen de toegang tot andere, nieuwe en dure essentiële 
medicijnen ook verbeteren? Deze vraag is met name van belang in het licht van de 
groeiende prevalentie van niet-overdraagbare ziekten. 
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Het antwoord op die vraag wordt hier gezocht door de verschillende 
benaderingen te onderzoeken van intellectuele eigendom op het gebied van 
geneesmiddelen. De volgende onderzoeksvragen komen aan de orde. 1) Hoe 
leidde de hiv/aids-crisis tot aanpassingen in octrooirecht en beleid? 2) Hoe 
waarborgde de Verenigde Naties (UN) de kwaliteit van generieke geneesmiddelen 
voor hiv? 3) In welke mate hebben overheden in de praktijk gebruik gemaakt van 
de flexibiliteiten in het Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) verdrag (TRIPS-flexibiliteiten) om de toegang tot lager geprijsde 
geneesmiddelen te verbeteren? 4) Hoe vormt data-exclusiviteit een belemmering 
voor het gebruik van TRIPS-flexibiliteiten? 5) Hoe te komen tot een ‘Public Health’ 
benadering voor innovatie en toegang tot behandeling? 
De hiv-crisis leidde tot veranderingen in de octrooiwetgeving en het beleid 
door toepassing van juridische instrumenten die bekend staan als TRIPS-
flexibiliteiten. Deze instrumenten kunnen landen gebruiken om octrooi-
belemmeringen voor de toegang tot generieke geneesmiddelen weg te nemen. 
Effectieve behandeling vereist ook dat de kwaliteit van geneesmiddelen wordt 
gewaarborgd. De WHO ontwikkelde hiervoor het ‘Prequalification of Medicines 
Program’(PQP). En donororganisaties gingen ertoe over om te eisen dat uitsluitend 
geneesmiddelen worden aangeschaft waarvan de kwaliteit kon worden vastgeteld. 
De PQP bleek essentieel voor het bevorderen van internationale handel in lager 
geprijsde generieke geneesmiddelen, met name ARVs. Kwaliteitsborging en 
TRIPS-flexibiliteiten zijn wezenlijke elementen voor het bevorderen van 
beschikbaarheid, toegankelijkheid en acceptatie, componenten die deel uitmaken 
van het raamwerk van mensenrechten met betrekking tot gezondheid. 
Het hier beschreven onderzoek heeft gegevens opgeleverd over de mate 
waarin regeringen in de praktijk gebruik hebben gemaakt van TRIPS-flexibiliteiten, 
in het bijzonder waar het gaat om de aanschaf van geneesmiddelen. In de periode 
2001 tot 2016 bleken in 176 gevallen TRIPS-flexibiliteiten te zijn toegepast om 
toegang tot geneesmiddelen te verschaffen. Het toepassen van deze juridische 
instrumenten voor het omzeilen van belemmeringen van de toegang tot generieke 
geneesmiddelen, is effectief gebleken. Het gebruik van deze instrumenten blijkt 
vaker voor te komen dan tot nu toe is beschreven. 
Octrooien zijn niet de enige horde als het gaat om toegang tot generieke 
geneesmiddelen. 
Zo is er bijvoorbeeld het mechanisme dat ‘data-exclusivity’ wordt genoemd. 
Dit mechanisme verbiedt de geneesmiddelenautoriteit om gedurende een zekere 
periode een gelijkwaardig generiek product te registreren (toe te laten tot de 
markt). De Europese Unie voert data- en marktexclusiviteitsbeleid uit via het 
Europees Geneesmiddelenbureau (EMA). Data- en marktexclusiviteit kan 
verhinderen dat een EU-lidstaat effectief gebruik maakt van dwanglicenties. 
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Dwanglicenties zijn een essentieel onderdeel van TRIPS-flexibiliteiten. Het is aan te 
bevelen om de Europese regelgeving zodanig aan te passen dat EU lidstaten toch 
dwanglicenties kunnen verstrekken waar strikt toegepast data- en 
marktexclusiviteitsbeleid dat zou verhinderen. 
Om te komen tot duurzame oplossingen voor innovatie en beschikbaarheid, is 
een nieuwe aanpak nodig voor Onderzoek en Ontwikkeling (R&D). De 
farmaceutische industrie zegt dat ze de hoge prijzen en winsten nodig hebben om 
de ontwikkeling van nieuwe geneesmiddelen te kunnen bekostigen. Alleen al deze 
benadering heeft tot vele problemen geleid, waaronder onvoldoende aandacht 
voor belangrijke wereldwijde gezondheidsproblemen en de moeilijkheden die 
voortvloeien uit de hoge prijzen voor geneesmiddelen. Om los te komen van de 
hoge medicijnprijzen als bepalende factor voor de ontwikkeling van nieuwe, 
essentiële geneesmiddelen, is het nodig om op een andere manier prioriteiten te 
stellen en om andere een andere manier R&D te financieren. Overheden zouden de 
prioriteiten voor R&D moeten stellen en ook in de benodigde 
financieringsmechanismen moeten voorzien. De prijs van nieuwe essentiële 
geneesmiddelen kan dan worden losgekoppeld van de ontwikkelingskosten en de 
producten kunnen op grote schaal beschikbaar komen tegen generieke prijzen via 
niet-exclusieve licentieovereenkomsten. 
In dit proefschrift is beschreven welke internationale processen hebben geleid 
tot belangrijke beleidswijzigingen en aanpassingen van wetgeving op het gebied 
van octrooirecht waarmee toegang tot belangrijke geneesmiddelen is verbeterd. 
Veel van deze veranderingen zijn ontstaan uit de noodzaak om de hiv-crisis het 
hoofd te bieden. Er zijn geen juridische obstakels om dezelfde instrumenten toe te 
passen voor de toegang tot andere laaggeprijsde generieke geneesmiddelen. Uit de 
hiv/aids-casus vallen belangrijke lessen te trekken voor uitdagingen waarvoor 
andere ziekten ons vandaag de dag stellen. Toch blijft de toepassing van TRIPS-
flexibiliteiten door middeninkomens landen een politieke uitdaging omdat de 
rijkere landen daar weerstand tegen bieden. Om wereldwijd de mensenrechten 
met betrekking tot gezondheid zeker te stellen, in het bijzonder waar het gaat om 
de toegang tot essentiële geneesmiddelen, is het nodig om passende benaderingen 
te ontwikkelen voor intellectueel eigendom en financiering van innovatie. Om het 
beleidsdebat en de al lopende initiatieven van relevante informatie te voorzien, is 
aanvullend onderzoek en analyse nodig ten einde veranderingen in farmaceutische 
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Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API): The part of a pill that provides the 
medical benefit. Other parts of the pill are inactive and may include the material 
in which the API is encased (e.g., a gel capsule) or suspended (e.g., a liquid). 
Antiretroviral (ARV) and Antiretroviral Treatment (ART): A medicine for the 
treatment of HIV. There are several classes of ARVs, which all target a different 
phase in the reproductive cycle of the virus. ART is a treatment regimen 
composed of several ARVs (usually three). 
Compulsory Licence/Government Use: A compulsory licence is an authorisation by 
a competent government authority to use a patented invention by a third party 
without the consent of the patent holder, against a payment of “adequate 
remuneration.” A ‘government use’ is a particular form of compulsory licence 
issued by the government for its own use or for the use of a third party. 
Data Exclusivity: Data exclusivity is the prohibition of use of pharmaceutical test 
data submitted to a regulatory agency by an originator company for the 
purpose of registering a generic drug. Generic companies rely on this test data 
to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their bioequivalent drug. Delayed use 
of the data will therefore delay the registration and marketing of generic 
medicines, regardless of the patent status of the product. 
Delinkage: A concept in public health wherein the cost of research and 
development on a new medicine is ‘delinked’, or independent from, the 
medicine’s final market price. There have been several ways discussed to 
achieve delinkage, including pooled funding for research and development and 
cash prizes. 
Essential Medicines List (EML): The EML is a list maintained by the World Health 
Organization that contains the most important medicines that should be 
available and affordable to the communities and people that need them. The 
EML is a tool for governments and healthcare providers seeking to meet the 
health needs of their populations. The EML is updated periodically to detail the 
medicines a health system should seek to make available. 
Fixed-dose Combination (FDC): A treatment combined of several medicines in one 
pill (usually two or three). FDCs have been instrumental in scaling up HIV 
treatment by allowing for easier treatment, improved treatment compliance, 
and simplified distribution. 
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Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART): is a combination, usually of three 
or more, ARVs to help suppress HIV. The drug combination is selected 
depending on the patient’s viral load, previous experience with/resistance to 
other medicines, age, and other factors. The World Health Organization 
periodically releases guidelines on preferred treatment regimens for HIV. 
Intellectual Property: Intellectual property (IP) refers to the legal rights that result 
from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields. 
IP has two branches: Industrial property (e.g., inventions (patents), trademarks, 
industrial designs, geographical indications) and copyright (and related rights). 
LDC Transition Period Least-developed countries (LDCs) have an extended 
transition period before they have to comply with the TRIPS agreement; that 
period is currently in force until 2021. A separate LDC pharmaceutical 
transition period allows LDCs not to grant or not to enforce existing IP rights on 
pharmaceutical products. This is sometimes called the LDC waiver and will be 
in place until 2033. 
Parallel Importation: Parallel importation refers to the import and resale in a 
country, without the consent of the patent holder, of a patented product that 
has been legitimately put on the market of the exporting country. Parallel 
imports take place when there are significant price differences for the same 
good in different markets. 
Patent: A patent is a form of IP granted to an inventor for the creation of 
something new, non-obvious to a person who is knowledgeable in the field, and 
useful. Patents grant a temporary monopoly (usually 20 years), during which 
time the patent holder can prevent others from making, using, or selling their 
invention. A patent is national in nature, and inventors must apply under each 
countries patent laws in order to receive protection in that country. In 
international trade, however, a blocking patent in either the country of import 
or export could interfere. That means a patent in a country that produces lots of 
generic medicines, such as India, can be enough to restrict access to those 
medicines in other countries relying on the first country’s exports, regardless of 
whether or not there is a patent in the importing country. 
Prequalification of Medicines Programme (PQP): Established by the World Health 
Organization in 2001, the PQP provides a stringent, straightforward way to 
validate the quality of generic medicines and formulations. It is relied upon by 
United Nations-based and several external medicines procurement bodies, and 
has been critically important in scaling up treatment. Initially focussing on 
medicines for HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, the PQP has been expanding to 
new disease areas and medical technologies. 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS): 
Administered by the World Trade Organization, TRIPS sets out minimum 
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standards for the protection of several forms of IP that all World Trade 
Organization member countries need to implement. TRIPS also contains several 
important flexibilities to preserve the rights of nations to protect the public 
interest. 
Triple therapy: The use of three different ARVs, of at least two different classes, in 
a treatment regimen in order to more effectively fight the virus. Different 
classes of ARVs act to inhibit different stages of the virus’ life cycle. See also 
HAART, above. 
TRIPS-plus/TRIPS+: These are measures that require more stringent IP standards 
than those contained in TRIPS or that limit flexibilities inherent in TRIPS. They 
are often contained in bilateral or regional trade agreements, and are a matter of 
concern for public health advocates. 
Uruguay Round: A round of multilateral trade negotiations that began in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay in 1986 and concluded in Marrakesh in 1994 with an agreement 
to establish the World Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. 
World Health Assembly (WHA): Attended by health ministers from World Health 
Organization member states, the WHA is the most important World Health 
Organization governing body, setting the direction and priorities for the 
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